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Standing and Statistical Persons:
A Risk-Based Approach to Standing
Bradford Mank*

This Article proposes that any individual should have standing to
challenge government action that exposes her to an increased lifetime risk of
death or serious injury that is one in one million or greater. Because most
regulation involves statisticalprobabilities of harm, a plaintiff challenging a
government regulatory action or inaction as insufficiently protective cannot
demonstrate that he or she likely would be harmed by the allegedly inadequate
regulation, but merely that a different regulation might reduce the probability
of risk. The beneficiaries of a suit seeking better government regulation are,
therefore, statistical persons rather than identifiable persons. By contrast,
current standing law is largely based on the assumption that only identifiable
persons with specific injuries can sue in Article III federal courts, although
some decisions have explicitly or implicitly allowed "statistical standing"
based on a probabilityoffuture injury. In Natural Resources Defense Council
v. EPA, the District of Columbia Circuit recognized standing in a case
involving probabilisticfuture risk where there was evidence demonstratingthat
two tofour members of the NaturalResources Defense Council's nearly halfa
million members would develop skin cancerduring their lifetimes as a result of
an Environmental Protection Agency rule. Professor Heather Elliott has
recently argued that the Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA decision
has the troubling implication that large public interest organizations have
greater standing rights than small organizations or individuals because it is
statistically more likely that one of their members would be harmed by a
government regulation that allegedly is insufficiently protective of public
safety. Under this Article 's proposedone in one million standard,an individual
or a member of a small association would have the same rights as a large
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organization. The proposed test would reduce the inconsistencies in how
different judges or judicial circuits apply today's vague standing test.
Additionally, Congress could overrule this presumptive standard and impose a
different standardin a statute whenever it chose to do so.
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INTRODUCTION

A legal gulf has arisen because the legislative and executive branches
recognize a broader range of injuries and harms to the public than the judiciary
does. While the laws passed by Congress and the administrative regulatory
state exert greater power to protect the public from statistical harm, the courts
have been slow to allow members of the public into the courthouse to address
those same risks.
Many modem health and safety regulations are designed to protect the
public from the statistical possibility of future harm from pollution or
dangerous products, rather than compensating them for existing injuries after
they occur.1 For instance, the government limits public exposure to some
chemicals that have a one in one million risk of causing death to exposed
populations. 2 However, because most regulation involves statistical
probabilities of harm, a plaintiff challenging a government regulatory action or
inaction as insufficiently protective cannot demonstrate that he or she likely

1. Robin Kundis Craig, Removing "'TheCloak of a Standing Inquiry": Pollution Regulation,
Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 149, 157, 169
(2007).
2. See infra Part VI.C.
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would be harmed by the allegedly inadequate regulation. Instead, at most the
plaintiff would be able to show that a different regulation might reduce the risk
that he or she would be the particular person harmed. 3 The beneficiaries of a
suit seeking more protective government regulation are, therefore, statistical
4
persons rather than identifiable persons.
By contrast, standing law is largely based on the assumption that only
identifiable persons with specific injuries can sue in Article III federal courts,
although some decisions have explicitly or implicitly allowed "statistical
standing" based on a probability of future injury. 5 The Supreme Court has
interpreted Article III of the Constitution to impose a standing test requiring
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they have personally suffered an injury that is
"actual or imminent," and not merely "conjectural or hypothetical." 6 The
"actual or imminent" requirement raises serious difficulties for plaintiffs
alleging probabilistic injuries that threaten the public at large. 7 As a result, in a
wide class of government actions involving the regulation of risks of harms to
statistical persons, the persons affected by the government regulation will often
be barred from challenging it.
These general trends notwithstanding, some lower court decisions have
adopted a more lenient interpretation of these terms and allowed probabilistic
standing. 8 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has required plaintiffs to demonstrate only that there is a "substantial
probability" that a challenged government action will harm them. 9 The D.C.

3. Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in EnvironmentalLaw, 35 FLA. ST. L. REV. 433, 43637, 440-51, 466-69 (2008).
4. See Craig, supra note 1, at 157, 169; Hsu, supranote 3, at 436-37, 440-51,466-69.
5. Hsu, supra note 3, at 466-69.
6. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 563-64 (1992) (citing Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of
Citizen Suits, "Injuries," andArticle 111,
91 MICH L. REv. 163 (1992) (criticizing standing requirement
that plaintiff must prove an injury is "imminent").
7. Hsu, supra note 3, at 466-69.
8. See infra Parts II.B-E, 11I.B and III.C.2.
9. Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665-72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying strict fourpart test for standing in procedural rights case, including requiring a procedural rights plaintiff to
demonstrate a particularized injury-that "a particularized environmental interest of theirs that will
suffer demonstrably increased risk" and that it is "substantially probable" that the agency action will
cause the demonstrable injury alleged by the plaintiff); see Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The
Dangers of Imposing a Standing Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391, 393-95, 403-15 (2009) (arguing D.C.
Circuit's threshold test of substantial harm in standing cases is inappropriate); Bradford C. Mank,
Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 51-56 (2005) (discussing Florida
Audubon's substantial probability standing test); Cassandra Sturkie & Suzanne Logan, Further
Developments in the D.C. Circuit'sArticle IIl Standing Analysis: Are Environmental Cases Safe From
the Court's Deepening Skepticism of Increased-Risk-of-Harm Claims?, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10460, 10461 (2008) (discussing D.C. Circuit's substantial probability standing test); Cassandra
Sturkie & Nathan Seltzer, Developments in the D.C. Circuit'sArticle III Standing Analysis: When Is an
Increased Risk of Future Harm Sufficient to Constitute Injury-in-Fact in Environmental Cases?, 37
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10287, 10289-91 (2007) (same).
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Circuit's approach is important because it has exclusive jurisdiction over
several regulatory statutes1 ° and concurrent jurisdiction over many others. 1' In
at least three cases the D.C. Circuit has recognized probabilistic standing
claims, albeit reluctantly. 12 Most recently, a panel of the D.C. Circuit has
suggested that the circuit grant en banc review to examine whether probabilistic
13
standing is ever appropriate.
Other circuits have also applied a more lenient test in cases involving
probabilistic standing, although there remains considerable uncertainty about
precisely when these courts will recognize standing. 14 Several decisions have

10. The D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review regulations issued pursuant to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (2006), the Comprehensive
Environmental Resource, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (2006), the Oil
Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2717(a) (2006), and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2618(a)(1) (2006); national pollution standards issued under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)
(2006); "actions pertaining to the establishment of national primary drinking water regulations" under
the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a)(l) (2006); decisions of the "God Squad" under the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n) (2006); and national rules promulgated under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1276(a) (2006). See Leiter, supra note 9, at 404
n.76; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10287.
11. The D.C. Circuit has concurrent jurisdiction to review orders under the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §160(0 ("[Alny person aggrieved by a final order of the [National Labor
Relations Board] may obtain review in the court of appeals for any circuit wherein the unfair labor
practice was alleged to have been engaged, wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the
D.C. Circuit."); or any proceeding under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10139.42 (2006)
(stating venue for review of any proceeding "shall be in the circuit in which the petitioner involved
resides or has its principal office, or in the D.C. Circuit"). See Leiter, supranote 9, at 404 n.76; see also
John G. Roberts, What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 389
(2006) ("Whatever combination of letters you can put together, it is likely that jurisdiction to review that
agency's decision is vested in the D.C. Circuit.").
12. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 11), 464 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (recognizing
standing where members of organization had increased risk of one in 129,000 and one in 200,000 of
developing skin cancer because of government exemptions for methyl bromide); La. Envtl. Action
Network v. EPA, 172 F.3d 65, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (recognizing standing where members of
organization had increased risk of harm from hazardous waste sites because of variances granted by
EPA); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing
that an incremental increase in the risk of forest fires caused by the Forest Service's action satisfied
Article III
standing requirements).
13. Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (Public Citizen 11), 513 F.3d 234, 241
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10466.
14. Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 341 F.3d 961, 972-75 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting D.C.
Circuit's substantial probability and stating that such plaintiffs "need only establish 'the reasonable
probability of the challenged action's threat to [their] concrete interest'); Comm. to Save the Rio
Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447-52 (10th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with D.C. Circuit's "substantial
probability" test for procedural rights plaintiffs and instead adopting a test that plaintiff must establish
an "increased risk of adverse environmental consequences" from the alleged failure to follow the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)); Mank, supra note 9, at 56-63 (discussing Ninth and Tenth
Circuit decisions rejecting D.C. Circuit's substantial probability test and applying more lenient standing
test); Blake R. Bertagna, Comment, "Standing" Up for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs To
Establish Legal Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 BYU L. REV. 415, 46164 (2006) (discussing split between Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits on causation portion of
standing test).
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recognized standing for threatened or probabilistic injuries, but it is uncertain
whether an individual plaintiff has standing where the individual probability of
harm is low. 1 5 For instance, the Eighth Circuit has rejected standing where the
alleged risks were likely far less than a 50 percent probability during the
16
plaintiffs' lifetime.
One interesting implication of the conflict between statistical safety
regulations and standing law is whether large public interest organizations with
many members have greater standing rights than individual plaintiffs.17 In
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA (NRDC II), the D.C. Circuit
recognized standing in a case involving probabilistic future risk where there
was evidence demonstrating that two to four members of NRDC's nearly half a
million members would develop skin cancer during their lifetimes as a result of
an EPA rule. 18 Professor Heather Elliott has recently argued that the NRDC II
decision raises the troubling implication that large public interest organizations
have greater standing rights than small organizations or individuals because it
is statistically more likely that one of their members would be harmed by a
government regulation that allegedly is insufficiently protective of public
safety. 19 Raising separation-of-powers principles, she has questioned whether
public interest organizations should have greater standing rights the larger their
membership, especially when there is only a statistical probability that their
20
members will be harmed in the future.
While Professor Elliott raises interesting questions about whether larger
organizations should have greater standing rights than small ones, this Article
argues that associations should be able to represent their members no matter
how large the organization, even under current standing doctrine. The Supreme

15. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 633 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he courts of appeals have
generally recognized that threatened harm in the form of an increased risk of future injury may serve as
injury-in-fact for Article III standing purposes."); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d
938, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "the possibility of future injury may be sufficient to confer
standing on plaintiffs" and concluding that plaintiffs could proceed with their suit where they "raised a
material question of fact ... [as to] whether they will suffer a substantial risk of harm as a result of [the
government's] policies"); Johnson v. Allsteel, Inc., 259 F.3d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
"increased risk that a plan participant faces" as a result of an Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) plan administrator's increase in discretionary authority satisfies Article III injury-in-fact
requirements); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling, Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (concluding that "threats or increased risk constitutes cognizable harm" sufficient to
meet the injury-in-fact requirement); Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that
"[a] probabilistic harm, if nontrivial, can support standing"); Craig, supra note 1, at 190-94 (discussing
cases); Leiter, supra note 9, at 392 n.6, 404; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10293 (observing that
Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits apply a more lenient standing test than the D.C. Circuit).
16. Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2004); see infra Part II.F.
17. See Heather Elliott, The FunctionsofStanding, 61 STAN. L REv. 459, at 504-O5 (2008).
18. NRDC II, 464 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Craig, supra note 1, at 200-01; Elliott, supra note
17, at 504; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10294.
19. Elliott, supra note 17, at 504-06.
20. Elliott, supra note 17, at 505 n.222.
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Court has stated that mass suits are appropriate if each plaintiff has a concrete
and individualized injury. 2 1 Additionally, in Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission, the Supreme Court set forth a three-part test for
associational standing that placed no limits on the size of the organization. 22 A
better response to Professor Elliott's question is to recognize standing rights for
any individual who has a non-trivial statistical probability of harm from the
government's failure to enforce a statute or regulation, rather than relying on
some aggregation of risk across many individuals as the D.C. Circuit implicitly
did in NRDC II.
Recognizing an individual standing right grounded in a statistical harm
may not be too far removed from current doctrine. Pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has stated that a small concrete injury is
enough for individual standing. 23 Any measureable amount of concrete harm is
arguably enough for constitutional standing, although the Supreme Court has
never precisely defined the outer limits of the standing doctrine. 24 Courts,
however, may impose prudential limitations on standing to avoid relatively
trivial suits that might overwhelm the court system if large numbers of such
suits were filed. 25 This Article proposes that on balance any individual should
have standing to challenge a government action that exposes her to an increased
lifetime risk of one in one million or greater of death or serious injury. The one
in one million risk standard is comparable with the one in 200,000 or one in
129,000 risk of serious harm threshold used in the D.C. Circuit's NRDC II
decision involving the regulation of methyl bromide. 26 Under this standard, a
member of a small association or even a single individual would have the same
rights as a large organization. The proposed test would reduce the
inconsistencies in how different judges or circuits apply today's vague standing
test. To clarify this test, Congress could enact a statutory standing test that

21. See infra Parts IV and VI.
22. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
23. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998); United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n. 14 (1973); see infra Part IV.
24. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14 (stating small injury is enough for standing). But see Korsinsky
v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 1528, 2005 WL 1423345, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21778, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 2005) (denying standing where plaintiff alleged climate change could worsen his sinus condition
because "[s]uch allegations fall more within the realm of the hypothetical and conjectural than the actual
or imminent and therefore are insufficient for purposes of standing"), aff'd, 192 Fed. App'x. 71 (2d Cir.
2006).
25. See Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 654-55 n.12 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J.,
concurring) (discussing the authority of federal courts to limit suits that are excessively burdensome if
political branches or suit by the United States could address issue); Mank, supra note 9, at 28, 44-45
(agreeing with Judge Gould that courts may invoke prudential standing barrier to that are excessively
burdensome).
26. NRDC I1, 464 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see infra Part V.D.1.
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applies to some or all regulatory statutes, or the courts could adopt a 27prudential
judge-made standard that would be subject to congressional revision.
Some commentators likely would object to a purely quantitative standing
test. Some risks are not easily quantified, including diminished recreational
uses or aesthetic injuries. As such, under the proposed standard, a plaintiff
would still have standing if their "reasonable concerns" about pollution or other
harmful activities caused them to avoid or diminish their recreational activities
or aesthetic enjoyment of nature. 2 8 The proposed one in one million risk
standard would supplement, but not replace, existing standing requirements.
The quantitative approach to standing would only be used where probabilistic
evidence is readily available, as it often is in regulatory rulemaking.
Part I discusses the basics of constitutional standing, associational
standing, and the relationship between separation-of-powers principles and
standing. Part II examines when courts have recognized or denied standing in
probabilistic standing cases. Part III discusses the D.C. Circuit's "substantial
probability test" and the Circuit's conflicting decisions regarding probabilistic
standing. Part IV examines whether probabilistic risks are generalized
grievances for the political branches or suitable concrete injuries for the courts.
Part V examines Professor Elliott's argument that the NRDC H decision gave
greater standing rights to large organizations. Part VI argues that organizations
should have standing even if we cannot identify which members will be injured
in the future by an unlawful government action. Part VII proposes that
Congress or courts adopt a one in one million risk threshold for when
individuals may sue. The proposed risk-based standing test would both provide
more protection to individuals threatened by environmental or health-based
threats that pose long-term harms and simplify today's overly complex standing
jurisprudence.
I.

STANDING AND PROBABILISTIC INJURIES

A major obstacle for plaintiffs who allege that government regulations are
insufficiently protective of public safety is the standing doctrine arising out of
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which requires that a plaintiff have suffered
29
or will suffer concrete and imminent injuries from the defendant's actions.
There are serious questions about whether a plaintiff can sue to address
generalized or probabilistic injuries resulting from insufficiently protective
government regulations. 30 Yet some members of the Supreme Court have also

27. See infra Part VII.C.
28. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-83
(2000); see infra Parts II.A. and VII.D.2.
29. See infra Parts L.A and I.C.
30. See infra Parts IV and V.
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recognized the authority of Congress to address new types of injuries that
would have been unimaginable when the Constitution was adopted in 1789.31
A.

ConstitutionalStanding

Even though the Constitution does not explicitly mention the standing
doctrine, the Supreme Court since at least 1944 has interpreted Article III's
limitation of judicial decisions to cases and controversies as requiring plaintiffs
to establish standing. 32 The federal courts have jurisdiction over a case only if
at least one plaintiff can prove that she has standing for each form of relief
sought.33 A federal court must dismiss a case without deciding the merits if the
plaintiff fails to meet standing requirements. 34 For standing in an Article III
court, the Supreme Court usually requires a plaintiff to show
"[(1)] [she] ha[s] suffered an "injury in fact" [that] is (a) concrete and
particularized . . . and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical'[;] . . . [(2)] the injury [is] "fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant ... [; and (3)] it [is] "likely," as opposed
to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable
35
decision."
36
A plaintiff has the burden of establishing all three prongs of the standing test.
31. See infra Parts ll.G and VII.C-D.
32. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (first Supreme Court case explicitly stating Article
III standing requirements); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting federal judiciary to "case" or
"controversy"); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340-42 (2006) (explaining why Supreme
Court infers that Article IlI's case and controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations);
Bradford C. Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?:
Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Testfor States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1701, 1709-10 (2008);
Mank, supra note 9, at 22 (stating Supreme Court first explicitly referred to standing in 1944 Stark
decision); Michael E. Solimine, RecalibratingJusticiabilityin Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 531,
533 (2004); Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudenceof Doubt: GeneralizedGrievances as a Limitation
to FederalCourtAccess, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1863, 1868 (1996). But see Sunstein, supra note 6, at 168-79,
208 (1992) (arguing that framers of Constitution did not intend that Article III would require standing).
Some pre-1944 cases used standing-like concepts to deny review, but did not use the term "standing."
See Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (denying challenge to appointment of Supreme Court
Justice because petitioner had no interest in suit "other than that of a citizen and a member of the bar of
this Court"); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922) (dismissing suit challenging procedures
by which nineteenth amendment was ratified because the suit was "not a case within the meaning of...
Article III" because plaintiff asserted "only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require ihat the
Government be administered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted").
33. DaimlerChrysler,547 U.S. at 352-53; Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185 ("a plaintiff must demonstrate
standing for each form of relief sought"); Mank, supranote 32, at 1710.
34. See DaimlerChrysler,547 U.S. at 341; Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180 ("We have an obligation to
assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article Ill standing at the outset of the litigation."); Mank, supra
note 32, at 1710; Mank, supra note 9, at 23.
35. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); accord Mank, supra note 32, at
1710.
36. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must
"carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article 1II"); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (same);
Mank, supra note 32, at 1710.
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Small injuries and incremental risk already play a role in the standing
analysis in cases involving remedies for procedural errors. For such cases,
including the failure of the government to prepare an environmental impact
37
statement (EIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
courts relax the imminence and redressability portions of the standing test. 38
While a plaintiff usually must demonstrate that it is likely that an injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision, 39 plaintiffs alleging that the government has
violated a procedural requirement may have standing if the proposed remedy
would merely reduce the risk of future harm. 40 In Massachusetts v. EPA, 4 1 the
Court observed that Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife had applied a different
standard to procedural violations, stating: "When a litigant is vested with a
procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the
requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision
that allegedly harmed the litigant. '42 In Massachusetts, the EPA argued that the
petitioners' request that the agency regulate emissions from new motor vehicles
would not remedy the problem of global climate change because the U.S.
vehicle emissions at issue only constituted 4 percent of global greenhouse gases
and growing emissions from China and India alone would dwarf any reductions

a court might order. 4 3 The Court rejected the EPA's argument because it
"rest[ed] on the erroneous assumption that a small incremental step, because it
is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum...

37.
38.

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006).
There is this much truth to the assertion that "procedural rights" are special: The person
who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that
right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Thus,
under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a
federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare
an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty
that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the
dam will not be completed for many years.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. A plaintiff must still have alleged that the proposed government action
would have some possibility of causing him a concrete harm. Justice Scalia explained that a person who
lives next to a proposed dam site can sue regarding the government's alleged failure to prepare an
environmental impact statement, but not someone who lives in a distant state. ld; Mank, supra note 32,
at 1717. The Supreme Court has never clearly explained to what extent the immediacy or redressability
portions of the standing test are relaxed in procedural rights cases. Mank, supra note 32, at 1718-20.
39. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
40. Kimberly N. Brown, JusticiableGeneralized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221, 250, 252, 254
(2008).
41. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
42. Id. at 518 (emphasis added). In Massachusetts the Supreme Court relaxed the redressability
standard both because Massachusetts deserved "special solicitude" as a state and because it alleged that
the EPA had committed a procedural violation in failing to address whether greenhouse gases
endangered the public and welfare. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517-20, 525-26; Mank, supra note 32, at
1727-29, 1746-52.
43. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523-25; see also id. at 543-45 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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44
[A]ccepting that premise would doom most challenges to regulatory action."
The Court concluded that Massachusetts had met the redressability portion of
the standing test because a court order requiring the EPA to regulate emissions
45
from new vehicles would "slow or reduce" global climate change.
Massachusetts's recognition of incremental remedies is consistent with
probabilistic standing suits that seek to reduce plaintiffs' future risk of harm.
Most of the controversy about statistical standing, however, has focused on the
injury prong of the test and, therefore, the remainder of this Article will focus
on the injury prong rather than the redressability part of the test.
Even for substantive claims, a plaintiff can sue even if her injury is
relatively small, so long as it is concrete. In United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures(SCRAP),4 6 the Court rejected the
government's argument that a plaintiff must demonstrate a significant injury:
The Government urges us to limit standing to those who have been
"significantly" affected by agency action. But ...we think [such a test]
fundamentally misconceived. "Injury in fact" . .. serves to distinguish a
person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation--even though
small-from a person with a mere interest in the problem. We have
allowed important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more at
stake in the outcome of an action than a fraction of a vote ...; a $5 fine
and costs ...; and a $1.50 poll tax ....As Professor Davis has put it: "The
basic idea that comes out in numerous cases is that an identifiable trifle is
enough for standing to fight out a question of principle ....- 47
SCRAP, however, did not address whether a small probabilistic risk of injury is
enough for standing.
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court created an unfortunate and
unnecessary distinction between regulated entities challenging government
over-enforcement of the law and citizens challenging the government's
misinterpretation or underenforcement of the law. The Court stated:
When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from
the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of
someone else, much more is needed. In that circumstance, causation and
redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or
action or inaction-and perhaps on
regulable) third party to the government
48
the response of others as well.

Numerous commentators have challenged Lujan's distinction between
regulated and non-regulated plaintiffs as biased in favor of business interests
44. Id.at 524 (majority opinion).
45. Id. at 525 (emphasis in original).
46. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
47. Id. at 689 n.14 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)); accord Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); K. Davis, Standing:
Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601, 613 (1993).
48. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (emphasis in original).
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and biased against beneficiaries of regulation. 49 In his dissenting opinion in
Lujan, Justice Blackmun argued that the "principal effect" of the majority's
restrictive approach to standing was "to transfer power into the hands of the
Executive at the expense-not of the Courts-but of Congress, from which that
power originates and emanates." 50 Part VI.D demonstrates that separation-ofpowers principles do not prohibit Congress from redressing this imbalance by
enacting a statute that confers standing on any person who has suffered or is
statistically likely to suffer an injury from the government's underenforcement
of the law.
Finally, in addition to constitutional standing limitations, the courts may
impose prudential standing limitations as a matter of judicial policy.51 For
example, courts have imposed the prudential requirement that a suit must be
within a statute's "zone of interests." 5 2 Unlike constitutional limits on standing,
Congress may impose its own prudential standing limitations or expressly
override judicially imposed prudential limitations. 53 Either Congress or the
courts may adopt this Article's proposed one in one million standing threshold
proposal as a prudential standard to clarify what constitutes a sufficient injury
for standing and to provide greater judicial access to plaintiffs threatened by
long-term environmental or health injuries.

49. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and
Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 766 (1997) (arguing that
the "standing inquiry playing field ... is tilted to the advantage of regulatory targets"); Leiter, supra
note 9, at 393-94 n. 15 (arguing that "one effect of the drive [to restrict standing] is to make judicial
review less available to beneficiaries of regulation (usually individuals or communities) than to its
objects (usually business interests)").
50. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); accord Elliott, supra note 17, at 496
(arguing courts should not use standing doctrine "as a backdoor way to limit Congress's legislative
power"); Gene R. Nichol, Forward:The Impossibility ofLujan's Project, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
F. 193, 199 (2001) ("Lujan, in full flower, would strike at congressionally authorized standing and the
claimed 'overjudicialization' of the operation of American government."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J.
1170, 1170-71 (1993) (criticizing Lujan as "an insupportable judicial contraction of the legislative
power to make judicially enforceable policy decisions").
51. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does
Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standingfor the Unborn?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 27-28 (2009).
52. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1997) (explaining the "zone of interest" standing test
as a prudential limitation and not a constitutional requirement); Mank, supra note 9, at 28.
53. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162-66 (holding that "unlike their constitutional counterparts, [prudential
limits on standing] can be modified or abrogated by Congress," and concluding that a citizen suit
provision abrogated the zone of interest limitation); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; Mank, supra note 32, at
1712 n.50; Zachary D. Sakas, Footnotes, Forests, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit Split
Regarding Standing in ProceduralInjury-based Programmatic Challenges, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L.
175, 179 (2006).
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B.

Associational Standing

Associations of individuals may play a particularly relevant role in
understanding the rights of statistical persons because of the way they
seemingly manifest a level of risk as a predicted injury to particular individuals.
Over the last several decades, the Court has come to recognize standing for
associations of individuals. In Sierra Club v. Morton,54 the Supreme Court held
that the Sierra Club did not have standing to challenge the granting of building
permits for Mineral King Valley, a national game refuge adjacent to Sequoia
National Park, because Sierra Club had not alleged that any of its members
used the park or would be injured by the proposed development. 55 The Court
rejected the Sierra Club's argument that it was entitled to standing as the
representative of the public, the environment, or future generations without
proof that its members would be injured by the government's proposed
actions. 56 The Court did not explicitly address whether the Sierra Club would
have organizational standing if at least one of its members used the park and
had individual standing, but the Court observed that "[i]t is clear that an
organization whose members are injured may represent those members in a
proceeding for judicial review." 57 In a footnote, the Court stated that the Sierra
Club could request permission from the district court to amend its complaint to
58
allege additional facts that might allow it to gain standing.
In its 1975 decision in Warth v. Seldin,59 the Court first explicitly
recognized that "an association may have standing solely as the representative
of its members," despite "the absence of injury to itself."'60 The Court warned,
however, that "the possibility of such representational standing . . . does not
eliminate or attenuate the constitutional requirement of a case or
controversy." 6 1 The court stated that the association must allege that at least
one of its members is "suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of

54. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
55. Id. at 731, 734-35; Mank, supra note 51, at 5.
56. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-40 (noting that "the complaint alleged that the development
'would destroy or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of the
park and would impair the enjoyment of the park for future generations' and that Sierra Club sought
standing as a representative of the public without proof that any member of the Club was injured); Karl
S. Coplan, Is Voting Necessary? OrganizationStanding and Non-voting Members of Environmental
Advocacy Organizations,14 S.E. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 51 (2005); Mank, supra note 51, at 5. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that "bona fida" environmental public interest organizations should be
able to file suit on behalf of the public at large. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 757-60 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Mank, supra note 51, at 5 n.14.
57. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739; accordCoplan, supranote 56, at 51-52.
58. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8.
59. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
60. Id. at 511; accord Christopher J. Roche, Note, A Litigation Association Model to Aggregate
Mass Tort Claimsfor Adjudication, 91 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1493 (2005).
61. Warth, 422 U.S. at 511; accordRoche, supra note 60, at 1493.
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the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the
62
members themselves brought suit."
In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,63 North
Carolina argued that the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission did
not have standing to represent several Washington apple growers and dealers
who were allegedly harmed by North Carolina's regulation of the sale of
apples. As the Commission was a state agency in which membership was
compelled, North Carolina argued it was not analogous to the voluntary
membership organization for which the Court had in earlier cases recognized
associational standing.64 To decide whether a state agency was entitled to
associational standing, the Court set forth a three-part test for when associations
may have standing:
An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires
65
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
Applying the three-part test, the Hunt Court concluded that the
Commission could serve as representative for the growers and dealers because
"they possess all of the indicia of membership in an organization" by electing
the members of the Commission and "financ[ing] its activities, including the
costs of this lawsuit, through assessments levied upon them." 66 The Court
observed that many unions and bar associations require that their members pay
dues, but that courts had treated them as organizations able to represent their
members. 67 Following Hunt's broad "indicia of membership" test for
associational standing, several courts have recognized "de facto" membership
organizations for groups that lacked formal membership rules, but treated
68
allegedly injured persons like members.
62. Warth, 422 U.S. at 511; accord Roche, supra note 60, at 1493.
63. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
64. Id. at 336-43; Coplan, supra note 56, at 52-53; Roche, supra note 60, at 1493.
65. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343; accord Roche, supra note 60, at 1493-94.
66. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344-45; accordCoplan, supra note 56, at 53; Roche, supra note 60, at 1494.
67. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345; Coplan, supra note 56, at 53.
68. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 129 F.3d 826, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The
[district] court found that [Friends of the Earth] did not have any members under the laws of the District
of Columbia and, as a result, did not have any members for purposes of constitutional standing.... [W]e
do not believe this defect should overshadow the considerable activities of [Friends of the Earth] with
and for those persons its officers and staff have consistently considered to be members."); Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 119 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[Magnesium
Elektron's] counsel also contended at oral argument that [Public Interest Research Group] and [Friends
of the Earth] lacked standing because their charters prohibit them from having members. We do not
accept this formalistic argument because it lacks merit. To meet the requirements of organizational
standing, [Public Interest Research Group] and [Friends of the Earth] need only prove that their
members possess the 'indicia of membership' in their organizations."); Upper Chattahoochee
Riverkeeper Fund v. City of Atlanta, 986 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1997) ("The Chattahoochee
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C.

SeparationofPowers and Standing

Finally, the role of the judiciary envisioned in the Federal Constitution
may in part explain the gap between legislative and regulatory responses to
risks to statistical persons, and the judiciary's refusal to address statistical risks
as a foundation for jurisdiction. Standing requirements promote broader
separation-of-powers principles among the three branches of government,
especially by ensuring that the "Federal Judiciary respects 'the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society.' 69 Professor
Elliott explains:
the Supreme Court has used standing doctrine to promote at least three
separation-of-powers functions for the courts: (1) hearing only cases
possessing sufficient concrete adversity to make them susceptible of
judicial resolution; (2) avoiding questions better answered by the political
branches; and (3) resisting Congress's use of citizen suits-and therefore
Congress's conscription of the courts-to monitor the compliance of the
70
executive branch with the law.
1.

Concrete Adversity

The concrete adversity portion of standing doctrine requires a genuine
case and controversy for judicial resolution and precludes unconstitutional
advisory opinions. 71 Further, the injury requirement excludes plaintiffs who
have no genuine stake in a controversy and could be unreliable advocates as a
result. 72 The Court has generally rejected standing based on the legal rights or
Riverkeeper, Inc. is a defacto membership organization."); Coplan, supra note 56, at 65-67 (discussing
cases). But cf Basel Action Network v. Maritime Admin'r, 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 69-70 (D.D.C. 2005)
(rejecting associational standing asserted by a plaintiff organization that gave no voting or control rights
to those injured individuals it sought to represent); Coplan, supra note 56, at 68-69 (discussing Basel
Action Network). See generally id. at 49, 88 &passim (observing that lower courts have disagreed about
whether membership voting rights are essential for associational standing and arguing that voting rights
should not be determinative in deciding whether someone is a "member" of an organization).
69. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 750 (1984)); accord Elliott, supra note 17, at 475; Mank, supranote 51, at 26; Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
881, 881, 896 (1983).
70. Elliott, supra note 17, at 459.
71. DaimlerChrysler,547 U.S. at 341-42; Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24
(1998); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357-61 (1911); Elliott, supra note 17, at 469-73 &
n.56; Mank, supra note 32, at 1705, 1709-11; Tacy F. Flint, Comment, A New Brand of
Representational Standing, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1052-53 (2003) (arguing case and controversy
requirement promotes quality of adversary system).
72. While it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged action,
the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal
way. This requirement is not just an empty formality. It preserves the vitality of the
adversarial process by assuring both that the parties before the court have an actual, as
opposed to professed, stake in the outcome, and that the legal questions presented ...
will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete
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interests of third parties because such suits usually fail the concrete adversity
test. 73 On the other hand, Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in Sierra

Club argued that "bona fida" public interest groups such as the Sierra Club are
often better suited than anyone else to represent the public interest even if none
74
of their members has a concrete injury, but the Court rejected his approach.
2.

GeneralizedInjuries and the PoliticalBranches

In part, the rejection of the rights of associations to sue in the public
interest reflects a desire to limit standing to those with a particular and special
interest in the issues. Courts have refused to grant standing where a plaintiff has
only an abstract interest in seeing the law enforced that is shared by all other
citizens. 75 Analogously, the Court generally has dismissed suits by taxpayers
interested in making sure that the government spends money wisely, as such an
interest is shared by all taxpayers and hence is not a particularized interest
suitable for judicial review. 76 As is discussed in Part IV, the Supreme Court has

stated that generalized grievances that affect all citizens in the same way are

factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial
action.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting with approval Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (stating standing requirements assure "that the most effective advocate of
the rights at issues is present to champion them"); Elliott, supra note 17, at 470-71; Flint, supra note 71,
at 1052-53 (arguing case and controversy requirement promotes quality of adversary system).
73. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80 ("There are good and sufficient reasons for this prudential
limitation on standing when rights of third parties are implicated-the avoidance of the adjudication of
rights which those not before the Court may not wish to assert, and the assurance that the most effective
advocate of the rights at issue is present to champion them."); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975); Mank, supra note 51, at 28. But see Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 2008 WL
2277521 (11 th Cir. 2008) (recognizing exception to general rule against third party standing where nonHispanic landlord has standing to sue Florida town for allegedly discriminatory enforcement of its
housing code to drive out Hispanic immigrant tenants because he suffered economic loss from alleged
discrimination); Flint, supra note 71, at 1048-51 (discussing cases where courts have allowed thirdparty standing).
74. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 757-60 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Scalia, supra
note 69, at 891 (observing that person who has injury and standing may argue a case less effectively
than a national public interest organization without injury); Elliott, supra note 17, at 474 (same).
75. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74 ("We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally
available grievance about government-claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits
him than it does the public at large-does not state an Article II1 case or controversy."); Lance v.
Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439-42 (2007) (holding voters may not challenge state constitutional provision
where they have only an abstract interest in the enforcement of the law); Elliott, supra note 17, at 47980.
76. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343-44 (2006) (observing that Court has on
several occasions rejected federal taxpayers standing under Article III to challenge a particular
expenditure of federal funds because it is not a particularized injury "but instead a grievance the
taxpayer 'suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.' Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 488 (1923)."); Brown, supra note 40, at 17-18; Elliott, supra note 17, at 480-81.
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more appropriately redressed by the political branches than the federal judiciary

in light of separation-of-powers principles. 77 Yet courts do grant standing in
mass tort situations for "injuries that may be widely shared but are
particularized for each plaintiff."'78 A person who has suffered a concrete injury
may bring a citizen suit even though that suit may vindicate broader interests
through the payment of fines to the government as long as the plaintiff
79
personally benefits from the deterrent effect of the civil penalties.
3.

ProtectingExecutive Authorityfrom CongressionalEncroachment

According to Professor Elliott, "[r]ecent opinions by the Court and certain
Justices, notably Justice Scalia, have suggested that standing serves a third
separation-of-powers purpose-that of protecting the executive branch against
an unholy alliance between Congress and the courts." 80 Some "citizen suit"
statutes, especially in the area of environmental law, allow "any person" to sue
if the government underenforces the law. 81 The implication in these statutes
that literally any person could sue the government could allow the judiciary to
second guess a wide range of executive decisions. Professor Elliott writes,
But if literally any person can invoke the power of the courts to oversee the
actions of the executive branch, there would be no limit on the courts'

ability to intrude on executive functions. Any rulemaking priorities,
decisions whether to prosecute, and other core activities of the Executive
82
could be completely upset by citizen intervention using the courts.

Despite concerns about the possibility of excessive congressional interference
with executive discretion, courts have recognized that Congress can authorize
suits against the executive branch for its failure to implement legal

77. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-77 (stating that the Constitution assigns the political branches of
government the responsibility for addressing grievances affecting the public at large); infra Part IV.
78. Elliott, supra note 17, at 477; accord Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S 11, 24-25
(1998); Mank, supra note 32, at 1714. See generally infra Part VI.B (discussing class action and mass
tort cases).
79. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185-88 (2000);
Elliott, supra note 17, at 498.
80. Elliott, supra note 17, at 492-93; see also Kimberly N. Brown, What 's Left Standing? FECA
Citizen Suits and the Battlefor JudicialReview, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 677, 702-03 (2007) (arguing that
Justice Scalia believes that the Constitution limits the authority of Congress to authorize suits
challenging the executive branch's failure to enforce the law).
81. See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (2006); Toxic
Substances Control Act § 119, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2006); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g) (2006); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (2006);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006); Safe Water Drinking Act §
1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)
(2006); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006); see also Elliott, supra note 17, at 493 & n. 160.
82. Elliott, supranote 17, at 493 (emphasis in original).
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requirements as long as the plaintiff has suffered at least a small concrete injury
83
from the legal violation.
Sharing some of Professor Elliott's concerns about the impact of citizen
suits on separation-of-powers principles, the Supreme Court has limited citizen
suit standing to those who can meet the three-part constitutional standing test to
prevent excessive judicial interference with executive actions. In Lujan, Justice
Scalia for the majority stated that separation-of-powers and standing principles
limited Congress's authority to use lawsuits to make the judiciary into
"virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action." 84 He stated, "The concrete injury requirement has . . . separation-ofpowers significance," so Congress cannot convert "the public interest in proper
administration of the laws (specifically, in agencies' observance of a particular,
statutorily prescribed procedure) . . . into an individual right by a statute that
denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens ...to sue." 85 Without

standing restrictions, Congress might attempt to use citizen suits as a means to
give the judiciary "a position of authority over the governmental acts of another
and co-equal department." '86 Besides Article III standing doctrine, Justice
Scalia invoked the President's Article II authority, stating: "To permit Congress
to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance
with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts is to permit
Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most
important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,' Art. II, § 3.''87 Congress may not waive the injury requirement for
standing and allow citizens to file suit simply to enforce the public's interest in
enforcing the law. 88 Even according to Justice Scalia's Lujan opinion,
however, Congress may authorize citizen suits when a citizen suffers a concrete
89
individual injury from the government's failure to enforce a law.
83. See infra Part VL.D.
84. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 760 (1984)).
85. Id; accord Mank, supra note 9, at 34.
86. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923)); accord
Elliott, supra note 17, at 493.
87. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577. But see Brown, supra note 40, at 47 (arguing "Take Care" clause in
Article I1of the Constitution does not give the President discretion to ignore legal requirements, but
requires the President to obey the law); Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done:
An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 275 (2003) (same).
88. Leiter, supra note 9, at 399-400; Mank, supra note 9, at 33-34; Sunstein, supra note 6, at 226
(concluding Lujan "foreclose[d] 'pure' citizen suits," in which someone "with an ideological or lawenforcement interest initiates a proceeding against the government, seeking to require an agency to
undertake action of the sort required by law").
89. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8, 577-78; Brown, supra note 80, at 702-03 (arguing Justice
Scalia would limit lawsuits to those involving individual rights); Elliott, supra note 17, at 493-94
(arguing Justice Scalia seeks to limit suits against executive branch, but recognizes suits involving
concrete injury).
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While Justice Scalia's Lujan opinion suggested that the Court would take
a relatively restrictive approach to when citizens may sue the executive branch,
subsequent Supreme Court decisions have adopted a broad view of which
injuries are sufficiently concrete to justify standing; Justice Scalia has found
himself in the dissenting minority in many of those cases. 90 For example, over
Justice Scalia's dissent, the Court allowed citizens to sue when the government
failed to provide information needed for voting decisions. 9 1 The Court has also
found standing when plaintiffs alleged that their recreational or aesthetic
92
interests were diminished because of "reasonable concerns" about pollution.
Additionally, the Court has allowed standing for qui tam relators even though
the relators have suffered no harm to themselves, but simply receive a reward
or bounty for suing on behalf of the United States to recover for fraud against
the government, because parties have traditionally had the authority to assign a
cause of action to another. 93 Furthermore, in a 2008 decision, Sprint
Communications v. APCC Services, Inc., the Court in a divided five to four
decision arguably weakened the traditional rule that a plaintiff must suffer an
injury to have standing by holding that an assignee has standing to sue on
behalf of other parties, even if all the proceeds from the suit go back to the
assignor. 94 Thus, after Lujan, the Court has defined what constitutes a
"concrete" injury sufficient for standing in a broad way.
In his crucial concurring opinion in Lujan, Justice Kennedy, who was
joined by Justice Souter, arguably took a broader approach to congressional
authority than the majority. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion is important
because he and Justice Souter supplied the necessary votes for the majority in
Lujan.9 5 Justice Kennedy stated that Congress has the authority "to define
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before," as long as a statute both identifies "the
injury [Congress] seeks to vindicate" and ties that injury "to the class of
persons entitled to bring suit." 9 6 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the majority quoted
Justice Kennedy's language in the previous sentence and concluded that
"[congressional] authorization is of critical importance to the standing
90. See infra Parts II.A and IV.
91. Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 13-25 (1998); see infra Part IV.
92. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-83 (2000);
see infra Part II.A.
93. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000); Elliott,
supra note 17, at 495-96 (discussing Vermont Agency); Mank, supra note 9, at 34 (same).
94. Sprint Commc'ns. v. APCC Services, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008).
95. Without Justices Kennedy and Souter, only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Thomas would have joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 556 (1992). Part III.B of Justice Scalia's opinion, which addressed whether the plaintiff's claims
were redressable by the Court, was a plurality opinion joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Thomas. Id. at 556, 568-71.
96. Ltjan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
accordLeiter, supra note 9, at 400; Mank, supranote 9, at 35.
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inquiry." 97 While Congress may not authorize advisory opinions or suits by
plaintiffs with a completely abstract interest in the enforcement of the law, it
98
has broad authority to define when an injury is sufficient for standing.
11.

STANDING AND THREATENED RISKS

As is discussed below in Part II, the Supreme Court has stated that
imminent or threatened risks are sometimes sufficient injury for standing, but
has not provided a clear test for future or probabilistic injuries. Several
appellate decisions have concluded that probabilistic injuries are sufficient for
standing, but other decisions have disagreed. Part II examines the leading cases
involving standing and threatened risks, except for cases from the D.C. Circuit,
which are discussed in Part III.
Significantly for the standing rights of statistical persons, the Lujan Court
stated that standing was possible for an "imminent" injury that has not yet
taken place. 99 Similarly, in Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union,
the Court stated "One does not have to await the consummation of threatened
injury to obtain preventive relief If the injury is certainly impending that is
enough."' 10 0 The Court has not defined how probable a risk must be or how
soon it must occur for it to be considered "imminent." 10 1
In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC),
Inc. (Laidlaw),'1 2 the Court stated that a threatened injury that alters a
plaintiffs recreational activities may be enough for standing if the plaintiff has
"reasonable concerns" about the risk. 10 3 Subsequently, several appellate court
decisions recognized standing for threatened or probabilistic injuries, but they
did not establish a clear test for how likely a risk must be for a plaintiff to have
standing. 10 4 For example, the Eighth Circuit rejected standing where the
97. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516-17 (2007) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
98. Brown, supra note 40, at 33.
99. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; see also Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d
1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting "imminent" standing test to include an increased risk of harm);
Mank, supranote 51, at 39 (same).
100. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) ("The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that threatened rather than actual injury can
satisfy Article Ill standing requirements.").
101. Mank,supranote 51, at 39.
102. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
103. Id. at 185-93.
104. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 633 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he courts of appeals have
generally recognized that threatened harm in the form of an increased risk of future injury may serve as
injury-in-fact for Article III standing purposes."); Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 160 (concluding that
"threats or increased risk constitutes cognizable harm" sufficient to meet the injury-in-fact requirement);
Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "the
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alleged risks were too uncertain and likely to occur in the distant future. 10 5
Mostly recently, the Massachusetts decision found standing based in part on
projected injuries from climate change through the year 2100.106
A.

Laidlaw

In Laidlaw, the Court recognized standing even though the plaintiffs could
not show that the defendant's activities had harmed them or that the defendant
was likely to harm them in the future. 10 7 The plaintiffs argued that they had
standing to sue a defendant that discharged mercury into a river because they
avoided swimming or fishing in that river due to their fear of possible harms
from the mercury, although they could not prove that the concentrations of
mercury were likely to harm them or the environment. 108 The Laidlaw decision
did not require the plaintiffs to prove that the environment had suffered an
actual injury or was likely to suffer an injury in the future, but instead focused
on whether the plaintiffs had reasonable grounds to change their recreational
activities. 10 9 The Court stated that, in environmental cases, "[t]he relevant
showing for purposes of Article III standing ...is not injury to the environment
but injury to the plaintiff."' 110 The Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs
had suffered a sufficient injury for Article III standing because their
"reasonable concerns" about the harmfulness of the mercury caused them to
discontinue recreational use of the river. 111 The Court treated the loss or
diminishment of the plaintiffs recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the river
as the concrete injury. 112 Because the diminished recreational and aesthetic
enjoyment of the river was a sufficiently concrete injury to the plaintiffs, the
Court avoided the more difficult question of whether the mercury pollution was
possibility of future injury may be sufficient to confer standing on plaintiffs" and concluding that
plaintiffs could proceed with their suit where they "raised a material question of fact ... [as to] whether
they will suffer a substantial risk of harm as a result of [the government's] policies"); Johnson v.
Allsteel, Inc., 259 F.3d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the "increased risk that a plan participant
faces" as a result of an ERISA plan administrator's increase in discretionary authority satisfies Article
III injury-in-fact requirements); Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that "[a]
probabilistic harm, if nontrivial, can support standing"); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92
F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing that an incremental increase in the risk of forest fires
caused by the Forest Service's action satisfied Article III standing requirements); Craig, supra note 1, at
190-94 (discussing cases); Mank, supranote 51, at 40-45, 48 (same).
105. Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2004).
106. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 n.20; id. at 540-42 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (criticizing Massachusetts use of estimates of sea level rise through 2100).
107. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-84 (2000); Mank, supra note 51, at40-41.
108. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-83; Craig, supra note 1, at 181; Mank, supra note 51, at 40.
109. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181; Craig, supra note 1, at 181-84; Mank, supra note 51, at 40-41. But
see Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 199-201 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that plaintiffs should have to prove
that defendant's activities actually harmed the environment).
110. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181; accord Craig,supra note 1, at 181.
111. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181; Mank, supra note 51, at40-41.
112. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-84; Craig, supra note 1, at 184.
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harmful enough to the plaintiffs to constitute a concrete injury. 11 3 Indirectly,
the Court considered the toxicity and potential harmfulness of the mercury
pollution to some extent by requiring that the plaintiffs demonstrate that their
avoidance of recreational activities was based on "reasonable concerns" about a
potentially harmful activity. 1 14 If Laidlaw had been dumping a harmless
substance into the river, it is doubtful that the Court would have found that
reasonable grounds for avoiding recreational use of the river. Unfortunately, as
is discussed below in Part II, because Laidlaw did not define when a plaintiff
has "reasonable concerns" sufficient to meet standing requirements, it is not
surprising that the various circuits have applied somewhat different tests in
attempting to follow the Court's decision.
In Laidlaw, the Court also addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to
seek civil penalties that would be paid to the United States. Because civil
penalties would deter the defendant from committing future violations that
could harm the plaintiff even though the plaintiffs could not prove that future
violations were likely to occur in the absence of penalties, the Court concluded
that plaintiffs had standing to seek such penalties. 115 Laidlaw concluded that if
a plaintiff has "reasonable concerns" about a present threatened harm, the
plaintiff may seek injunctive relief or civil penalties to prevent future harms to
the plaintiff from similar conduct in the future. 116 Although the defendant in
Laidlaw was a private corporation, the reasoning in the Laidlaw decision
should allow plaintiffs to sue the government to challenge governmental
actions that cause the plaintiffs to diminish their recreational or aesthetic
activities because of reasonable concerns about that action.
B.

Gaston Copper

However, Laidlaw did not establish any test evaluating the sufficiency of a
plaintiffs "reasonable concerns," but left that issue for case-by-case
development by the lower courts. After the Laidlaw decision, several courts of
appeals have found standing where a plaintiff avoids recreational activities
because of reasonable concerns that a defendant's activities pose a risk of
harm. 117 In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.
(Gaston Copper),'1 8 the plaintiff alleged that he swam and fished in a lake less
often because of his concern about the defendant's discharge of pollution into
the lake. 119 The Fourth Circuit in an en banc decision concluded that the
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
banc).
119.

Craig, supra note 1, at 184.
See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-83.
Id. at 185-88; Mank, supra note 51, at41.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185-93; Mank, supranote 51, at 41.
See Mank, supra note 51, at 40-45; see infra Parts II.B-E.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (en
Id.atl56.
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plaintiff "has plainly demonstrated injury in fact" because "[h]e has produced
evidence of actual or threatened injury to a waterway in which he has a legally
protected interest." 120 The court interpreted Laidlaw to allow standing where a
plaintiff has reasonable concerns about a probabilistic injury and stated:
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that threatened rather than
actual injury can satisfy Article III standing requirements ..

.

. Threats or

increased risk thus constitutes cognizable harm. Threatened environmental
injury is by nature probabilistic.121
Going a step beyond Laidlaw, the Gaston Copper court explicitly stated
122
that a plaintiff can sue based on a probabilistic threatened injury. 123
Furthermore, the court stated that "risk itself' is of "injurious nature."
According to Gaston Copper's reasoning, a plaintiff can sue if her recreational
activities are harmed or diminished because of her reasonable concern about a
potential probabilistic injury.
C.

Ecological Rights Foundation

Like Gaston, the Ninth Circuit has also recognized that a plaintiff may
demonstrate an injury in fact if the defendant's recreational activities are
harmed or diminished by the threat of potential injury. 124 In Ecological Rights
Foundation v. Pacific Lumber Co., several plaintiffs alleged that they had
regularly swam or fished in Yager Creek, but further alleged that they had
stopped or diminished these recreational activities because of their fears about
the harmfulness of the defendant's pollution of the Creek.125 The Ninth Circuit
interpreted Laidlaw as recognizing that
an individual can establish 'injury in fact' by showing a connection to the
area of concern sufficient to make credible the contention that the person's
future life will be less enjoyable-that he or she really has [suffered] or
will suffer in his or her degree of aesthetic or recreational satisfaction-if
26
the area in question remains or becomes environmentally degraded. 1
Following Laidlaw, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants' assertion
that the plaintiffs must demonstrate actual harm to the environment. 127 Citing
Laidlaw and Gaston Copper, the Ecological Rights Foundation decision stated
that a plaintiff's reasonable concerns about an increased risk of harm from a
120. Id. at 156 (emphasis added); accordCraig, supranote 1, at 191 n.207.
121. Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 160 (emphasis added); accord Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific
Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gaston Copper with approval); Craig, supra
note 1, at 191 (discussing Gaston Copper as recognizing that increased risk is enough to provide
standing for plaintiff); Mank, supra note 51, at 41.
122. See Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 156-60.
123. Id. at 160.
124. Craig, supra note 1, at 191-92; Mank, supra note 51, at 42-43.
125. EcologicalRights Found, 230 F.3d at 1144-45.
126. Id. at 1149; accord Craig, supra note 1, at 191-92; Mank, supranote 51, at 42.
127. EcologicalRights Found, 230 F.3d at 1151.
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defendant's activities is sufficient for standing.' 28 While Laidlaw had implied
that a plaintiff's "reasonable concerns" for standing purposes might include
possible future injuries, the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that a plaintiff could
obtain standing to reduce the risk of future pollution even if no actual harm had
occurred yet, stating:
The Clean Water Act . . . not only regulates actual water pollution, but
embodies a range of prophylactic, procedural rules designed to reduce the
risk of pollution. It is not necessary for a plaintiff challenging violations of
to show the presence of actual
rules designed to reduce the risk of pollution
29
pollution in order to obtain standing. 1
D.

Maine People's Alliance

Like the Fourth Circuit in Gaston Copper,the First Circuit has recognized
that a plaintiff has standing if a defendant's actions present a realistic threat of a
probabilistic near-term harm. 130 In Maine People's Alliance v. Mallinckrodt,
Inc., 13 1 the First Circuit determined that the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act's citizen suit provision "allows citizen suits when there is a
reasonable prospect that a serious, near-term threat to human health or the
environment exists." 132 The court explained that "[i]t is the threat that must be
close at hand, even if the perceived harm is not." 133 Providing an example, the
court observed that "if there is a reasonable prospect that a carcinogen released
into the environment today may cause cancer twenty years hence, the threat is
near-term even though the perceived harm will only occur in the distant
future." 134 Rejecting the defendant's claim that the plaintiffs must provide
evidence of actual environmental harm, the First Circuit determined that
"probabilistic harms are legally cognizable, and the district court made a
supportable finding that a sufficient probability of harm exists to satisfy the
13 5
Article III standing inquiry."

128. Id. at 1151-52.
129. Id. at 1152 n. 12 (emphasis in original); accord Craig, supra note 1, at 192; Mank, supra note
51, at 43.
130. Mank, supra note 51, at 43-44.
131. Me. People's Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277 (lst Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 93 (2007).
132. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 279 (emphasis added); accord Craig, supra note 1, at 193;
Mank, supranote 51, at 43.
133. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 279 n. 1 (emphasis in original); accord Craig, supra note 1,
at 193; Mank, supra note 51, at 43.
134. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 279 n.1; accord Craig, supra note 1, at 193; Mank, supra
note 51, at 43.
135. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 283-84; accord Craig, supra note 1, at 193; Mank, supra
note 51, at 43.
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The First Circuit interpreted Laidlaw's reasonable concerns standing test
to require the plaintiffs to prove a "realistic threat" of harm. 136 The court
stated:
Still, neither a bald assertion of such a harm nor a purely subjective fear
that an environmental hazard may have been created is enough to ground
standing. Rather, an individual's decision to deny herself aesthetic or
recreational pleasures based on concern about pollution will constitute a
cognizable injury only when the concern is premised upon a realistic
13 7
threat.
The First Circuit explained that "the plaintiffs must show that Mallinckrodt's
activities created a significantly increased risk of harm to health or the
environment so as to make it objectively reasonable for the plaintiffs' members
to deny themselves aesthetic and recreational use of the river." 13' 8 The First
Circuit's "significantly increased risk of harm to health or the environment"
test appears to be more stringent than the Ninth Circuit's requirement of a
"credible" risk in Ecological Rights Foundation, although the First Circuit
never compared its approach in Maine People's Alliance to the Ninth Circuit's
approach. The First Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had standing because
they had introduced sufficient evidence of harm to the river from the
defendant's actions by presenting expert testimony that the defendant was the
primary source of mercury in the Penobscot River and that the mercury was
entering biota in bioavailable methylated form "in sufficient quantity that it
139
may well present an imminent and substantial danger to the environment."
E.

Baur

The Second Circuit has concluded that a plaintiff has standing if a
government's alleged underenforcement of the law increases the plaintiffs
lifetime risk of contracting a deadly and incurable disease. 140 In Baur v.
Veneman, the Second Circuit found standing where the Department of
Agriculture's inadequate regulations failed to prevent downed livestock
potentially carrying mad cow disease from entering the food chain, and thereby
increased the plaintiff's risk of contracting Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (vCJD),
which can be contracted by humans who eat meat infected with mad cow
disease. 14 1 The court concluded "that exposure to an enhanced risk of disease

136. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 284; accord Mank, supra note 51, at 43-44.
137. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 284.
138. Id. at 284; accordCraig, supra note 1, at 193; Mank, supra note 51, at 44.
139. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 285; accord Craig, supra note 1, at 193; Mank, supranote
51, at 44.
140. Mank, supranote 51, at 44-45.
141. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 628-43 (2d Cir. 2003); accord Craig, supra note 1, at 198200; Mank, supra note 51, at 44. Specifically, Baur alleged that the Department of Agriculture's
inadequate regulations increased "the risk that humans will contract a fatal form of TSE [Transmissible
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transmission may qualify as injury-in-fact in consumer food and drug safety
suits."

14 2

To meet the injury-in-fact standing requirement in a case asserting
government regulatory actions or omissions have increased the risk of harm to
the plaintiff, the court explained that the plaintiff "must allege that he faces a
direct risk of harm which rises above mere conjecture."' 143 The court stated that
it would consider the potential severity of the disease in assessing whether the
plaintiff had demonstrated an injury in fact: "Because the evaluation of risk is
qualitative, the probability of harm which a plaintiff must demonstrate in order
to allege a cognizable injury-in-fact logically varies with the severity of the
probable harm." 144 The court determined that Baur's allegation that he was at
increased risk of harm from an inadequate government regulation was
sufficient to meet standing requirements because vCJD is "a deadly disease
with no known cure or treatment" and therefore "even a moderate increase in
the risk of disease may be sufficient to confer standing."' 145 Because "Baur
[had] successfully alleged a credible threat of harm from downed cattle," 146 the
Second Circuit rejected the government's argument that he must quantify to
47
what extent he is at increased risk of disease to meet standing requirements.
Further, the court commented that "the evaluation of the amount of tolerable
risk is better analyzed as an administrative decision governed by the relevant
statutes rather than a constitutional question governed by Article III."148
The Second Circuit's requirement that a plaintiff "must allege that he
faces a direct risk of harm which rises above mere conjecture" 149 appears to be
less stringent than the First Circuit's requirement that a plaintiff must
demonstrate a "significantly increased risk of harm to health or the
environment so as to make it objectively reasonable for the plaintiffs' members
to deny themselves aesthetic and recreational use of the river." 150 The Second
Circuit rejected a quantitative approach to standing, but sought to provide some
substance to standing criteria by using the severity of the threat as a criterion
for deciding which risks are sufficient for standing purposes. As is discussed in
Part VII.D.3, this Article proposes a quantitative approach to standing where
possible and discusses whether standing was appropriate in Baur.
Spongiform Encephalopathy] known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease ("vCJD") by eating BSE
[Bovine Spongiform Encephalophy]-contaminated beef products." Baur, 352 F.3d at 628; accord Craig,
supra note 1, at 199 n.263; Mank, supra note 51, at 44 n.208.
142. Baur, 352 F.3d at 628; accord Craig, supra note 1, at 199; Mank, supranote 51, at 44.
143. Baur, 352 F.3d at 636; accord Craig, supra note 1, at 199; Mank, supra note 5 1, at 44-45.
144. Baur, 352 F.3d at 637; accord Craig,supra note 1, at 199; Mank, supra note 5 1, at 45.
145. Baur, 352 F.3d at 637-41; accord Craig, supra note 1, at 199; Mank, supra note 51, at 45.
146. Baur, 352 F.3d at 637; accord Craig,supra note 1, at 200; Mank, supra note 51, at 45.
147. Baur, 352 F.2d at 643.
148. Id.; accord Craig, supra note 1, at 200; Mank, supra note 51, at 45.
149. Baur, 352 F.3d at 636.
150. Me. People's Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 284 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 93 (2007); Craig, supra note 1, at 193.
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F.

Shain v. Veneman

In Shain v. Veneman, 15 1 the Eighth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' standing
argument because the alleged risk was not likely to occur during the plaintiffs'
lifetimes or ownership of the property at issue. 152 The plaintiffs alleged that the
government would violate federal law by financing the building of a sewagetreatment plant on a 100-year flood plain near the property they owned or
rented. 153 The district court concluded that the plaintiffs' had failed to allege an
adequate injury because the risk of a 100-year flood is not "imminent" and "is
by definition speculative and unpredictable." 154 Affirming the district court's
dismissal of the case for lack of standing, the Eighth Circuit agreed that the
possibility of a 100-year flood was too remote for standing:
If the possibility of a 100-year flood is remote in the abstract, the
possibility the flood will occur while they own or occupy the land
becomes a matter of sheer speculation. Indeed, one wonders whether
any of the parties (or the court) in this155case will be alive the next time a
100-year flood occurs upon the land.
Additionally, the court argued that the lagoons associated with building
project would have only a slight impact on the risk of a flood: "To whatever
extent the lagoons increase the theoretical risk of flooding on the plaintiffs'
property, they will do so only if the remote risk of a 100-year flood first
156
materializes while the plaintiffs have a property interest in the land."
The Eighth Circuit sought to distinguish the Seventh Circuit's arguably
different approach in Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 157 which had

found standing where the plaintiffs alleged that the construction of a radio
tower on a floodplain would limit the creek's drainage area and increase the
risk of flooding. 158 Although the facts of the case involved the defendant
placing "a huge slab of concrete near the creek ...limiting the creek's drainage
area," the Elk Grove Village court stated, arguably in dicta, that "even a small
probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy-to take a suit
out of the category of the hypothetical-provided of course that the relief
sought would, if granted, reduce the probability.' 15 9 The Shain decision
distinguished the facts in its case from those in Elk Grove Village:

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
55-56.

Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2004).
Mank, supranote 51, at 55-57.
Shain, 376 F.3d at 816; Mank, supranote 51, at 55.
Shain, 376 F.3d at 816, 818; accordMank, supra note 51, at 55.
Shain, 376 F.3d at 818; accordMank, supra note 51, at 55.
Shain, 376 F.3d at 819; accord Mank, supra note 51, at 55.
Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 328-29; accord Mank, supra note 51, at 55.
Elk Grove Village, 997 F.2d at 329; Shain, 376 F.3d at 819; accord Mank, supra note 51, at
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In our mind, Elk Grove is easily distinguishable from this case. There,
the flood plain was a common flood area, which continually imposed
sandbagging and other flood-control costs on the Village of Elk Grove.
Thus, the Village had a direct stake in ensuring the defendant's conduct did
not aggravate a known and predictable danger, even if the marginal
increase in risk defied calculation. Here, in contrast, the danger of the flood
itself is remote and improbable. To whatever extent the lagoons increase
the theoretical risk of flooding on the plaintiffs' property, they will do so
only if the remote risk of a 100-year flood160first materializes while the
plaintiffs have a property interest in the land.
However, because the Elk Grove court did not quantify the increased risk
caused by the construction of the radio tower from the prior risk, it is not clear
whether the risk in Elk Grove was substantially different from the risk in
16
Shain. 1
The Shain decision also distinguished the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman,162 which is discussed
below, 163 where the court had recognized standing for plaintiffs who
challenged the Forest Service's plan to prohibit logging in a national forest
because the plan would increase the probability of a catastrophic fire by
permitting fuel to accumulate in dead trees. 164 In characterizing Mountain
States, the Eighth Circuit contended that there was a distinction between direct
and intervening factors in determining whether there was sufficient injury to
satisfy standing requirements:
The analogy between Glickman and the instant case, of course, is flawed.
There, the defendant's conduct directly and measurably increased the
chances a fire would start; the defendant's conduct was not merely an
intervening factor that could aggravate an independently occurring natural
lagoons
disaster. For this case to become truly analogous to Glickman, the
165
would have to increase the probability of a 100-year flood itself.
The Shain court's distinction between the facts of its case and Mountain
States is debatable because the Forest Service plan in Mountain States arguably
aggravated the "independently occurring natural disaster" of fire by providing
more fuel in the same manner as the lagoons in Shain increased the
harmfulness of the natural disaster of flooding. 166 Additionally, a government
action that significantly aggravates an "independently occurring natural
disaster" should be a sufficient injury for standing if it significantly increases

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Shain, 376 F.3d at 816, 818-19; accord Mank, supra note 51, at 56.
Mank, supra note 51, at 56-57.
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
See infra Part III.B.
Mountain States, 92 F.3d at 1234-35; Mank, supranote 51, at 46, 56-57.
Shain, 376 F.3d at 819; accord Mank, supra note 51, at 56.
Mank, supra note 51, at 56-57.
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either the probability of harm or the magnitude of the harm. 16 7 A stronger
argument would be that the lagoons have such a minor and hypothetical effect
on the risk of flooding that their impact is too remote to justify standing,
although it is not certain from the case how significant a risk the lagoons
68
represented. 1
Although it reached a different result by denying standing, the Eighth
Circuit's reasoning is arguably consistent with the other court of appeals
decisions addressing a plaintiffs' increased risk of disease or harm. 169 The
Shain decision's emphasis that the harm must occur during the lifetime or
ownership of the plaintiffs is consistent with NRDC II and even Baur. In NRDC
1H, the D.C. Circuit explicitly focused on lifetime risk. 170 Even the broad Baur
decision looked at the risk that the plaintiff would contract mad cow disease
during his lifetime. 17 1 Arguably, the result in Shain was appropriately different
because it was the only case in which there was a significant possibility that the
172
harm would occur after the lifetime of or ownership by the plaintiffs.
The Shain decision is also consistent with Laidlaw's framework that
courts should focus on whether there has been an injury to the plaintiff rather
than the environment. 173 It is likely that a 100-year flood will occur someday
near the plaintiffs' property. 174 Indeed, the risk of a flood is likely far greater
than the risk that the plaintiff in Baur will contract mad cow disease. 175 The
Eighth Circuit focusing on the harm to the plaintiffs and not the environment,
however, stated that any such flood likely would take place after the plaintiffs
died or sold or no longer rented the properties. 176 The court ignored the
approximately one in one hundred risk per year that a flood would take place;
that risk is far from trivial during the plaintiffs' lifetimes. Arguably, the Eighth
Circuit in Shain was wrong to find no standing because there was a non-trivial
threat of injury to the plaintiffs.
Pursuant to the Shain decision's reasoning, a private plaintiff cannot sue
for risks that will probably occur after her lifetime. 177 Although less explicit,
the NRDC H and Baur decisions based on a plaintiff's increased risk of future
78
harm seem to assume that the risk must occur during the plaintiff's lifetime.1

167. Id. at 57.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. NRDC 11, 464 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ; Mank, supra note 51, at 57; Sturkie & Seltzer,
supranote 9, at 10294.
171. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 637-41 (2d Cir. 2003); Mank, supra note 51, at 57.
172. Mank, supra note 51, at 57.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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All of the court of appeals decisions discussed above involved private persons
or non-governmental organizations. 179 Standing for a government may be
different from private persons or non-governmental organizations because
180
governments have no fixed lifespan, but are assumed to last indefinitely.
G.

Massachusetts v. EPA

In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court found standing based in part on
projected injuries through the year 2100 to Massachusetts's coastline from
rising sea levels caused by anthropogenic climate change, 18 1 although Chief
Justice Roberts argued in his dissenting opinion that the computer model
projections used as evidence were too unreliable to justify standing. 182 The
Court found that Massachusetts had already suffered injury from the release of
greenhouse gases that trapped heat in the atmosphere and that rising
temperatures caused sea levels to rise. 183 The Court specifically found that
"global sea levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the
twentieth century as a result of global warming" and that "[t]hese rising seas
have already begun to swallow Massachusetts's coastal land."' 184 Additionally,
the majority opinion found that "[t]he severity of that injury will only increase
over the course of the next century."' 185 In a footnote, the Court relied upon a
declaration submitted by an expert witness for Massachusetts "discussing
possible loss of roughly 14 acres of land per miles of coastline by 2100. ' ' 1 86 In
his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the computer model
projections used as evidence were too unreliable to justify standing, and, even
if the projections were correct about the loss of Massachusetts's coastline, that
"accepting a century-long time horizon and a series of compounded estimates
187
renders requirements of imminence and immediacy utterly toothless."
Agreeing with Chief Justice Roberts, Professor Jonathan Adler has argued
that the Massachusetts decision undermined "the traditional requirement that an
alleged injury be 'actual or imminent' by for the first time allowing a future
179. Id.
180. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523 n.20 (2007) (considering future impacts of
global warming through 2100 on Massachusetts coastline in determining that Commonwealth of
Massachusetts had injury sufficient for standing); Mank, supra note 51, at 57-58 (arguing Supreme
Court in Massachusetts considered future impacts of global warming in deciding that Commonwealth of
Massachusetts had injury sufficient for standing).
181. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 497 & n.20.
182. Id. at 541-43 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing Massachusetts use of estimates of sea
level rise through 2100); see Jonathan H. Adler, Essay, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 63, 67-68 (2007) (discussing Massachusetts Court's consideration of future harms
from climate change through 2100); Mank, supra note 32, at 1731, 1741 (same).
183. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521.
184. Id; accord Mank, supra note 32, at 1731.
185. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521; accordMank, supra note 32, at 1731.
186. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523 n.20.
187. Id. at 540-42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); accord Mank, supra note 32, at 1741.
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injury to satisfy the injury requirement. 188 As the discussion in Part II has
demonstrated, Laidlaw and subsequent lower court decisions have allowed
standing based on threatened injury in the near future, although none of the
cases before Massachusetts allowed standing for an injury that might take place
up to ninety-three years into the future. An important issue is whether
Massachusetts'srelaxed approach to the imminence requirement for standing is
limited to state plaintiffs. 189 As discussed in Part L.A and Part II.G,
Massachusetts stated that states were entitled to special standing rights by
virtue of their status in our federal system of government, but also stated that
Massachusetts was entitled to a relaxed approach to the imminence and
redressability portions of the standing test because it was asserting procedural
rights. 190 A non-state plaintiff asserting a procedural injury could argue that
Massachusetts allows consideration of future injuries, 19 1 but it remains to be
seen whether a court would limit the standing analysis in Massachusetts to state
plaintiffs or any plaintiff asserting procedural injuries. 192 The Massachusetts
decision suggested that the Court in the future might adopt a lenient approach
to standing issues, but the Court did not resolve the uncertainties created for
lower courts by Laidlaw's imprecise "reasonable concerns" test.
III.

THE D.C. CIRCUIT APPROACH TO PROBABILISTIC STANDING

The D.C. Circuit has adopted the most stringent standard for plaintiffs
alleging that a government action increased their risk of harm by requiring
plaintiffs to prove that there is a "substantial probability" that the action will
harm them. 193 The D.C. Circuit's standing test is important because the circuit
has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction for many regulatory statutes and hears

188. Adler, supra note 182, at 67-68.
189. Mank, supra note 32, at 1727-29, 1746-52 (discussing to what extent the relaxed standing
approach in Massachusetts is based on special standing rights for states); Mank, supra note 51, at 68-75
(same).
190. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516-22; see supra Parts L.A and II.G.
191. Brown, supra note 40, at 31 (arguing Massachusetts used procedural rights framework to
expand standing rights). But cf Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Safety Admin. (Public Citizen 1), 489
F.3d 1279, 1294 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that states
receive 'special solicitude' in standing analysis, including analysis of imminence. See 549 U.S. at 145455. No state is involved in this case, however.").
192. Mank, supra note 32, at 1727-29, 1746-52 (discussing to what extent the relaxed standing
approach in Massachusettsis based on special standing rights for states or procedural rights in general).
193. Fla. Audubon Society v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665-72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying strict test
for standing in procedural rights case, including requiring a procedural rights plaintiff to demonstrate a
particularized injury, that "a particularized environmental interest of theirs that will suffer demonstrably
increased risk" and that it is "substantially probable" that the agency action will cause the demonstrable
injury alleged by the plaintiff); Leiter, supra note 9, at 404; Mank, supra note 51, at 45-46; Mank, supra
note 9, at 45-63 (discussing split in circuits about how to apply footnote seven standing test in NEPA
cases); Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10461 (discussing substantial probability test in D.C. Circuit);
Sturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10290-91 (same).
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more regulatory cases than any other circuit. 194 Despite its stringent standing
test, the D.C. Circuit has recognized standing for probabilistic injuries in at
least three cases. 195 In its 2007 and 2008 decisions in Public Citizen v. National
Highway Traffic Administration,196 however, a panel of the D.C. Circuit argued
that probabilistic standing was inconsistent with separation-of-powers
principles and in dicta suggested that the Circuit should reconsider prior cases
197
that allowed standing in cases involving probabilistic future injuries.
The D.C. Circuit should abandon its overly strict substantial probability
test and instead adopt a reasonable probability or reasonable concerns test. 198
The substantial probability test is arguably more restrictive than demanded by
Lujan's imminence and concreteness requirements. 199 Further, the substantial
probability test is inconsistent with at least the spirit of Laidlaw's "reasonable
concerns" test.
A.
1.

SubstantialProbabilityTest

Florida Audubon

In 1996, in FloridaAudubon Society v. Bentsen, the D.C. Circuit in an en
banc decision required a plaintiff establishing standing to demonstrate that is
"substantially probable" that a challenged government regulatory action
injured them by causing a "demonstrable increase in risk to their particularized
interest. '20 0 In his concurring opinion, Judge Buckley criticized the majority's
194. Leiter, supra note 9, at 404 n.76 (citing statutes); supranote 11 and accompanying text.
195. NRDC 11,464 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (recognizing standing where members of
organization had increased risk of one in 129,000 and I in 200,000 of developing skin cancer because of
government exemptions for methyl bromide); La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 172 F.3d 65, 67-68
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (recognizing standing where members of organization had increased risk of harm from
hazardous waste sites because of variances granted by EPA); Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing that an incremental increase in the risk
standing requirements).
of forest fires caused by the Forest Service's action satisfied Article III
196. Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d 1279 (2007), modified on reh'g, Public Citizen 11, 513 F.3d 234
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
197. Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10466; see infra Part III.D.
198. Mank, supra note 9, at 60-63; Mank, supra note 51, at 54.
199. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 341 F.3d 961, 972-75 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting
FloridaAudubon Society v.Bentsen's standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs and stating that such
plaintiffs "need only establish 'the reasonable probability of the challenged action's threat to [their]
concrete interest'); Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447-52 (10th Cir. 1996)
(disagreeing with Florida Audubon's "substantial probability" test for procedural rights plaintiffs and
instead adopting a test that plaintiff must establish an "increased risk of adverse environmental
consequences" from the alleged failure to follow NEPA); Leiter, supra note 9, at 404 (arguing D.C.
Circuit's threshold test of substantial harm in standing cases is more stringent than Lujan), Mank, supra
note 51, 54 n.261; Mank, supra note 9, at 45-63 (suggesting D.C. Circuit's standing test is too stringent
and that other circuits have appropriately rejected it).
200. Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664-66 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); see
also id at 669, 671-72; Mank, supra note 9, at 54 (discussing substantial probability test in Florida
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test for placing a heavy burden on plaintiffs to provide evidence that they
would be harmed even though the government was in a far better position to
perform the necessary research. 20 1 Similarly, Judge Rogers's dissenting
opinion, which was joined by Chief Judge Edwards and Judges Wald and Tatel,
argued that the majority's standing test required plaintiffs to perform
20 2
substantial research that should be performed instead by the government.
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have disagreed with the test and several
commentators have criticized the substantial probability test for imposing too
20 3
heavy a burden of proof on plaintiffs to establish standing.
In applying the standard, the Florida Audubon court held that the
plaintiffs' probabilistic allegations were insufficient to meet the court's new
standing test. The plaintiffs sued the Treasury Department and the Internal
Revenue Service for failing to prepare an EIS pursuant to NEPA 20 4 regarding
the environmental impacts of a tax credit for ethyl-tertiary butyl ether (ETBE),
a fuel additive derived from plant-based ethanol. 20 5 The plaintiffs alleged that
the tax credit for ETBE would encourage farmers to increase their production
of corn, sugar cane, and sugar beets-natural sources of ethanol and its
derivative ETBE-and that increased production of these crops would harm
neighboring wildlife areas that the plaintiffs used for recreation and aesthetic
206
enjoyment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the government because
it determined that the plaintiffs did not meet standing requirements. A divided
panel of the D.C. Circuit, however, in an opinion by Judge Rogers, reversed the
district court and concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations met standing
requirements for both injury in fact and causation because the agencies'

Audubon), Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10289-90; llyssa Bimbach, Note, Newly Imposed
Limitations on Citizens' Right to Sue for Standing in a ProceduralRights Case, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REv. 311,312,325 (1998) (same).
201. Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 672 (Buckley, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 9, at 55. See
generally Leiter, supra note 9, at 415 (criticizing D.C. Circuit's standing test for imposing heavy
evidentiary burden and costs to establish standing).
202. Fla.Audubon, 94 F.3d at 674 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 9, at 55.
203. Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 972-75 (rejecting D.C. Circuit's substantial
probability and stating that such plaintiffs "need only establish 'the reasonable probability of the
challenged action's threat to [their] concrete interest"'); Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 447-52 (disagreeing
with D.C. Circuit's "substantial probability" test for procedural rights plaintiffs and instead adopting a
test that plaintiff must establish an "increased risk of adverse environmental consequences" from the
alleged failure to follow NEPA); Leiter, supra note 9, at 393-95, 403-15 (criticizing D.C. Circuit's
substantial probability test); Mank, supra note 9, at 56-63 (discussing and agreeing with Ninth and
Tenth Circuit decisions rejecting D.C. Circuit's substantial probability test and applying more lenient
standing test).
204. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70(f) (2006); Mank, supra
note 9, at 45-47 (discussing the basic structure of the NEPA).
205.
10290.
206.

Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 662; Mank, supra note 9, at 51; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at
Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 662; Mank, supranote 9, at 51-52.
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preparation of an EIS might result in the tax credit being canceled or
adjusted. 20 7 After granting en banc review, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal for lack of standing because the majority concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that it was substantially probable that the
tax credit would cause them particularized injury. 20 8 Even though Congress had
predicted that the tax cut would increase agricultural production in the United
States in the statute's legislative history, the D.C. Circuit found that there were
too many "uncertain links in a causal chain" to be sure that the tax credit would
result in increased crop production among the farmers adjacent to the plaintiffs'
land. 20 9 Additionally, since the plaintiffs could not prove that increased crop
production would occur in areas near them, the court determined that the
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate "a geographical nexus to any asserted
2 10
environmental injury."
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Rogers argued that the plaintiffs "[had]
demonstrated concrete and particularized injury by establishing that they had a
'geographical nexus' to the threatened environmental injury." 2 11 She contended
that the plaintiffs had presented "voluminous evidence" that the tax credit
would encourage neighboring farmers to abandon crop rotation to exclusively
plant crops that produce ethanol, that the resulting monoculture would likely
cause increased erosion of their farm lands, and that soil erosion and water
pollution resulting from greater use of pesticides and fertilizer for crops
producing ethanol ingredients would harm wildlife habitats used and enjoyed
by the plaintiffs. 2 12 Additionally, one plaintiff presented evidence that the tax
credit would encourage farmers to use more pesticides and that these uses
213
would result in contamination of her groundwater and drinking water.
2.

Impact of SubstantialProbabilityTest on ProbabilisticClaims

The Florida Audubon's standing test presents serious difficulties for
plaintiffs asserting probabilistic injuries against the government. A plaintiff
must demonstrate that it is substantially probable that the government's action
will increase the risk of particularized injuries within an area with a
"geographical nexus" to where the plaintiffs live or recreate. 2 14 Judge Rogers's

207. Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 54 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1995), overruled by 94 F.3d 658 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (en banc); Mank, supra note 9, at 52.
208. Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 668-672.
209. Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 666-670; accord Mank, supra note 9, at 52-54; Sturkie & Seltzer,
supra note 9, at 10290.
210. Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 668; accordMank, supra note 9, at 54-55.
211. Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 677 (Rogers, J., dissenting); accordMank, supra note 9, at 56.
212. Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 677 (Rogers, J., dissenting); accordMank, supra note 9, at 56.
213. Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 677-78 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 9, at 56.
214. Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 666-670; Mank, supra note 9, at 52-54; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra
note 9, at 10290.
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dissenting opinion made a sound argument that tax credits would likely cause
problems for the plaintiffs' recreational activities and aesthetic enjoyment, but
the majority demanded greater exactitude in how the credits would precisely
affect neighboring farmers. The majority's evidentiary demands were
formidable despite the fact that the government was in a far better position to
2 15
determine the impact of the tax credit.
Even after Florida Audubon, the D.C. Circuit has sometimes recognized
probabilistic risk. In Louisiana Environmental Action Network v. EPA
(LEAN), 2 16 the D.C. Circuit applied a relatively broad view of what constitutes
a substantial probability of injury. LEAN challenged EPA regulations that
allowed variances from otherwise required treatment standards for hazardous
wastes deposited in landfills. 217 Three members of LEAN lived near a landfill
218
that received waste potentially subject to the challenged regulations.
Although the risks of the hazardous waste to the three plaintiffs were uncertain
and were contingent on which variances the EPA might grant in the future, a
majority of the court found those allegations sufficient for standing since the
govemment had already required the remediation of many other landfills in
Louisiana to prevent harm to the public and EPA had a common practice of
granting some variances at comparable landfills. 2 19 Citing FloridaAudubon,
the LEAN court concluded that the plaintiffs had met the injury-in-fact standing
test because there was a "very 'substantial probability' that some variances will
be granted, increasing risk to LEAN members near the Carlyss site." 220 In a
dissenting opinion, Judge Sentelle argued that the court should have concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing because it was speculative
whether the EPA would grant variances in the future and therefore that the
plaintiffs could not prove that there was a substantial probability that the
regulations would harm them. 22 1 The LEAN decision was not even cited by the
Public Citizen II decision and thus appears to have had less influence in the
D.C. Circuit than the Mountain States and NRDC II decisions, discussed below,
which were extensively discussed in Public Citizen J.222
215. Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 672 (Buckley, J., concurring) (arguing that it was inappropriate to
place heavy evidentiary burden on plaintiffs to prove standing when statute required government to
research the environmental impacts of its projects); Id. at 674 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (same); Mank,
supra note 9, at 55 (same). See generally Leiter, supra note 9, at 415 (criticizing D.C. Circuit's standing
test for imposing heavy evidentiary burden and costs to establish standing).
216. La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 172 F.3d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
217. Id. at 67; Sturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10291.
218. La. Envil. Action Network, 172 F.3d at 67; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10291.
219. La. Envil. Action Network, 172 F.3d at 67-68.
220. La. Envtl. Action Network, 172 F.3d at 68 (emphasis in original) (quoting Fla. Audubon, 94
F.3d at 666); accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10291.
221. La. Envtl. Action Network, 172 F.3d at 71-72 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
222. Public Citizen II, 513 F.3d 234, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (discussing Mountain States
and NRDC H as examples of decisions in the D.C. Circuit allowing standing for probabilistic risk, but
not citing LEAN).
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Mountain States

Only three days after FloridaAudubon was decided, a panel of the D.C.
Circuit recognized standing for probabilistic injuries in Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Glickman.223 The Mountain States decision did not cite Florida
Audubon or use the substantial probability test even though two of the three
judges on the panel had joined the en banc decision just three days before:
Judge Stephen F. Williams, who wrote the Mountain States opinion, and Judge
Henderson. 224 One might speculate that perhaps the Mountain States decision
avoided discussing Florida Audubon because the third member of the panel,
Judge Buckley, had only concurred in the en banc decision. 225 There is also the
possibility that the panel did not want to change an opinion that was almost
finished, but it is impossible to know for certain.
In Mountain States, the court held that the incremental increase in the risk
of future forest fires resulting from the government's action was a sufficient
injury to support constitutional standing for plaintiffs who challenged a Forest
Service plan to prohibit logging in a national forest.2 26 The plaintiffs
demonstrated that the plan would increase the probability of a catastrophic fire
by permitting fuel to accumulate in dead trees. 22 7 Applying an incremental
approach to risk, the court stated that "[t]he more drastic the injury the
government action makes more likely, the lesser the increment in probability
necessary to establish standing." 228 The court explained that "'even a small
probability"' of a drastic harm, such as wildfire, "'is sufficient to ... take [the]
suit out of the category of the hypothetical' and make it an appropriate case
for Article III courts. 229 Agreeing with decisions in other circuits that a court
should consider the severity of a risk in determining standing, the court
concluded that "the potential destruction of fire is so severe that relatively
modest increments in risk should qualify for standing." 230 Thus, the Mountain
States' decision focused more on the expectation of harm rather the risk in
assessing the probabilistic injury.

223. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Sturkie & Seltzer,
supra note 9, at 10290. Mountain States was decided on August 23, 1996. Mountain States, 92 F.3d at
1228. FloridaAudubon was decided on August 20, 1996. Fla.Audubon, 94 F.3d at 658.
224. See Mountain States, 92 F.3d at 1231.
225. Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 661.
226. Mountain States, 92 F.3d at 1234-35; Mank, supra note 51, at 46; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra
note 9, at 10290.
227. Mountain States, 92 F.3d at 1234-35; Mank, supra note 51, at 46; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra
note 9, at 10290.
228. Mountain States, 92 F.3d at 1234; accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10290.
229. Mountain States, 92 F.3d at 1235 (citing Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328,
329 (7th Cir.1993)); accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10290.
230. Mountain States, 92 F.3d at 1235 (emphasis added); accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at
10290.
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Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA I and II

In NRDC II, the D.C. Circuit recognized standing in a case involving
probabilistic future risk, although it had initially rejected probabilistic standing
in NRDC 1.231 In both NRDC decisions, unlike Baur's qualitative approach to
standing, the D.C. Circuit used a quantitative methodology for assessing
whether the plaintiffs had standing, although the court reheard the case after
deciding that its original standing analysis was flawed. 2 32 The court's approach
in NRDC H suggested a reasonable approach to a quantitative standing test, but
also raised questions about its use of the NRDS's membership size as a factor
233
in standing analysis.
I.

NRDC I

In NRDC 1,the plaintiff NRDC petitioned for review of a final rule issued
by the EPA exempting for the year 2005 certain "critical uses" for agricultural
users of the otherwise banned chemical methyl bromide, which destroys
stratospheric ozone. 234 NRDC argued that the rule violated the United States'
treaty obligations under the 1987 Montreal Protocol, 23 5 which requires
signatory nations to phase out and eventually ban chemicals that destroy
stratospheric ozone, and also violated provisions of the Clean Air Act that
implement the Protocol. 236 NRDC argued that the exemptions in the final rule
237
were more than necessary to satisfy critical U.S. uses.
NRDC argued that it had standing because the exemptions would increase
its members' risk of contracting skin cancer or cataracts because the exempted

231. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1), 440 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006), withdrawn,
464 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2006); Craig, supra note 1, at 200-01 (discussing NRDC rs rejection of
NRDC 11,
standing and NRDC Irs finding of standing); Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10287-88, 10291-96
(same).
232. NRDC 1,440 F.3d at 481-83 (quantifying risk of harm to plaintiffs); NRDC 11, 464 F.3d at 7
(same); Craig, supra note 1,at 200-01 (discussing quantitative approach in NRDC I rejecting standing
and subsequent decision finding standing); Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10287-88, 10291-96
(same).
233. See infra Parts III.C.2 and V.
234. NRDC 1, 440 F.3d at 478-80; see EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Process for
Exempting Critical Uses From the Phaseout of Methyl Bromide, Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,982,
76,990 (2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (exempting certain "critical uses" of methyl bromide for
2005).
235. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.Treaty Doc.
No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29; Sturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10291.
236. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 2399, 2648
(implementing the Montreal Protocol), 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(h) (2006) (requiring EPA to "promulgate
rules for reductions in, and terminate the production, importation, and consumption of, methyl bromide
under a schedule that is in accordance with, but not more stringent than, the phaseout schedule of the
Montreal Protocol Treaty as in effect on October 21, 1998"); Mank, supra note 51, at 47 n.226; Sturkie
& Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10291.
237. NRDCI, 440 F.3d at 480; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10292.
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methyl bromide would destroy some stratospheric ozone, which serves a
critical role in protecting human beings by absorbing most dangerous
ultraviolet radiation from the sun so that high levels never reach the surface of
the earth. 23 8 NRDC supported its standing allegations with an affidavit
submitted by Dr. Sasha Madronich, which states that "it is reasonable to expect
more than 10 deaths, more than 2,000 non-fatal skin cancer cases, and more
than 700 cataract cases to result from the 16.8 million pounds of new
production and consumption allowed by the 2005 exemption rule." 23 9 Because
it conceded standing, the EPA did not contest these assumptions or offer a
240
different analysis.
In its initial but later withdrawn decision, the D.C. Circuit held that NRDC
did not have standing to petition the court to review the final rule because the
annualized risk to members of NRDC was too remote and hypothetical to meet
the injury-in-fact portion of the standing test. 24 1 Interpreting Dr. Madronich's
affidavit as predicting deaths over the next 145 years and spread among the
American population of 293 million persons, the D.C. Circuit concluded that
"[w]ith ten more cancer deaths in 145 years, the probability of fatality from
EPA's rule comes to 1 in 4.2 billion per person per year." 24 2 Among NRDC's
490,000 members, the court observed that the risk of death was "infinitesimal:"
one death in approximately 12,000 years. 243 Additionally, the court determined
that the "other risks" were "similarly small"--"a 1 in 21 million chance of
contracting non-fatal skin cancer and a 1 in 61 million chance of getting a
cataract over the next 145 years." 244 The court concluded that the injury was
insufficient to meet the D.C. Circuit's substantial probability test because an
injury must be more than a "'non-trivial' chance of injury" according to
Mountain States and the risk from the exempted methyl bromide to NRDC's
members did not even meet that low standard. 24 5 In light of its decision when it
re-heard the case, it is significant that the court dismissed a 1 in 21 million risk
of contracting skin cancer as too small to justify standing.
Critically, the NRDC I court embraced a quantitative approach to
determining whether the plaintiffs had a sufficient injury for standing. 246 The

238. NRDCI, 440 F.3d at 481-82; Sturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10292.
239. NRDC I, 440 F.3d at 481; accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10292.
240. Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10292 n.89 ("In its merits brief, EPA stated that it 'believes
that Petitioner has satisfied the requirements for Article III standing."').
241. NRDC 1, 440 F.3d at 483-84; Craig, supra note 1, at 200-01; Mank, supra note 51, at 47;
Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10292.
242. NRDC 1, 440 F.3d at 481 (emphasis in original); accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at
10292.
243. NRDC 1,440 F.3d at 482; accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10292.
244. NRDC 1, 440 F.3d at 482; accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10292.
245. NRDC 1,440 F.3d at 483 (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228,
1235 (D.C. Cir.1996)); accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10292-93.
246. NRDCI, 440 F.3d at 481-82; Sturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10292.
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court acknowledged that "[i]n some cases it might not be possible to quantify
the probability of harm;" however, "[i]n other cases, the 'risk'-that is, the
combination of the probability of a negative event and the impact of it-may
affect the assessment. '24 7 The court made its own quantitative calculations by
248
taking Dr. Madronich's numbers and dividing them by the U.S. population.
Furthermore, the court divided the numbers by 145 to determine the annualized
risk.24 9 If the court's risk analysis had been correct, then it would have been
right to dismiss the plaintiffs injury as too small for standing, but the court's
quantitative analysis was flawed, as it conceded in NRDC JJ.250
Despite its calculation of probabilistic risk, NRDC I took a skeptical
approach to probabilistic injuries. The court stated:
Among those [injuries] which fit least well [in deciding which injuries are
actual or imminent for the Court's standing test] are purely probabilistic
injuries. Environmental or public health injuries, for example, may have
complex etiologies that involve the interaction of many discrete risk
factors. The chance that one may develop cancer can hardly be said to be
an "actual" injury-the harm has not 1yet come to pass. Nor is it "imminent"
25
in the sense of temporal proximity.
The court rejected the suggestion in decisions by the Second, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits, citing Baur and Gaston Copper among others, that any "increase in
probability itself constitutes an 'actual or imminent' injury."2 52 The D.C.
Circuit agreed instead with the Eighth Circuit's position in Shain "rejecting 'the
253
proposition that a heightened risk of future harm is a cognizable injury."'
The court concluded "the law of this circuit is that an increase in the likelihood
of harm may constitute injury in fact only if the increase is sufficient to 'take a
2 54
suit out of the category of the hypothetical.'
2.

NRDC II

NRDC petitioned for a re-hearing on the grounds that the court had
miscalculated the risk of the methyl bromide exemption to its members and
therefore had erroneously concluded that NRDC failed to prove an injury in
fact. 2 55 First, NRDC argued that the court erred by focusing only on the ten
247. NRDC 1,440 F.3d at 483; Sturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10293.
248. NRDC I, 440 F.3d at 481-82.
249. Id. at 481-82; Sturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10292.
250. See infra Part III.C.2.
251. NRDC 1,440 F.3d at 483; accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10292.
252. NRDC 1, 440 F.3d at 483-84; accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10293.
253. NRDC I, 440 F.3d at 484 (quoting Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2004));
accordSturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10293.
254. NRDC I, 440 F.3d at 484 (quoting Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228,
1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10293.
255. NRDC Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, No. 04-1438, at 1, 8-11 (D.C. Cir. Apr.
21, 2006) [hereinafter NRDC Pet.]; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10293.
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predicted fatalities from skin cancer, but had largely ignored the 2700 predicted
nonfatal illnesses. 256 Second, NRDC argued that the court mistakenly assumed
the health risks "were spread over 145 years" and as a result erred in dividing
by 145 to determine the annual risk to each person. 257 Because of methyl
bromide's short atmospheric lifetime, almost all the risks will occur during the
lifetimes of the 293 million Americans alive at the time of the suit and therefore
the court should have based its calculations on lifetime risk rather than annual
risks. 258 NRDC argued that the court's one in 4.2 billion risk estimate grossly
underestimated the risk to its members and that the actual risk of death or
serious illness was about one in 100,000, or approximately five of its 490,000
members. 259 NRDC argued that the risk of death or serious illness to five of its
members was sufficient for standing, although it also argued that the court
should have used a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach to
standing. 260 In opposing NRDC's petition for rehearing, the EPA
acknowledged that the court should not have divided the risk by 145, but
26 1
argued that the risk was not "almost 40,000" times higher as NRDC claimed.
The court granted the petition for rehearing and withdrew its previous
opinion because "[i]n their respective petition for and opposition to rehearing,
NRDC and EPA offered new information that has led us to change our view of
the standing issue." 2 62 Both the EPA and the methyl bromide industry
intervenor argued that NRDC had "procedurally defaulted or waived the
arguments it makes in its rehearing petition." 263 Although NRDC had the
burden of proving standing, the court stated that it granted the petition for
rehearing to "correct[]" the "panel's misperception of the evidence" in the first
2 64
decision.
In NRDC II, the court was noticeably less antagonistic to NRDC's
probabilistic standing argument, perhaps chastened by its mistaken analysis in
its first decision. 26 5 While the first decision had characterized probabilistic
claims of increased risk as "[a]mong those that fit least well" in the "definitions
of 'actual' or 'imminent,"' 26 6 the second decision more favorably observed:
Although this claim does not fit comfortably within the Supreme Court's
description of what constitutes an "injury in fact" sufficient to confer

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
04-1438,
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

NRDC Pet., supra note 255, at 9; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10293.
NRDC Pet., supra note 255, at 9; accordSturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10293.
NRDC Pet., supra note 255, at 9; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10293.
NRDC Pet., supra note 255, at 9-10; Sturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10293.
NRDC Pet., supra note 255, at 10-11; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10293.
Respondent EPA's Opposition to NRDC's Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, No.
at 6 n.7 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 2006); accordSturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10293-94.
NRDC 11,464 F.3d 1,3 (D.C. Cir. 2006); accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10294.
NRDC 11, 464 F.3d at 7 n.6.
Id; accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10294.
Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10294.
NRDCI, 440 F.3d at 483; accordSturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10294.
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standing-such injuries must be "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
in risk can at
'hypothetical,"' . . . -we have recognized that increases
2 67
times be "injuries in fact" sufficient to confer standing.
The first decision had mocked the Ninth Circuit's admission that probabilistic
standing claims can be expansive by sarcastically declaring that "expansiveness
is an understatement, '268 but the second decision merely cautioned that "this
category of injury may be too expansive." 269 The first decision was clearly
hostile to courts of appeals that had adopted a liberal approach to recognizing
probabilistic standing claims. 270 The second decision merely observed that the
courts of appeals have disagreed about when an increased risk of harm is
enough to justify standing, and whether the plaintiff must quantify that risk; the
court concluded that it did not have to "answer" that difficult question in this
case. 27 1 The court did not repudiate its earlier criticism of probabilistic
standing, but its tone was less hostile in its second opinion. Cassandra Sturkie
and Nathan Seltzer, two attorneys, argue that the court likely did not change its
generally negative view of probabilistic standing claims expressed in NRDC I,
but believe the court felt compelled to soften its criticism of the plaintiffs
standing allegations when presented with evidence that its erroneous
mathematical calculations in the first opinion significantly underestimated the
risk to the plaintiffs. 272 They believe that the D.C. Circuit remains generally
hostile to claims of standing based on increased risk of injury despite NRDC's
2 73
ultimate success in the methyl bromide case.
The court concluded that NRDC had standing because skin cancer caused
by the methyl bromide exemptions represented a significant lifetime risk to its
members. 274 The court adopted evidence from an EPA expert that the best
measure of risk from ozone depletion is lifetime risk and not the annualized
risk methodology used in its first decision. 275 However, the NRDC decisions
did not provide a precise threshold for what constitutes a substantial probability
of injury. The court found that the lifetime risk that an individual will develop
nonfatal skin cancer as a result of EPA's rule is about one in 200,000 according
to the intervenor's expert or one in 129,000 by the EPA's analysis. 276 The court
determined that this evidence demonstrating that two to four members of
NRDC's approximately half a million members would develop skin cancer
during their lifetimes as a result of EPA's rule was sufficient injury for NRDC
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

NRDC II, 464 F.3d at 6; accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10294.
NRDC I, 440 F.3d at 484; accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10294.
NRDC II, 464 F.3d at 6; accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10294.
See NRDC I, 440 F.3d at 483-84; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10293.
NRDC II, 464 F.3d at 6; Craig, supra note 1, at 201.
Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10295-96.
Id.
NRDC II, 464 F.3d at 5-7; Craig, supra note 1, at 201; Mank, supra note 51, at 47.
NRDC II, 464 F.3d at 7; Craig, supra note 1,at 201; Mank, supra note 51, at 48.
NRDC II, 464 F.3d at 7; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10294.
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to have standing. 277 By contrast, in NRDC 1, a one in 21 million chance of
contracting nonfatal skin cancer was insufficient for standing. 278 Although the
court did not explain what level of risk was sufficient for standing, it may have
implicitly used a one in one million standard, which, as is discussed below, is
2 79
used by many regulatory agencies and statutes as a key risk threshold.
D.

Public Citizen I and II

Following the NRDC decisions, a panel of the D.C. Circuit in two related
decisions questioned whether probabilistic injuries are ever sufficient for
constitutional standing in Public Citizen v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (Public Citizen I and Public Citizen 1). 280 Despite serious
questions about whether Public Citizen could meet standing requirements, the
Public Citizen I decision allowed Public Citizen to file affidavits demonstrating
the specific risks that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's
(NHTSA) rule posed to its members. 28 1 In Public Citizen I, the court
acknowledged that the D.C. Circuit in Mountain States and NRDC II had
allowed standing for probabilistic future injuries, but strongly questioned
whether standing in such cases violated separation-of-powers principles by
intruding on the role of the political branches. 2 82 The Public Citizen H court
suggested that the Circuit should sit as an en banc court in a future case to
283
address whether probabilistic standing should be allowable at all.
Public Citizen alleged that its members had an increased probability of
future injury from an automobile accident because the NHTSA's standards for
tire pressure monitors were less stringent than the alternative requirements that
Public Citizen had proposed. 2 84 In 2000, Congress enacted the Transportation
Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act (TREAD Act) to
require new tire safety requirements. 285 The TREAD Act required the Secretary
of Transportation to issue regulations mandating new vehicles to include a

277. NRDC 11, 464 F.3d at 7; Craig, supranote 1, at 201; Mank, supranote 51, at 48.
278. NRDC1, 440 F.3d at 482; Sturkie & Seltzer, supranote 9, at 10292.
279. See infra Parts VII.B and VII.D.1.
280. Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d 1279, 1291-98 (D.C. Cir. 2007), modified after rehearing,Public
Citizen 11, 513 F.3d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 1046367, 10470-72 (arguing that the two Public Citizen decisions seek to severely limit or eliminate
probabilistic standing claims).
281. Public Citizen L 489 F.3d at 1296-98; Mank, supra note 51, at 51-52.
282. Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d at 1291-98, Public Citizen 11, 513 F.3d at 237, 241; Sturkie &
Logan, supranote 9, at 10465-66.
283. Public Citizen 11, 513 F.3d at 241; Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10466.
284. Public Citizen L 489 F.3d at 1291-98; Mank, supra note 51, at 51-52; Sturkie& Logan, supra
note 9, at 10464.
285. See Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation Act, Pub. L. No.
106-414, § 13, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000); Mank, supra note 51, at 49.

2009]

STANDING AND STATISTICAL PERSONS

warning system "to indicate to the operator when a tire is significantly under286
inflated.
In 2005, the NHTSA promulgated a final rule regulating tire safety:
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 138.287 Standard 138 requires
automakers to install tire pressure monitoring systems that warn drivers "when
the pressure in the vehicle's tires is approaching a level at which permanent tire
damage could be sustained as a result of heat buildup and tire failure is
possible." 288 Public Citizen, four individual tire manufacturers, and the Tire
Industry Association filed petitions for review in the D.C. Circuit that
challenged Standard 138 for four alleged deficiencies: (1) the absence of a
requirement that pressure monitors be compatible with all replacement tires; (2)
the up to twenty minute delay between significant under-inflation and the
illumination of the dashboard warning light; (3) the use of the 25 percent below
placard pressure standard for under-inflation; and (4) the testing that NHTSA
28 9
required for pressure monitors.
1.

Public Citizen I

Public Citizen I was hostile to Public Citizen's claim of probabilistic
standing. 290 The court suggested that Public Citizen had failed to meet standing
requirements, but a majority of the court allowed Public Citizen to file
supplemental briefs to address whether Standard 138 increased the probability
that its members would be injured in a traffic accident. 29 1 The court first
acknowledged that Public Citizen had demonstrated a "concrete" and
"particularized" injury because "injuries from car accidents are particularized
-each person who is in an accident is harmed personally and distinctly" and
they are concrete even if many other persons suffer similar injuries. 292 The
court, however, questioned whether Public Citizen's alleged injuries were
"actual or imminent" because Public Citizen raised only "remote and
speculative claims of possible future harm to its members." 293 The court
doubted whether the future traffic injuries alleged by Public Citizen were
"imminent" because:
286. Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation Act, Pub. L. no. 106414, § 13, 114 Stat. at 1806 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30123 note); accord Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9,
at 10464.
287. See Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,136 (Apr. 8, 2005) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 571, 585), recon. granted in part, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,079 (Sept. 7, 2005); Mank, supra note 51,
at 49.
288. 70 Fed. Reg. at 18,148; accord Mank, supra note 51, at 49.
289. Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d at 1286; Mank, supranote 51, at 49.
290. Sturkie & Logan, supranote 9, at 10464-65.
291. Public Citizen 1,489 F.3d 1291-98; Mank, supra note 51, at 50; Sturkie & Logan, supra note
9, at 10464-65.
292. Public Citizen 1,489 F.3d at 1292-93; accord Sturkie & Logan, supranote 9, at 10464.
293. Public Citizen 1,489 F.3d at 1293-95; accord Sturkie & Logan, supranote 9, at 10464.
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no one can say who those several hundred individuals are out of the 300
million people in the United States, nor can anyone say when such
accidents might occur. For any particular individual, the odds of such an
accident occurring are extremely remote and speculative, and the time (if
294
ever) when any such accident would occur is entirely uncertain.
Further, the court stated that Public Citizen could not gain standing by
aggregating the claims of its members, stating, "[n]or does it help Public
Citizen to aggregate a series of remote and speculative claims." 295 The fact that
Public Citizens had 130,000 members did not help its standing case. The court
stated:
Under the Supreme Court's precedents, it therefore does Public Citizen no
good to string together 130,000 remote and speculative claims rather than
one remote and speculative claim. Each claim is still remote and
speculative, which under the Supreme Court's precedents is an
296
impermissible basis for our exercising the judicial power.
Unlike NRDC II, the number of members of the plaintiff's organization did not
affect whether it had standing because Public Citizen I treated the plaintiffs
allegations of future probabilistic harm as speculative.
The Public Citizen court maintained that the political branches rather than
the courts should decide claims of probabilistic harm:
To the extent Congress is concerned about Executive under-regulation or
under-enforcement of statutes, it also may exercise its oversight role and
power of the purse . . . .The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
disputes about future events where the possibility of harm to any given
individual is remote and speculative are properly left to the policymaking
297
Branches, not the Article III courts.
The court concluded that judicial recognition of probabilistic harm cases was
improper because "virtually any citizen-because of a fractional chance of
benefit from alternative action-would have standing to obtain judicial review
of the agency's choice" and recognition of such claims would open the
floodgates to judicial challenges of almost all executive actions. 29 8 The
recognition of probabilistic claims:
would drain the "actual or imminent" requirement of meaning in cases
involving consumer challenges to an agency's regulation (or lack of
regulation); would expand the "proper-and properly limited"constitutional role of the Judicial Branch beyond deciding actual cases or
controversies; and would entail the Judiciary exercising some part of the

294. Public Citizen L 489 F.3d at 1293-94; accord Mank, supra note 51, at 50; Sturkie & Logan,
supra note 9, at 10464.
295. Public Citizen L 489 F.3d at 1294.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.at 1295; accord Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10464-65.
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Executive's responsibility to take care that the law be faithfully
299
executed.
Accordingly, the court asserted that, "[a]llowing a party to assert such remote
and speculative claims to obtain federal court jurisdiction threatens . . .to
eviscerate the Supreme Court's standing doctrine ....300
Public Citizen I posed the following question: "What increase in the risk
of harm and what level of ultimate risk are high enough to be 'substantial'and thus to render the harm sufficiently 'imminent'? '30 1 The court observed
that "Mountain States did not specify any hard-and-fast numerical rules" for
what constitutes a substantial injury. 30 2 The Public Citizen court concluded that
Supreme Court precedents required a strict approach to what is a substantial
risk:
In applying the "substantial" standard, we are mindful, of course, that the
constitutional requirement of imminence as articulated by the Supreme
Court--even if this Court has said it does not completely bar increasedrisk-of-harm claims-necessarily compels a very strict understanding of
'30 3
what increases in risk and overall risk levels can count as "substantial.
The court explained that it had allowed increased risk of harm claims when a
plaintiff met two tests: "We have allowed standing when there was at least both
...
a substantially increased risk of harm and.., a substantial probability of
harm with that increase taken into account. '30 4 This two-part interpretation of
the substantial probability test is arguably more stringent than the way the D.C.
30 5
Circuit had applied the test in previous cases.
The Public Citizen decision rejected the suggestion by Professor Cass
Sunstein that an "'increased risk' is itself concrete, particularized, and actual
injury for standing purposes." 30 6 The court raised several objections to that
possibility. It stated:
First, the mere increased risk of some event occurring is utterly abstractnot concrete, direct, real, and palpable .... Second, increased risk falls on

a population in an undifferentiated and generalized manner; everyone in the

299. Public Citizen ,489 F.3d at 1295 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
300. Id. at 1294. But see Brown, supra note 40, at 47 (arguing "Take Care" clause in Article II of
the Constitution does not give the President discretion to ignore legal requirements, but requires the
President to obey the law); Cheh, supranote 87, at 275 (same).
301. Public Citizen 1,489 F.3d at 1295.
302. Id.at 1296; accordSturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10465.
303. Public Citizen 1,489 F.3d at 1296; accord Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10465.
304. Public Citizen 1,489 F.3d at 1295 (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d
1228, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (emphasis in original); accordSturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10465
(arguing Public Citizen's two-part substantial probability test is more stringent than the test used in prior
cases).
305. Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10465 (arguing that Public Citizen's two-part substantial
probability test is more stringent than the test used in prior cases).
306. Public Citizen 1,489 F.3d at 1297 (emphasis in original) (citing cf Sunstein, supra note 6, at
228).
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relevant population is hit with the same dose of risk, so there is no
particularization ....Third, the Supreme Court has said that, in temporal

terms, there are three kinds of harm-actual harms, imminent harms, and
potential future harms that are not imminent .... Treating the increased

risk of future harm as an actual harm, however, would eliminate these
categories. Under this approach, possible future injuries, whether or not
they are imminent, would magically become concrete, particularized, and
actual injuries merely because they could occur. That makes no sense,
except as a creative way to end-run the Supreme Court's standing
307
precedents.
2.

Public Citizen II

After the litigants submitted supplemental briefs, the D.C. Circuit in
Public Citizen 11 held in a per curium opinion that Public Citizen did not have
standing. 30 8 The court determined that Public Citizen's statistical analysis did
not prove that its members were at an increased risk of traffic injuries from
Standard 138 compared to Public Citizen's alternative proposals. 30 9 Public
Citizen was not able to quantify the number of excess injuries resulting from
Standard 138's allowance of up to a twenty minute lag time between underinflation of a tire and the activation of a dashboard warning light compared to
Public Citizen's one-minute lag time proposal. 3 10 Additionally, Public
Citizen's argument that Standard 138's use of a 25 percent below placard
pressure measure would result in a lifetime risk of fatalities between 1.2 and
8.3 per 100,000 compared to its more stringent pressure proposal was fatally
flawed, according to the court, because Public Citizen statistical calculations
included recalled tires and tires subject to safety programs that are more likely
3
to suffer from structural defects than tire pressure problems. 11
The Public Citizen II majority suggested that it believed that courts should
not recognize standing in any case alleging probabilistic injury, but conceded
that a panel decision could not prohibit such suits in light of Mountain States
3 12
and NRDC 11, even though the majority viewed these decisions as flawed.
The court stated, "[i]f we were deciding this case based solely on the Supreme
Court's precedents, we would agree with the separate opinion." 313 In light of
307. Public Citizen 1,489 F.3d at 1297-98 (emphasis in original); accord Sturkie & Logan, supra
note 9, at 10465.
308. Public Citizen 11, 513 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Mank, supra note 51, at 52-54; Sturkie &
Logan, supranote 9, at 10465-67.
309. Public Citizen IL 513 F.3d at 238-41; Mank, supra note 51, at 52; Sturkie & Logan, supra
note 9, at 10465-66.
310. Public Citizen 11,
513 F.3d at 239-40; Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10466.
311. Public Citizen I, 513 F.3d at 240; Sturkie & Logan, supranote 9, at 10466.
312. Public Citizen 11, 513 F.3d at 241; Mank, supra note 51, at 52-53; Sturkie & Logan, supra
note 9, at 10466.
313. Public Citizen IA 513 F.3d at 241.
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the circuit's precedent allowing standing in those two cases, the Public Citizen
H decision acknowledged that "[a]s we read our decisions in Mountain States
and NRDC [Ii], however, 'this Court has not closed the door to all increasedrisk-of-harm cases."' 314 The court suggested that the circuit should address the
appropriateness of standing based on probabilistic injuries in an en banc
decision: "[i]n an appropriate case, the en banc Court may have to consider
whether or how the Mountain States principle should apply to general
consumer challenges to safety regulations." 3 15 The Public Citizen II court
concluded that it would apply a stringent standard of proof in cases in which a
plaintiff sought standing based upon probabilistic injuries because "'the
constitutional requirement of imminence as articulated by the Supreme Court'
requires 'a very strict understanding of what increases in risk and overall risk
3 16
levels' will support injury in fact."
In his separate concurring opinion in Public Citizen II, Judge Sentelle
argued that courts should reject all probabilistic standing cases based on an
increased risk of injury because their consideration results in courts violating
their limited constitutional role and interfering with the functions of the
political branches:
As the majority noted in the earlier iteration of this litigation, the
probabilistic approach to standing now being applied in increased-risk
cases expands the "'proper-and properly limited'--constitutional role of
the Judicial Branch beyond deciding actual cases or controversies; and...
entail[s] the Judiciary exercising some part of the Executive's
'3 17
responsibility to take care that the law be faithfully executed.
The majority's discussion today illustrates the ill fit between judicial
power and that sort of future event and possible harm. The wide-ranging,
near-merits discussion at the standing threshold is the sort of thing that
congressional committees and executive agencies exist to explore. The
judicial process is constitutionally designed for cases or controversies
involving actual or imminent harm to identified persons-that is, the
persons who have standing. If we do not soon abandon this idea of

314. Id.at 241 (quoting Public Citizen 1, 1279, 1295 (D.C.Cit. 2007)); accord Mank, supra note
51, at 53.
315. Public Citizen I, 513 F.3d at 241; accordMank, supra note 51, at 53; Sturkie & Logan, supra
note 9, at 10466. Public Citizen will apparently not seek en bane review because it fears that an en bane
court might hold that standing may never be based on future injuries. Dawn Reeves & Lara Beaven, Key
Court Eyes New Bid To Limit Standing In Suits Against EPA, Experts Say, INSIDE EPA, January 25,
2008, availableat insideepa.com (subscription required), LEXIS Allnews, 2008 WLNR 1340003.
316. Public Citizen I, 513 F.3d at 241 (quoting Public Citizen 1,489 F.3d at 1296); accordMank,
supra note 51, at 53-54; Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10466-67.
317. Public Citizen I, 513 F.3d at 242 (Sentelle, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Public
Citizen 1, 489 F.3d at 1295).
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probabilistic harm, we will find ourselves looking more and more like
318
legislatures rather than courts.
Part VI.D disagrees with the Public Citizen majority decision and Judge
Sentelle's standing analysis, and argues that probabilistic standing can be
3 19
consistent with separation-of-powers principles.
3.

International Board of Teamsters v. Pefia

It is instructive to compare Public Citizen with a 1994 decision of the D.C.
Circuit, which was decided after Lujan but before the circuit adopted the
substantial probability test in its 1996 Florida Audubon decision. In
International Board of Teamsters v. Peha, a labor union representing truck
drivers sued to challenge a regulation promulgated by Federal Highway
Administration to implement a memorandum of understanding between the
United States and Mexico regarding recognition of each country's commercial
drivers licenses. 320 The union argued that allowing Mexican truckers to drive
on American roads would threaten not only their members' livelihood because
of increased competition, but also their safety "from a possible increase in the
number of truck accidents" since the requirements for commercial drivers
licenses are less stringent in Mexico. 32 1 The court found that the union's
allegations of a possible safety risk were sufficient for standing. The court
declared:
Focusing on the union's claims about highway safety, the government
protests that these claims--even if true-would merely establish an injury
that the union's members share with everyone who uses the highways...
Since the union has adequately alleged a concrete injury, there appears to
be no constitutional bar to standing, even if every inhabitant of the country
suffers the same concrete injury ....But we need not address this point,
because the union's members spend far more time on the roads than most
other Americans. Reductions in highway safety would cause more harm to
at large, and so the injury is not
them than to typical members of the public
"common to all members of the public." 322
Because commercial truckers drive more than the average member of the
public, the court concluded that their increased risk was enough to give them a
differentiated risk not common to the public. 323 It is not clear that the Public

318. Id.; Mank, supra note 51, at 52-53; Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10466-67. But see
Brown, supra note 40, at 47 (arguing "Take Care" clause in Article 11of the Constitution does not give
the President discretion to ignore legal requirements, but requires the President to obey the law); Cheh,
supra note 87, at 275 (same).
319. See infra Part VI.D.
320. Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. Pefla, 17 F.3d 1478, 1480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
321. Id.
at 1482-83.
at 1483 (citing SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 1483.

2009]

STANDING AND STATISTICAL PERSONS

Citizen court would have found standing with these facts because the

possibility of increased accidents probably is not enough to constitute a
"substantial probability" of injury since it is not clear how likely it is that those
injuries will occur.
Although only in dicta, InternationalBoardof Teamsters suggested that it

might have allowed standing for the public at large because the injury was
concrete, and cited SCRAP for the principle that there is standing for concrete
injuries even if every person in the United States is injured. Professor Sunstein
cited the case as supporting the proposition that Congress could "give standing
to all drivers to challenge acts that increase the risk of accidents on
highways." 32 4 The Public Citizen decisions

would clearly

reject that

proposition. It is remarkable how different the approach to standing is in Public
Citizen compared to International Board of Teamsters even though both

decisions were applying the same standing test announced in Lujan.
E.

The D. C. Circuit's SubstantialProbabilityTest Should Be Abandoned

The substantial probability test places too heavy an evidentiary burden on
plaintiffs and should be abandoned. In FloridaAudubon, both Judge Buckley's

concurring opinion 325 and Judge Roger's dissenting opinion convincingly
argued that the majority's standing test unreasonably required plaintiffs to
perform substantial and burdensome research about the impacts of the
government's action that the government should be required to address. 326 The

Ninth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have rejected the D.C. Circuit's standing
test because of its unreasonably heavy burdens on plaintiffs. 327 Professor
Amanda Leiter notes that "[u]nder the D.C. Circuit precedents, plaintiffs bear
the burden of establishing the substantiality of the challenged risk in their first
substantive filing to the court-a requirement that may necessitate conducting
extensive interviews, preparing myriad affidavits, hiring statistical experts, and
324. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U.
PA. L. REv. 613, at 672, n.256 (1999) (citing InternationalBd of Teamsters, 17 F.3d at 1483-87).
325. Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Buckley, J., concurring).
326. Id. at 674 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
327. Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 341 F.3d 961, 972-75 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Fla.
Audubon's standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs and stating that such plaintiffs "need only
establish 'the reasonable probability of the challenged action's threat to [their] concrete interest"');
Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447-52 (10th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with Fla.
Audubon's "substantial probability" test for procedural rights plaintiffs and instead adopting a test that
plaintiff must establish an "increased risk of adverse environmental consequences" from the alleged
failure to follow NEPA); see also Mank, supranote 9, at 45-63 (discussing split in circuits about how to
apply footnote seven standing test in NEPA cases); Mank, supra note 32, at 1720 n.91; Bertagna, supra
note 14, at 461-64 (discussing split between Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits on causation
portion of standing test); Sakas, supra note 53, at 192-204 ("The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have held
that a plaintiff need not have a claim that is site-specific, while the D.C., Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
have created a stricter standing doctrine where a site-specific injury is necessary" in procedural injury
challenges to programmatic rules.).
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perhaps even developing new statistical models." 328 The D.C. Circuit's
standing test is likely to be especially burdensome on plaintiffs raising
32 9
probabilistic claims that depend upon statistical and risk analysis.
The substantial probability test is contrary to Laidlaw, at least in spirit.
Pursuant to Laidlaw and decisions in the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, a
person who alters their recreational activities because of a reasonable fear of
possible harm from pollution has standing to sue, even though many other
persons have a similar risk and the actual risk to the plaintiff may be quite
33 0
small.
The D.C. Circuit has sometimes avoided the substantial probability test by
relying on Laidlaw's exception for recreational or aesthetic injuries. For
33 1
example, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA (NRDC Plywood),
which was decided four days after Public Citizen I, a panel of the D.C. Circuit
held that NRDC had standing because two of its members curtailed their
recreational activities because of air pollution from plywood and composite
wood products plants. 332 The court avoided addressing whether the probability
of injury was too low, despite extensive discussion in the briefs and oral
argument. 333 In fact, the EPA had classified the plants as "low risk."'3 34 The
relatively lenient approach to standing in NRDC Plywood is inconsistent with
the spirit of the stringent approach to standing in Public Citizen.
The contrast between the lenient approach to standing in NRDC Plywood
and the stringent approach in Public Citizen suggests that there are tensions
between the stringent substantial probability test and the more relaxed Laidlaw
"reasonable concerns" test. Cassandra Sturkie and Suzanne Logan, two
attorneys, argue that the different result in NRDC Plywood may be because the
court applies a more relaxed approach to standing in environmental cases
involving increased risk claims in light of Laidlaw and that the circuit now
takes a consistently stringent approach to standing in non-environmental
cases. 335 In Virginia State Corp. Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory
336
a panel of the D.C. Circuit in dicta
Commission (Virginia SCC),
distinguished between its approach to standing in environmental and non328. Leiter, supra note 9, at 415.
329. See id. (arguing D.C. Circuit's standing text places heavier burden on plaintiffs raising
complicated issues).
330. See supra Parts I.A-D.
331. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
332. Id.
at 1370-71.
333. Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10467-70; Panel Discussion, Risky Business, Massachusetts
v. EPA, Risk-Based Harm, and Standing in the D.C. Circuit, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10057,
10058 (2008) (comments of Amanda Leiter, Visiting Professor, Georgetown Law School and.former
attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council).
334. Natural Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1369-70; accord Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at
10467-70.
335. Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10469-70.
336. Va. State Corp. Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 468 F.3d 845 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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environmental cases, stating that "[o]utside the realm of environmental disputes
• . . we have suggested that a claim of increased risk or probability cannot
suffice." 33 7 Even if the D.C. Circuit is applying the test differently in
environmental and non-environmental cases, the circuit's different approach
between those two types of cases raises questions about the intellectual
consistency of its approach to standing. The Virginia SCC decision
acknowledged that "[t]he word 'substantial"' in the "substantial probability"
standard "poses questions of degree . . . far from fully resolved."3'38
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit should abandon its complicated and difficult-toapply substantial probability test for standing because it is more stringent than
required by Laidlaw, and should instead adopt the reasonable probability test
used in the Ninth Circuit because the latter test is closer to the spirit of the
Laidlaw decision. 339 Further, if the D.C. Circuit abandoned the "substantial
probability" test it arguably could achieve more consistent decisions by
eliminating the sharp contrast between that test and the Laidlaw exception for
aesthetic and recreational injuries.
Further, the D.C. Circuit should reject Public Citizen's hostile approach to
cases involving probabilistic injury. As is discussed below, a probabilistic
approach to standing is necessary to address risks that pose concrete injuries to
many people. 340 Additionally, probabilistic standing is consistent with
Laidlaw's allowance of standing where plaintiffs have "reasonable concerns"
about a risky activity but no proven injury. 34 1 This Article's proposal for a one
in one million risk standard for those cases where statistical evidence is
available would exclude weak cases that could overburden the judiciary, but
342
would allow cases involving a meaningful level of risk to proceed.
IV.

ARE PROBABILISTIC RISKS "GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES" FOR THE POLITICAL
BRANCHES OR WIDELY SHARED CONCRETE INJURIES FOR THE COURTS?

The two Public Citizen decisions held that claims of probabilistic injuries
were better decided by the political branches. 343 These two decisions failed to
distinguish between abstract suits seeking general compliance with general
statutory duties, and suits where the plaintiff is at risk of a genuine concrete
injury. Professor Elliott has observed that courts have distinguished between

337. Id at 848; accord Sturkie & Logan, supranote 9, at 10463.
338. Va. State Corp. Comm 'n, 468 F.3d at 848; accordSturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10463.
339. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 341 F.3d 961, 972-75 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting
Fla. Audubon's standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs and stating that such plaintiffs "need only
establish 'the reasonable probability of the challenged action's threat to [their] concrete interest"');
Mank, supra note 9, at 59, 82-83 (arguing courts should use Ninth Circuit's reasonable probability
standard in deciding standing in cases involving probabilistic injuries).
340. See infra Parts VI.C and VII.
341. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-83 (2000).
342. See infra Part VII.C.
343. Public Citizen 11, 513 F.3d at 237-38; Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d at 1292-95.
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generalized grievance claims "when the plaintiff cannot distinguish himself in a
meaningful way from other citizens," which do not give rise to standing, from
"injuries that are widely shared yet particularized for each plaintiff," which are
an appropriate basis for standing. 344 Citizens should be able to sue the
government to prevent environmental and consumer safety violations that may
result in concrete and particularized injuries to the plaintiffs.
Before 1998, the Court stated in several cases that it is inappropriate to
grant standing to plaintiffs with generalized injuries because the political
branches are better suited to address issues that affect all citizens equally. 345 In
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., the Supreme
Court stated that "we have declined to grant standing where the harm asserted
amounts only to a generalized grievance shared by a large number of citizens in
a substantially equal measure" because such suits raised "general prudential
concerns 'about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society.' 346 In Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, the Court
explained that the generalized grievance doctrine enabled "the judiciary ... to
avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights
would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants
best suited to assert a particular claim." 34 7 The Court in Warth v. Seldin
declared that the concrete injury requirement of the standing doctrine is
necessary because "[w]ithout such limitations .. .the courts would be called
upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other
governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and

344. Elliott, supra note 17, at 477.
345. Elliott, supra note 17, at 475-78.
346. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (quoting Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). There has been controversy about whether the Supreme Court's
limitation on suits involving generalized grievances is a prudential limitation that Congress can override
or is a constitutional requirement that is beyond Congress's authority to waive. Justice Scalia's Lujan
opinion suggested that the judicial rule against suits involving generalized grievances was constitutional
in nature. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-77 (1992); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 94 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing Lujan holding); Brown, supra note 80, at 681
("[l]n Lujan, the plurality construed [the generalized grievance restriction] as part-and-parcel of the
case-or-controversy requirement."); Sunstein, supra note 324, at 643-44 ("Before Akins, it was fair to
say that the ban on generalized grievances was moving from a prudential one to one rooted in Article Il1.
Lujan seemed to suggest that to have standing, citizens would have to show that their injuries were
'particular' in the sense that they were not widely shared."). Subsequently, the Court in Akins suggested
that the restriction on general grievances suits was usually a prudential limitation, but did not rule out
that the restriction might sometimes be a constitutional barrier to standing. Fed. Elections Comm'n v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11,23 (1998) ("Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the
Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political
process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared
grievance." (citing cases)); Brown, supra note 80, at 681; Mank, supra note 32, at 1715; Sunstein, supra
note 324, at 643-45; see infra note 360 and accompanying text.
347. Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,99-100 (1979).
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even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual
34 8
rights."
In its 1998 decision Federal Election Commission v. Akins (Akins), the
Supreme Court explained which types of mass or general injuries are
appropriate for judicial review. 349 Although the plaintiffs were situated
similarly to other voters, the Court granted standing to plaintiffs requesting
information from the Federal Election Commission because the statute
specifically authorized citizen suits, as many environmental statutes do, and
thus overrode any prudential limitations against generalized grievances. 350 The
Court explained that it would deny standing for widely shared, generalized
injuries only if the harm is both widely shared and additionally of "an abstract
and indefinite nature-for example, harm to the 'common concern for
obedience to law."' 35 1 The Akins decision read the Court's prior decisions as
denying standing only if an alleged injury was too abstract, but as approving
standing even if many people suffered similar concrete injuries. 35 2 The Court
observed that the fact that "an injury ... [is] widely shared ... does not, by
itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such an
interest, where sufficiently concrete, may count as an 'injury in fact. 353
Thus, under Akins, a plaintiff who suffers a concrete actual injury may sue
even though many others have suffered similar injuries:
The fact that a political forum may be more readily available where an
injury is widely shared ... does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an
This conclusion seems particularly
interest for Article III purposes ....
obvious where (to use a hypothetical example) large numbers of individuals
suffer the same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass tort), or where

348. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500; accordElliott, supra note 17, at 463, 478.
349. 524 U.S. at 21-25 (discussing Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)
(1994) (stating that an aggrieved party may file a petition if the FEC dismisses a complaint or fails to act
on a complaint within the stated time period)); David R. Hodas, Standing and Climate Change: Can
Anyone Complain About the Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 471 (2000) (discussing
Akins); Mank, supra note 9, at 37-40 (same); Mank, supra note 32, at 1713 (same); Sunstein, supra note
324, at 634-36, 644-45 (same).
350. Akins, 524 U.S. at 13-21; Hodas, supra note 349, at 471; Brown, supra note 80, at 678; Mank,
supra note 9, at 37; Mank, supra note 32, at 1713; Sunstein, supra note 324, at 616, 634-36, 642-45,
671-75 (stating that Akins concluded that statute at issue overrode any prudential limitations against
generalized grievances).
351. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25 (1998); accord Hodas, supra note 349, at 471-72; Mank, supra note
9, at 37-40 (discussing Akins); Mank, supranote 32, at 1713 (same); Sunstein, supra note 324, at 63436 (same).
352. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; Mank, supra note 9, at 38; Mank, supra note 32, at 1713-14;
Sunstein, supranote 324, at 636, 644 (same).
353. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added); accord Mank, supra note 9, at 38; Mank, supra note
32, at 1714.
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large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights conferred by
law.

3 54

In Pye v. United States, the Fourth Circuit summarized Akins as holding that
"so long as the plaintiff... has a concrete and particularized injury, it does not
matter that legions of other persons have the same injury." 355 Thus, Akins
makes clear that courts should not deny standing merely because large numbers
of persons have the same or similar injuries so long as those injuries are
concrete.
The Akins decision emphasized that courts should weigh congressional
intent when determining whether an injury is concrete or abstract. 356 The Court
stated: "The informational injury at issue here, directly related to voting, the
most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific" so as not to
"deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the
federal courts." 357 In recognizing that Congress has broad authority to define

which injuries are sufficient for constitutional standing, the Akins majority was
closer to the approach in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan than
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lujan.358 In his Lujan opinion, Justice
Scalia emphasized that Article III prohibits standing for a plaintiff who has
only a mere generalized grievance about the failure of the government to
enforce the law and no concrete injury even if Congress has authorized any
citizen to sue. 359 By contrast, Akins suggested that the standing doctrine

354. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; accord Hodas, supra note 349, at 472; Mank, supra note 9, at 38;
Mank, supra note 32, at 1714.
355. Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459,469 (4th Cir. 2001); accordMank, supranote 32, at 1714.
356. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; Brown, supra note 80, at 688, 690-94 (arguing Akins recognized
that Congress has significant power to define which injuries are sufficient for Article III standing);
Sunstein, supra note 324, at 616-17, 636, 645 (arguing Akins gives Congress the authority to waive the
prudential presumption against suits involving generalized grievances, especially in suits involving
informational injuries).
357. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; accord Brown, supra note 80, at 688, 690-94 (arguing Akins
recognized that Congress has significant power to define which injuries are sufficient for Article III
standing); Sunstein, supra note 324, at 616-17, 636, 645 (arguing Akins gives Congress the authority to
waive the prudential presumption against suits involving generalized grievances, especially in suits
involving informational injuries).
358. See Brown, supra note 80, at 693-94 (arguing that Akins "elevated Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Lujan, in which he reiterated that Congress is empowered to define injuries that give rise
to a cause of action that did not exist at common law"); Sunstein, supra note 324, at 617 ("Akins
appears to vindicate the passage from Justice Kennedy's important concurring opinion in Lujan."). It is
noteworthy that Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion in Akins, but that Justice Scalia dissented.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 13.
359. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-77 (1992); Sunstein, supra note 324, at
643--44 ("Before Akins, it was fair to say that the ban on generalized grievances was moving from a
prudential one to one rooted in Article III. Lujan seemed to suggest that to have standing, citizens would
have to show that their injuries were "particular" in the sense that they were not widely shared."). Justice
Scalia also suggested that the Constitution's Article II, § 3 provision that the President is responsible to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" bars Congress from authorizing citizen suits as private
attorneys general by those who lack a concrete injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77.
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disfavoring generalized grievances is largely a prudential limitation that
Congress can waive if it defines under which circumstances a class of litigants
may seek a remedy for a widely shared injury, such as information pertinent to
36 0
voting.
In his dissenting opinion in Akins, Justice Scalia, who was joined by
Justices O'Connor and Thomas, argued that the plaintiffs' request for
information that would assist them in making voting decisions was a
generalized grievance common to all members of the public. 36 1 He argued that
Article III prohibits all generalized grievances, even ones involving concrete
injuries, because the Lujan decision requires not only that an injury be concrete,
but also that the harm be "particularized," which the Lujan Court had defined
as an injury that "'affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." 362 He
contended that the plaintiffs' "'undifferentiated"' generalized grievance was
"'common to all members of the public"' and, therefore, that they must resolve
it "by political, rather than judicial, means." 363 Justice Scalia dissented in Akins
because the majority opinion gives the judiciary the authority to resolve many
types of generalized grievances that he believes are the exclusive responsibility
of the political branches under both Article III and the President's Article II
3 64
authority.
Akins made it clear that victims of mass torts who suffer concrete injuries
are entitled to standing even if many others suffer similar injuries, especially if
Congress has authorized the suit through a citizen suit provision. 36 5 Similarly,
"public rights" statutes that regulate the environment or consumer safety are
intended in many cases to provide individual protection to any one person
360. See Brown, supra note 80, at 689-94 (arguing Akins recognized that Congress has substantial
authority to define standing rights in a statute and thus is inconsistent with Lujan); Mank, supra note 32,
at 1714-15 (arguing that Akins treated the prohibition against generalized grievances as a largely
prudential barrier that Congress can waive, although the decision did not resolve all constitutional
questions about Congress's authority to define standing); Sunstein, supra note 324, at 636-37, 644-45,
671-75 (same). Akins did not address or resolve whether Article III in some circumstances forbids suits
that are generalized grievances. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23 ("Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential
limit on standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer
alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for
a widely shared grievance." (citing cases)); Brown, supra note 80, at 681; Mank, supra note 32, at 1715;
Sunstein, supra note 324, at 645.
361. Akins, 524 U.S. at 31-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brown, supra note 80, at 703-04.
accord
362. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1);
Sunstein, supra note 324, at 637.
363. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 177 (1974)); accordMank, supra note 9, at 39.
364. Akins, 524 U.S. at 31-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brown, supra note 80, at 702-03; Sunstein,
supranote 324, at 616-17, 637, 643-47.
365. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; Brown, supra note 80, at 688, 690-91 (arguing Akins recognized
that Congress has significant power to define which injuries are sufficient for Article III standing);
Sunstein, supra note 324, at 616-17, 636, 645 (arguing Akins gives Congress the authority to waive the
prudential presumption against suits involving generalized grievances, especially in suits involving
informational injuries).
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adversely affected by pollution or defective products even if many other
persons suffer similar injuries.366 Each person injured by pollution or a
defective product suffers an individual injury that is concrete and particularized
even if there are many other similar injuries. 36 7 For instance, Public Citizen I
acknowledged that "[i]njuries from car accidents-including death, physical
injuries, and property damage-are plainly concrete harms under the Supreme
368
Court's precedents."
Another possible interpretation of Akins is that the lack of the same
concrete information can affect each voter differently when each person
decides how to vote. 369 Each voter thus suffers an individualized concrete and
particular injury and is not simply sharing a generalized grievance. Professor
Elliott observes that environmental injuries are not generalized grievances
because pollution affects each individually differently. 370 She writes: "Even if
environmental harm is widely shared, each individual suffers a harm concrete
and particularized to herself. '371 For example, ozone pollution affects
asthmatics, the young and the elderly more than many other demographic
groups. 372 Protecting the public from non-trivial future environmental or health
threats is at least as important to the public welfare as the voting rights at issue
in Akins or the recreational interests involved in Laidlaw. The only way for
Congress or courts to grant standing to persons threatened by serious future
environmental or health threats is to recognize probabilistic standing. To avoid
the possibility of suits involving trivial injuries, this Article recommends that
Congress or the courts adopt a one in one million standard as the standing
threshold for what constitutes a serious enough injury to justify a suit in Article
III courts.

366. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401- 4 671p (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 (2006); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2085 (2006); see also Elliott,
supra note 17, at 484 (arguing that public rights statutes that give many citizens the right to clean
environment or safe products affect each citizen differently). See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (discussing public rights statutes that
give each citizen the right to clean environment or safe products).
367. Elliott, supra note 17, at 484 (arguing that public rights statutes that give many citizens the
right to clean environment or safe products affect allow citizens to have standing to sue because each
citizen has a concrete and particularized injury).
368. Public Citizen I, 489 F.3d 1279, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2007), modified after rehearing, Public
Citizen II, 513 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam); accord Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10464.
369. See Brown, supra note 40, at 43.
370. Elliott, supra note 17, at 485-86. See generally Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts:
Dismantling the Risk-Injury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1671 (2007) (discussing increasing scientific
evidence that a person's genetic characteristics affects the impact of chemical exposures on their
bodies).
371. Elliott, supra note 17, at 485.
372. Michael R. Campbell, The Employer Trip Reduction Program:Driving Restrictions Arrive in
Pennsylvania via the Clean Air Act, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 71, 77 (1994) ("Those especially
vulnerable to ozone pollution include 31 million children, 19 million elderly, 6 million asthmatics, and
7.5 million individuals with chronic lung disease.").
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V.
SHOULD LARGE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE GREATER STANDING RIGHTS?:
PROFESSOR ELLIOTT'S ARGUMENT THAT ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE SHOULD NOT MATTER

Professor Elliott has questioned the NRDC H court's consideration of the
373
plaintiff's organizational size as a factor in deciding whether it has standing.
NRDC II concluded that NRDC had organizational standing because two to
four of its nearly half million members were likely to develop skin cancer
because of the exemptions that the government granted for the use of methyl
bromide. 3 74 She infers that an organization with 10,000 members would not
have had standing in NRDC II, because it would have been statistically unlikely
that any of its members would develop skin cancer. 375 She writes:
[I]t seems unlikely that the D.C. Circuit, in the [NRDC II] case, would have
reached the same conclusion had the case been brought by a much smaller
organization. For example, an environmental group with 10,000 members
could show only that it had one-twentieth of a member would likely die
from the methyl bromide rule, arguably insufficient for standing. But there
is no reason that an 7association's
ability to sue should be exclusively
3 6
contingent on its size.
Although the NRDC II court did not directly address the issue of organizational
size and standing, Professor Elliott appears to be correct that the court assumed
that an organization must have at least one member suffer a serious injury.
Thus, implicitly, the NRDC II decision appears to give larger organizations an
advantage in determining whether they have standing because they are more
likely to have at least one injured member.
Professor Elliott observes that the logical result of NRDC II's reasoning is
that an organization with millions of members would have standing even if the
risk of harm were extremely small. 377 She writes:
Conversely, were America's environmental organizations to band together
to produce an umbrella organization whose membership numbered in the
millions or tens of millions, they would be able to show standing under the
statistical theory for virtually any risk, running counter to the prodemocracy argument and even the general ban on private attorneys
378
general.
Professor Elliott is right to raise the question of whether a doctrine that appears
to favor extremely large organizations with greater standing rights is contrary
to the principle that the Court disfavors generalized grievances. Yet the Court
in Akins recognized that large numbers of plaintiffs may have standing so long
as each has a concrete individualized injury and not a mere abstract injury, so

373.

Elliott, supra note 17, at 504-05.

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. at 504.
Id. at 504-05 n.222.
Id
Id.
Id.
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the size of an organization cannot automatically disqualify it from having
379
standing.
Further, Professor Elliott questions the NRDC II decision because the
court recognized standing even though it was impossible to identify which of
NRDC's members would suffer from skin cancer in the future as a result of the
methyl bromide exemptions. She observes that it "was and is impossible to
identify which of [NRDC's] members might die from increased methyl
bromide levels, or even if any member would be so affected." 38 She
concludes, "There was no identifiable member to support the association's
standing-only the statistical likelihood that some small number of NRDC's
members would be adversely affected by the regulation." 38 1 Finally, Professor
Elliott argues that the absence of an identifiable plaintiff in NRDC H raises
separation of powers problems.
But if one emphasizes the anticonscription or pro-democracy view, this
kind of standing makes scant sense. In particular, Hunt's requirement that
organizations work with actual people might be described as promoting
"small-d" democratic values. If that is a good idea, the move in NRDC [I]]
382
to permit statistical standing is somewhat troubling.
As is discussed below, the assumption that there must be an identifiable
plaintiff is antiquated. 383 Professor Elliott acknowledges that a statistical
approach to standing may be the best way to address environmental risks. She
writes, "None of this is to say that finding standing in these cases is wrong.
There are many reasons to suspect, for example, that environmental injury is
best addressed by associations precisely because certain types of environmental
risk are spread across populations." 384 Further, she concedes that recognizing
standing for plaintiffs with a statistical probability of injury can serve a
constitutional function by enabling courts to force the executive branch to
385
comply with the law.
To avoid the problem raised by Professor Elliott-giving organizations
greater standing rights if they can aggregate larger number of members and
hence potential injuries than a smaller organization--Congress or the courts
should instead set an individual risk threshold for standing. If any member of
organization has a probabilistic risk of serious injury exceeding one in one
million, that organization should have standing regardless of the size of the
organization. This Article's proposed individual risk threshold for standing
avoids the messy constitutional difficulties raised by Professor Elliot and
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998).
Elliott, supra note 17, at 504 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 504-05 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Id.at 506.
See infra Part VI.C.
Elliott, supra note 17, at 506 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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therefore is a better standing test for organizations than the approach used in
NRDC II.
VI. WHY ASSOCIATIONS SHOULD HAVE STANDING EVEN IF
WE CANNOT IDENTIFY WHICH MEMBERS WILL BE INJURED

There are at least four reasons why associations should have standing even
if we cannot identify which of its members will be injured. First, Hunt did not
limit the size of organizations that may have associational standing nor require
that those organization members be identifiable. Second, class action suits
provide a model for standing by large associations challenging government
regulations. Third, any requirement of identifiable victims for standing is
anachronistic when most environmental and safety risks are probabilistic in
nature. Fourth, separation-of-powers principles do not require identifiable
victims when only statistical plaintiffs can ensure that the executive branch
complies with regulatory mandates required in a statute.
A. Hunt Does Not Require Identifiable
Plaintiffs or Limit OrganizationalSize
The first part of the Hunt test states that an association has standing only if
386
"its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right."
Arguably, the first part of the test requires identifiable victims because of
Lujan's requirement of "concrete and particularized" injuries. 387 Nevertheless,
while it may seem that Hunt requires "that organizations work with actual
people" 388 (since the apple growers and sellers that the Washington State
Commission represented were actual people 389), the reasoning of Hunt does not
focus on how the North Carolina regulations affected individual growers or
sellers. In fact, the third prong of the Hunt test forbids associational standing "if
the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit. '390 Not only does the third prong of the test clearly not require an
identifiable plaintiff, Hunt makes the identification of individual plaintiffs with
injuries specific only to them a barrier to associational standing.
B. Class Action Suits Provide a Model for Standing
by LargeAssociations Challenging Government Regulations
Professor Leiter has criticized the D.C. Circuit's threshold requirement
that an individual plaintiff demonstrate a substantial risk of future harm to have
standing because it may prevent suits where many small injuries are relatively
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
Elliott, supranote 17, at 506.
See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 336-45.
Id. at 343.
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insignificant individually, but there are significant harms if aggregated. 39 1 As
an analogy, she suggests that courts should lower barriers for aggregating
regulatory injuries in the same way that class action suits routinely allow
plaintiffs to seek damages where the amount of harm is too small to justify
individual litigation. 392 As an example, she argues that an electric utility that
over charges each residential customer by one penny imposes only a small
harm, but the aggregate harm would be $38,000 if the utility has 3.8 million
residential customers. 393 She does not directly address the organizational size
issue raised by Professor Elliott, but her analysis suggests that aggregating risk
of harm makes sense to protect the public from significant harms that have only
a small impact on individual victims or plaintiffs. 394 She argues that courts
should consider the aggregate risk of a challenged action to a population group,
region or all persons in the United States in determining whether standing is
appropriate, rather than focus on the risk to the plaintiffs alone, whether
individually or as part of an organization. 395 Arguably, her proposed approach
is what the NRDC H decision did in aggregating the total skin cancer risk
across all members of NRDC. Additionally, she argues that courts should look
"at the size of the anticipated harm." 396. She also observes that the individuals
who will be harmed in the future by a risk have a "significant present interest in
3 97
averting their outcome," even if we cannot predict who they will be.
1.

Future Claimants in Mass Tort and Regulatory Suits

Modem class action suits increasingly use statistical sampling techniques
to measure the harm to large numbers of victims. 39 8 The data from these
samples can be used to develop grids to estimate the value of individual cases,
including future cases. 39 9 For example, in asbestos cases, lawyers use
sophisticated grids or matrices to estimate the value of present and future
cases.

40 0

In reviewing proposed class action settlements of asbestos litigation, the
Supreme Court has considered the interests of future claimants who are not yet
physically injured. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Court rejected a
391. Leiter, supra note 9,at 393-95, 403-15.
392. Id. at 406, 412-14.
393. Id.at 412-14.
394. See id
395. Id.at 411-14; accord Matthew D. Adler, Policy analysis for natural hazards: Some
cautionary lessonsfrom environmentalpolicy analysis, 56 DUKE L.J. 1, 25-31, 37-40 (2006) (arguing
agencies should consider population size in predicting severity of natural disasters).
396. Leiter, supra note 9, at 412.
397. Id.at414n.122.
398. See Roche, supra note 60, at 1502-06.
399. Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
InstitutionalAccountofAmerican Tort Law, 57 VAND.L. REV. 1571, 1625-31 (2004).
400. Id.at 1626-29.
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proposed global settlement for both present and future claims because there

was a conflict between "generous immediate payments" for currently injured
plaintiffs and "the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample,
inflation-protected fund for the future." 40 1 In Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp., the
Court rejected a global asbestos settlement because future claimants without

present injuries were not provided with separate legal representation. 40 2 The
Court stated, "it is obvious after Amchem that a class divided between holders
of present and future claims (some of the latter involving no physical injury and
attributable to claimants not yet born) requires division into homogeneous
subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with separate representation to eliminate
conflicting interests of counsel.

'40 3

The future claimants in Amchem and Ortiz

were statistical plaintiffs because one can only estimate what diseases persons
exposed to asbestos will develop in the future. 40 4 If the Court is willing to

recognize the rights of future claimants in asbestos cases, it should also give
standing rights to plaintiffs asserting that government underenforcement of the
law will harm them in the future.
The Hunt decision arguably implies that a suit seeking prospective relief
for potential injuries is appropriate if an organization can equally represent all
members and there is no basis for differentiating among individual members.
Hunt's third requirement for associational standing that "neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested [can] require[] the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit" is less of an issue in regulatory cases that typically
seek prospective relief than in tort cases involving damages where individual
participation is frequently required.40 5 Courts often deny class certification in

406
mass tort cases because defendants may have been injured in different ways.
401. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-28 (1997); see also id. at 597-98, 60001, 603-04 (discussing efforts of parties to reach global settlement addressing present and future
claimants).
402. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999).
403. Id. (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627).
404. It may be easier to predict the consequences of asbestos exposure than the exposure of persons
to many other toxic substances, but the principle of statistical estimation still applies.
405. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1975) (recognizing extent of participation by
association members depends on type of relief sought); accord Pa. Psychiatric Soc'y v. Green Spring
Health Servs., 280 F.3d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 2002) (concluding that "damages claims usually require
significant individual participation, which fatally undercuts a request for associational standing");
Nathaniel B. Edmonds, Comment, Associational Standing for Organizations with Internal Conflicts of
Interest, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 364 (2002) ("Courts have typically denied associational standing when
the remedy requested includes damages because individual participation is necessary in identifying the
appropriate levels of individual damages. When an association requests damages, the damage claims are
typically not shared by all members, and thus require individualized participation. In this situation, the
advantages of associational standing are minimized: the organization is not the best representative of any
member's individual interest because the organization is seeking to maximize the membership's total
gain, perhaps necessitating sacrifices from individual members."); Roche, supra note 60, at 1498-1502.
406. Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual CausationRequirement in Mass Products
Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 895-98 (2005) ("Today, with rare exceptions or in unusual
circumstances, courts almost always deny class certification in mass product torts." (footnotes omitted)).
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Courts are more willing to grant class certification, however, if plaintiffs do not
request damages, but only seek to recover the future cost of a medical
monitoring program to detect the development of a disease that may result from
the plaintiffs exposure to the defendant's product. 40 7 In Warth, the Court
recognized that in cases seeking prospective relief it is often not necessary to
consult with each individual member of the association:
If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some
other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the
remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the
association actually injured. Indeed, in all cases in which we have expressly
recognized standing in associations to represent their members, the relief
sought has been of this kind.40 8
When an association seeks prospective relief, there is usually no reason to limit
the number of plaintiffs or to exclude plaintiffs who have a statistical
probability of future injury because individual members will not need to
actively participate in fashioning any prospective remedy.
C.

The Requirement ofIdentifiable Victims for Standing is Misguided

The requirement of identifiable victims for standing is anachronistic when
most environmental and safety risks are probabilistic in nature. Nevertheless,
Lujan's requirement of a concrete injury makes it unlikely that courts will
completely dismiss the idea of identifiable victims. An important step toward
modernizing standing would be for courts to recognize that an increased risk of
serious injury greater than one in one million is a real injury that should entitle
a potential victim to have standing. This approach is not radically different
from the NRDC II decision's aggregation of NRDC's nearly half a million
members to find standing.
Professor Shi-Ling Hsu has convincingly argued that courts that focus on
identifying actual victims of pollution endanger the public safety because, as
Professor Elliott acknowledges, environmental risks are probabilistic in

Class actions may remain, however, a viable vehicle for handling mass products claims
in at least one situation. When members of the putative class have been exposed to a
dangerous product that may cause a latent disease, some courts have allowed class
certification for purposes of "medical monitoring" claims under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(2), which provides for certification of an action seeking declaratory or
injunctive relief when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief.., with respect to the class as a whole." In these claims, plaintiffs typically ask the
court to establish a medical monitoring program intended to detect the onset of any
injuries or diseases that might occur in the future as a result of exposure to defendants'
products.
Gifford, supranote 406, at 897 (footnotes omitted).
408. Warth, 422 U.S. at 515.
407.
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nature. 40 9 First, Professor Hsu reviews psychological research findings
demonstrating "the propensity for people to have stronger emotions regarding
4 10
identifiable individuals or groups rather than abstract, unidentifiable ones."
He argues that there is an "identifiability bias" against environmental protection
because beneficiaries of environmental law tend to be less identifiable than
4 11
those that might be economically harmed by environmental law.
Additionally, he contends that standing doctrine has an "identifiability bias" in
favor of suits that address harms to specific individuals, but disfavors suits
where the victims are less specifically identifiable such as victims of broad
diffuse environmental problems, including future generations. 4 12 In particular,
Professor Hsu argues that Lujan's requirement of concrete and immediate
injuries makes it difficult for plaintiffs to challenge diffuse environmental
problems that affect large numbers of persons.4 13 He writes:
Why is this an identifiability problem? "Concrete and particularized"
injuries occur to people that are concrete and particularized. Unidentifiable
individuals are exposed to substantial risks that courts have not deemed to
be "actual and imminent" injuries. The nature of environmental harm is
such that it rarely attaches to such identifiable individuals, but only
populations of individuals. Two of the theories of identifiability illustrate
how this doctrine biases against environmental protection: the diffuse and
widespread nature of environmental or ecological harms make the
reference group necessarily large, reducing the human compulsion to act;
and the proactive nature of most environmental lawsuits renders relief ex
ante rather than ex post, making relief or preventative action seem less
4 14
compelling.
While Lujan's requirement of concrete and particularized injuries may
seem to require identifiable victims, as Professor Hsu suggests, Justice
Kennedy's crucial concurring opinion emphasized that Congress may define
new types of injuries that were not traditionally recognized at common law,
presumably including probabilistic injuries. 4 15 Additionally, two subsequent
decisions by the Court open up the possibility of probabilistic standing. Akins
concluded that standing is possible even if many other persons have similar
injuries as long as the plaintiff's injury is concrete and not abstract, recognizing
Congress's authority in most circumstances to waive the largely prudential

409. Hsu, supra note 3, at 440-51, 466-69; see Elliott, supra note 17, at 506 (stating "that
environmental injury is best addressed by associations precisely because certain types of environmental
risk are spread across populations").
410. Id. at437.
411. Id. at436,440-51.
412. Id. at 466-69.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
415. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part);
Leiter, supra note 9, at 400; Mank, supra note 9, at 35.
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barrier to suits involving generalized grievances. 4 16 As discussed below, a
plaintiff with a risk of being injured by a pollutant or defective consumer good
has an injury at least as concrete as the plaintiffs in Akins who sought
4 17
information on political contributions.
Further, in Laidlaw, the Court found standing even though the plaintiffs
could not prove an injury, but merely had reasonable concerns about pollution
of a river that they had used for recreation. 4 18 The Fourth and Ninth Circuits
have interpreted Laidlaw to allow plaintiffs to sue when they diminish
recreational uses because of their fear of threatened risks in the future. 4 19 The
Second Circuit in Baur arguably went further in allowing a plaintiff to sue the
government because of his fear that inadequate regulation would increase his
risk of developing a deadly disease in the future. 420 At least for the present
generation, the Baur approach significantly addresses Professor Hsu's
identifiability problem by allowing standing whenever a plaintiff has a non-

trivial elevated risk of future serious harm.42 1 Additionally, the First Circuit has
also allowed suits based on future harms, although it suggested that a plaintiff
must have stronger evidence of harm than required by the Second, Fourth or
Ninth Circuits.

4 22

The solution to the identifiability bias in standing is for courts to recognize
that persons who are at an increased risk of harm in the future have suffered an
injury as long as the risk of serious injury is greater than one in one million.
Professor Hsu proposes a thought exercise to demonstrate that the persons
affected by pollution in the future are as real as a tort victim hurt by an accident
that we can see. Responding to the argument that courts should leave the
protection of potential pollution victims to the political branches out of respect
for democratic values, he writes:

416. Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998); Brown, supra note 80, at 68994 (arguing Akins recognized that Congress has substantial authority to define standing rights in a statute
and thus is inconsistent with Lujan); Elliott, note 17, at 24-25 (acknowledging that victims of mass torts
can file suit even if this result in numerous lawsuits); Mank, supra note 32, at 1714-15 (arguing that
Akins treated the prohibition against generalized grievances as a largely prudential barrier that Congress
can waive, although the decision did not resolve all constitutional questions about Congress's authority
to define standing); Sunstein, supra note 324, at 636-37, 644-45, 671-75 (same).
417. Akins, 524 U.S. at 13-21; see supra Part IV; infra notes 349-360 and accompanying text;
infra Part VII.
418. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-83 (2000).
419. See Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1152 n.12 (9th Cir.
2000); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156-60 (4th Cir.
2000) (en banc).
420. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 637-43 (2d Cir. 2003).
421. See id. The issue of when future generations have standing presents a different issue. In
another article, the author argues that states can file suit on behalf of future generations. Mank, supra
note 51, at 77-97.
422. See Me. People's Alliance v. Mallinckrodt., Inc, 471 F.3d 277, 284 (1st Cir. 2006) (requiring
plaintiffs to prove a "realistic threat" of harm), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3156 (2007).
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[I]t is useful to repeat a thought exercise posed earlier in this [a]rticle: what
if we could actually name, see, and identify certain victims of pollution, the
way that we can identify victims of a plane crash? What if, we knew,
beforehand, the names of 30,000 individuals that would die in the coming
year from air pollution from power plants? What would we then demand of
our judicial system in terms of seeking redress? Would we not be in an
42 3
uproar if the judiciary simply demurred, "it's not my job"?
The NRDC II decision effectively addressed Professor Hsu's thought
exercise by aggregating NRDC's nearly half million members to find that two
to four of them were likely to contract skin cancer. 4 24 Professor Elliott is
probably correct that the court would not have granted standing if the
organization had only 10,000 members and less than one member was likely to
develop skin cancer. 4 25 Yet the risk to each individual member of developing
skin cancer would be the regardless of the size of the organization. 426 By
looking at individual risk rather than the aggregate risk to the organization, the
court could have avoided favoring large organizations at the expense of small
ones.
D.

Separation ofPowers Issues Do Not Bar StatisticalStanding

Professor Elliott argues that the NRDC II decision's implicit granting of
greater standing rights to large organizations than small organizations when
addressing probabilistic risks raises troubling separation-of-powers
questions. 42 7 She suggests that probabilistic standing is questionable under both
the pro-democracy approach and the anti-conscription function. 4 28 Although
Elliott raises legitimate questions, probabilistic standing serves the fundamental
constitutional goal of ensuring that the executive branch complies with the laws
enacted by Congress. The current approach to standing undermines the
separation of powers by giving unelected judges too much discretion in
determining whether an injury is sufficient for standing because judges are in
effect engaging in policy making regarding which injuries are subject to redress
4 29
and which are not.
The Supreme Court has warned that courts should not usurp the role of the
political branches and the democratic electoral process. 430 To avoid such
423. Hsu, supra note 3,at 473 (emphasis added).
424. NRDC 11, 464 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
425. Elliott, supra note 17, at 505 n.222.
426. NRDC 11, 464 F.3d at 7.
427. Elliott, supra note 17, at 504-06.
428. Id.at 506.
429. Brown, supra note 80, at 687.
430. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[R]edress of
grievances of the sort at issue here 'is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,' not the federal
courts." (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992))); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-77
(stating that Constitution assigns the political branches of government the responsibility for addressing
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usurpation, the Court has expressed reluctance to allow standing in cases1
43
involving generalized grievances that are common to the public at large.
Nevertheless, Akins allows citizens to sue regarding mass injuries as long as
each plaintiff has a concrete and particularized injury and is not simply seeking
to enforce an abstract interest in compliance with the law. 432 Further, Akins
suggested that Congress in most circumstances can waive the largely prudential
limitation against generalized grievances, although it did not decide whether
there are ever constitutional barriers to such suits.4 33 Additionally, Laidlaw
allows citizen suits that result in penalties to the government as long as the suits
434
deter a defendant from conduct that could harm the plaintiffs in the future.
Citizen suits in general and probabilistic suits in particular enable
Congress to make sure that the executive branch enforces the law. 435 Elliott
herself concedes that "the pro-Congress view of separation of powers counsels
that courts are needed to help enforce the rules as Congress (or the Constitution
4 36
She admits that the public often fails to mobilize
...) has established them."
to seek redress through the political process and therefore that lawsuits are
often the only practical way for the public to prevent abuses by the
government. 4 37 She also acknowledges that courts should not use a restrictive
standing test as "a backdoor way to limit Congress's legislative power" to
require the executive branch to follow the law.4 38 Even worse, courts can
manipulate current standing doctrine to pick and choose when the executive is
required to follow the law and when it is not.
Courts have a duty to enforce the law if the executive branch fails to obey
the law and a plaintiff with any concrete injury from that violation sues to
grievances affecting the public at large); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 221 n. 10 (1974) (stating the judicial role of deciding cases involving particularized injuries "is in
sharp contrast to the political processes in which the Congress can initiate inquiry and action, define
issues and objectives, and exercise virtually unlimited power by way of hearings and reports, thus
making a record for plenary consideration and solutions. The legislative function is inherently general
rather than particular and is not intended to be responsive to adversaries asserting specific claims or
interests peculiar to themselves."); Elliott, supra note 17, at 477-80; Mank, supra note 9, at 18-22.
431. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Elliott, supranote 17, at 477-80.
432. Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998); Elliott, supra note 17, at 481.
433. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; Brown, supra note 80, at 689-94 (arguing Akins recognized that
Congress has substantial authority to define standing rights in a statute and thus is inconsistent with
Lujan); Mank, supra note 32, at 1714-15 (arguing that Akins treated the prohibition against generalized
grievances as a largely prudential barrier that Congress can waive, although the decision did not resolve
all constitutional questions about Congress's authority to define standing); Sunstein, supra note 324, at
636-37, 644-45, 671-75 (same); see supra Part IV.
434. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185-88 (2000);
see supra Part II.A.
supra note 17, at489-90, 499-500; Pierce, supra note 50, at1170-71; see Sunstein,
435. Elliott,
supra note 6,at165.
supra note 17, at 506.
436. Elliott,
at489-90, 499-500.
437. Id.
438. ld.at496.
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enforce that law.4 39 Since its seminal 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison,440
the Supreme Court has made it clear that the President and the executive branch
are bound by mandates in a statute. 44 1 Professor Sunstein has argued that the
President's authority under the "take care" clause of Article II of the
Constitution does not give the President the license to ignore the law or prevent
44 2
the judiciary from enforcing the law:
The "take Care" clause ... is a duty, not a license. The clause requires the
President to carry out the law as enacted by Congress . . . . [T]he
President's discretion, and the "take Care" clause in general, do not
authorize the executive branch to violate the law through insufficient action
any more than they authorize it to do so through overzealous enforcement.
If administrative action is legally inadequate or if the agency has
violated the law by failing to act at all, there is no usurpation of executive
prerogatives in a judicial decision to that effect. Such a decision is
directives, as part of the
necessary in order to vindicate congressional
' 443
judicial function "to say what the law is.
Professor Elliott acknowledges that Congress may use the courts to ensure that
444
the executive branch follows procedural mandates in a statute.
If the courts refuse to allow standing in probabilistic risk cases, they will
undermine Congress's authority to regulate any type of probabilistic risks. 445 A
stringent standing test that rejects probabilistic risk is inconsistent with Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan, which stated that Congress has the
authority "to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise
to a case or controversy where none existed before." 446 Accordingly, courts do
not violate the separation of powers when they allow standing in a case alleging

439. See Brown, supranote 40, at 55 (arguing courts have a duty to enforce the law if the executive
fails to obey it); Cheh, supra note 87, at 255, 261-62, 278, 288 (same).
440. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
441. See Cheh, supra note 87, at 253-63 (discussing Marbury's recognition that courts have the
authority to enforce legal mandates against the executive branch and its implications for modem law).
442. Cass Sunstein, Standing and the Privatizationof Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1471
(1988); Elliott, supra note 17, at 514 n.279 (discussing Sunstein's argument that courts may allow suits
challenging executive compliance with the law).
443. Sunstein, supra note 442, at 1471 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137) (footnotes omitted);
accord Brown, supra note 40, at 47 (arguing "Take Care" clause in Article I1 of the Constitution does
not give the President discretion to ignore legal requirements, but requires the President to obey the
law); Cheh, supra note 87, at 275 (same); see also Elliott, supra note 17, at 514 n.279 (discussing
Sunstein's argument that courts may allow suits challenging executive compliance with the law).
444. Elliott, supra note 17, at 500 n.200 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 ("We
have long recognized that the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from seeking
assistance, within proper limits, from its coordinate Branches.")).
445. Leiter, supra note 9, at 420-21 ("In the D.C. circuit, no statute, no matter how specific and
well-drafted, may recognize tiny risks as legally cognizable.").
446. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (J. Kennedy, concurring in part);
accord Leiter, supra note 9, at 420-21 (arguing D.C. Circuit's substantial probability standing test is
inconsistent with Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan).
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increased risk if a statute requires the executive branch to follow certain
procedures and the executive's failure to do so results in a non-trivial risk of
injury to the plaintiff.
Vil. A PROPOSAL FOR RECOGNIZING STATISTICAL INJURIES

As illustrated, one of the most critical questions in standing law is whether
plaintiffs who challenge allegedly ineffective government regulation that poses
a future, statistical risk to them have imminent, concrete injuries or merely the
abstract possibility of injury. The Public Citizen decisions argued that potential
injuries are abstract and not imminent until they actually occur. Yet agencies
treat probabilistic risk as real and important enough to justify a wide range of

regulations costing billions of dollars and affecting thousands of lives. 447 If a
government regulation is less protective than required by statute, probability
theory predicts that the challenged regulation will likely cause a greater number
of concrete injuries to unidentified persons in the future. 44 8 Accordingly, courts
should treat statistical injuries as sufficiently concrete for standing as long as
the increased risk of serious harm caused by inadequate government regulation
is at least one in one million. If it is difficult to quantify a risk, courts can resort
to a qualitative standard.
A.

Modern Tort Law IncreasinglyRecognizes ProbabilisticHarms

Tort law provides a useful analogy for why statistical injuries should be
considered to be sufficient injury for standing purposes. Under the loss of
chance doctrine, a majority of states currently allow a plaintiff injured by
medical malpractice to recover for her injuries even if there was a less than 50
percent probability that she would have recovered absent any malpractice
because the malpractice may have prevented her recovery. 449 Pursuant to

traditional common law principles, a tort plaintiff had to demonstrate a greater
447. See R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
239 (1983) (discussing the Clean Air Act, the author observed, "If the EPA sets excessively stringent
standards, billions of dollars of unnecessary control costs will be imposed on the economy. If standards
are too lenient, then the health of thousands of individuals will suffer."); Howard Latin, Good Science,
BadRegulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 105 (1988) ("It is important to stress
that thousands of lives and billions of dollars in regulatory costs may depend on an agency's choice of
controversial risk-assessment principles.").
448. The larger the affected population, the more likely an estimate is to come true, but all
estimates are just predictions and not certain to occur. Elliott, supra note 17, at 504 n.221 ("An
individual risk of death of I in 200,000 does not actually translate into certainty that one person in a
particular group of 200,000 people will die; the larger the group gets, the more likely that it contains
someone who will eventually suffer the event subject to the risk analysis, but the question is always one
of probability,not one of certainty." (emphasis in original)).
449.

Smith v. State, 676 So. 2d 543, 547 n.8 (La. 1996) (observing that "the loss of a chance of

survival doctrine has been recognized by a majority of the states"); David A. Fischer, Tort Recoveryfor
Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 605, 611 (2001); Leiter, supra note 9, at 408 (arguing D.C.
Circuit standing test's rejection of probabilistic injuries is inconsistent with loss of chance doctrine).
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than 50 percent probability that medical malpractice would result in an
injury. 450 By contrast, a majority of courts today will allow medical
malpractice claims where there is less than a 50 percent probability that the
malpractice caused the injury or prevented a recovery. 45 1 In loss of chance
of injury alone
cases, courts have increasingly recognized that an increased risk
452
is compensable even if the increase in risk is relatively small.
A minority of jurisdictions requires defendants to pay for medical
monitoring of plaintiffs who are at an increased risk of disease because of
exposure to chemicals released by the defendant even though they have not yet
suffered an injury. 453 These cases recognize that a plaintiff suffers a cognizable
450. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in PersonalInjury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L. J. 1353, 1363 (1981) ("Under the
traditional approach,... loss of a not-better-than-even chance of recovering from... cancer would not
be compensable because it did not appear more likely that not that the patient would have survived with
proper care."); Leiter, supra note 9, at 407-08 (same).
451. One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things,
is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care
increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance
upon the undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1977); see Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 83 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("The degree of causation required under the lost chance doctrine is lower than that
traditionally required. Rather than requiring 'but for' causation, the lost chance doctrine requires only a
showing that the defendant's negligence was a 'substantial factor' in the causation of the injury.");
Smith, 676 So. 2d at 547 n.8 (observing that "the loss of a chance of survival doctrine has been
recognized by a majority of the states"); Fischer, supra note 449, at 611; Leiter, supra note 9, at 407-08.
452. Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272 (Ind. 2000); Leiter, supra note 9, at 408.
453. To support a monitoring claim, plaintiffs generally must prove that they were (1) significantly
exposed to a hazardous substance through the actions of the defendant; (2) as a proximate result of
exposure, they suffered a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (3) as a
consequence of the exposure, a reasonable physician would prescribe a monitoring regime different
from the one that would have been prescribed in the absence of the exposure; and (4) testing procedures
exist that make the early detection and treatment of disease possible and beneficial. Brown v. Monsanto
Co., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987));
Grodsky, supra note 370, at 1685-86 (citing Brown v. Monsanto Co., 35 F.3d 717, 788 (3d Cir. 1994);
accord Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft, Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(allowing medical monitoring claim in District of Columbia); Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 793 N.E.2d
869, 874 (I11.App Ct. 2003) (allowing medical monitoring claim); Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d
103 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1999) (same); Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 426, 43234 (W. Va. 1999) (allowing plaintiff to recover for medical monitoring even if there is no proof that
early detection will improve the course of the disease because future medical advances may make
information useful in the future); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993)
(allowing medical monitoring claim); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply, 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993)
(same); Bums v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (same). But see Henry v.
Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Mich. 2005) (rejecting medical monitoring claims in the
absence of "a present physical injury"). See generally D. Scott Aberson, Note, A Fifty-State Survey of
Medical Monitoring and the Approach the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted
with the Issue, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1095, 1114-16 (2006) (listing 15 jurisdictions that allow
medical monitoring claims in the absence of an injury, a slightly larger number that do not and those
jurisdictions that have not yet addressed the issue); id at 1129-43 (summarizing law regarding recovery
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harm worthy of compensation when a defendant's actions increase the
plaintiffs risk of developing a disease in the future. 454 Federal courts have not
recognized a federal cause of action for medical monitoring expenses, but they
also have not squarely rejected such claims. In Metro-North Commuter
Railroad Co. v. Buckley, a case involving the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not recover lump sum damages to
pay for future medical monitoring costs. 4 55 However, the Court did not decide
whether a plaintiff could recover such expenses through a court supervised
fund, as is the practice in several state courts, and hinted that it would be more
receptive to a medical monitoring claim that sought the creation of such a
fund.

45 6

It is true that standing doctrine is not the same as substantive tort law, but
generally standing doctrine is supposed to be a threshold test for whether a suit
should be allowed all and is not supposed to more stringent than whether a
plaintiff can win a suit on the merits. Modem tort law has become more
receptive to probabilistic claims, especially loss of chance suits. The medical
monitoring cases suggest that a plaintiff who has been exposed to toxic
substances is entitled to some relief for possible future injuries, even if she is
not entitled to full damages. As a threshold test for whether a suit should be
allowed at all, standing doctrine is not supposed to be more stringent than
whether a plaintiff can win a suit on the merits. If modem substantive law
recognizes probabilistic injuries, even small ones, then Public Citizen's
rejection of probabilistic injuries as too trivial to constitute an injury for
457
standing purposes is questionable to say the least.
B.

FederalAgencies Regulate ProbabilisticRisk

Congress and federal agencies often use a one in one million lifetime risk
of death standard in determining if an activity is dangerous enough to

of medical monitoring costs in all 50 states and also U.S. territories); Kara L. McCall, Medical
Monitoring Plaintiffs and Subsequent Claims for Disease, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 969, 973-78 (1999)
(summarizing development of medical monitoring doctrine).
454. Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 977 (Utah 1993) ("Although the physical
manifestations of an injury may not appear for years, the reality is that many of those exposed have
suffered some legal detriment; the exposure itself and the concomitant need for medical testing
constitute the injury.").
455. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,438-44 (1997).
456. Id. (rejecting plaintiff's claim for lump sum damages for future medical monitoring costs, but
observing that several states that reject lump sum payments for such expenses have created court
monitored funds for those expenses and suggesting that a claim requesting a court monitored fund would
be more acceptable to the court); see id. at 444-55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that Court should have plainly explained to lower courts whether plaintiffs can recover
medical monitoring costs through as court-supervised fund).
457. See Leiter, supra note 9, at 407-09.
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regulate. 458 Since the 1970s, the Food and Drug Administration has applied a
one in one million threshold in determining whether certain food or color
additives with possible carcinogenic risk should enter or remain in the food
supply because their risk is de minimis, although the Delaney Clause mandates
a zero-risk approach for other additives. 459 In the Food Quality Protection Act
of 1996,460 Congress also adopted a one in one million lifetime cancer risk as
the appropriate maximum risk tolerance for pesticides residues on food. 4 61 In

Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, Congress also adopted a one in one million
risk threshold, which requires the EPA to issue technology-based emission
standards to reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants and then requires
EPA to consider issuing residual risk emission standards if "excess cancer risks
to the individual most exposed to emissions . . . [exceed] one in one

million." 462 Additionally, the Consumer Product Safety Commission defines a
458. Matthew D. Adler, Against "Individual Risk": A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment,
153 U. PA. L. REv. 1121, 1123-24(2005).
459. See FDA, Revision of the Definition of the Term "No Residue" in the New Animal Drug
Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,172, 78,172-73 (Dec. 23, 2002) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 500) (defining
"no residue" as including a risk less than a life time cancer one in one million if available detection
methods are unable to assess lower risks); FDA, Sponsored Compounds in Food-Producing Animals, 52
Fed. Reg. 49,572, 49,572-74 (Dec. 31, 1987) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 500) (defining safe level of food
or color additives as less than I in lone in one million lifetime risk of cancer); Adler, supra note 458, at
1123, 1134, 1165-68 (discussing history of FDA's regulation of food additives); Dominic P. Madigan,
Setting an Anti-Cancer Policy: Risk, Politics, and the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 17 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 187, 206-26 (1998) (discussing Delaney Clause and regulation of pesticide residues before
1996 legislation created exemption to Delaney Clause). The Delaney Clause prohibits any additive if it
is "found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are
appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of ... additives, to induce cancer in man or animal." 21
U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2006) (food additives); see id § 379e(b)(5)(B) (parallel provision for color
additives); Adler, supra note 458, at 1165-66. The FDA, however, has long interpreted the Clause to not
apply to an additive that itself has not been found to be carcinogenic, but has some nonfunctional
chemical constituent that is carcinogenic. Id. at 1166-68.
460. Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 110 Stat. 1489 (1996). The FDA also exempted pesticides on raw food
and exempted pesticide residue on processed food if the pesticide did not concentrate as a result of the
processing. Madigan, supranote 459, at 193-94.
461. In the case of a nonthreshold effect which can be assessed through quantitative risk
assessment, such as a cancer effect, the Committee expects, based on its understanding
of current EPA practice, that a tolerance will be considered to provide a "reasonable
certainty of no harm" if any increase in lifetime risk, based on quantitative risk
assessment using conservative assumptions, will be no greater than "negligible." It is the
Committee's understanding that, under current EPA practice . . . EPA interprets a
negligible risk to be a one-in-a-million lifetime risk. The Committee expects the
Administrator to continue to follow this interpretation.
H.R.Rep. No. 104-669, pt.2, at 41 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1268, 1280; see also Ven R.
Walker, The Myth of Science as a "Neutral Arbiter" for Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 197, 221 n.60 (2003); Madigan, supranote 459, at 202, 228.
462. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2006) (directing EPA to consider promulgating emission standards
for hazardous air pollutants if a category or subcategory of sources poses a risk greater than one in one
million "to the individual most exposed to emissions from a source in the category or subcategory"); see
also Adler, supra note 458, at 1123, 1151-52. The one in one million risk standard triggers the EPA's
consideration of additional regulations for hazardous air pollutants, but the EPA has adopted a one in ten
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product containing a carcinogen as "hazardous" if a consumer using the
product incurs an "individual risk" exceeding one in one million. 463 The
Occupational Health and Safety Administration allows workers in some cases
to be exposed to a maximum risk of one in ten thousand, but higher risks are
464
arguably more acceptable if a worker voluntarily accepts a dangerous job.
Not all statutes or regulations use the one in one million lifetime risk
standard, but it is the most widely used standard for public protection. 4 65 The
Consumer Product Safety Commission observed that other risk thresholds had
"been considered or proposed" by other agencies, but concluded that "the use
of one in a million has been most prominent and also has the most precedent in
the case of actions taken by the Commission and other agencies for
carcinogens. ' 4 66 Even some statutes or regulations that allow higher risks use a
467
one in one million standard as the ideal goal.

thousand risk standard for the most exposed individual. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, No. 07-1053,
2008 WL 2310951, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12113 (D.C. Cir. June 6, 2008) (holding EPA may apply one
in ten thousand excess cancer risk rather than one in one million standard for regulating residual risks
from hazardous air pollutants); Bradford C. Mank, A Scrivener's Error or Greater Protection of the
Public: Does the EPA Have the Authority to Delist "Low-Risk" Sources of CarcinogensFrom Section
112's Maximum Available Control Technology Requirements?, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 94-96 (2005)
(explaining that section 112 of the Clean Air Act uses one in one million risk standard as trigger for
regulation, but allows risks as high as one in ten thousand).
463. Labeling Requirements for Art Materials Presenting Chronic Hazards, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,626,
46,656 (Oct. 9, 1992) (codified at 16 C.F.R. 1500.14(b)(8)); Adler, supranote 458, at 1178-79.
464. Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 62 Fed. Reg. 1494, 1560 (Jan. 10, 1997)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) ("[A] risk of 1/1000 . . . is clearly significant. It represents the
uppermost end of a million-fold range suggested by the Court, somewhere below which the boundary of
acceptable versus unacceptable risk must fall." (citing Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum
Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 655 (1980)); Adler, supra note 458, at 1170 ("The [IndustrialUnion (Benzene)]
Court then went on to suggest, famously, that the 'significant risk' requirement might be understood in
terms of 'individual risk.' A 1 in 1000 'individual risk' was clearly significant, the Court said; a 1 in I
billion risk was not.").
465. Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL
L. REv. 773, 838 n.241 ("Typically, Congress and regulatory agencies consider risks greater than one in
one million to be publicly unacceptable, although risks of one in ten thousand have been considered
acceptable under certain circumstances.").
466. Labeling Requirements for Art Materials and Other Products Subject to the FHSA Presenting
Chronic Hazards, 56 Fed. Reg. 15,672, 15,696 (April 17, 1991).
467. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions from
Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels, Benzene Equipment
Leaks, and Coke By-Product Recovery Plants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,044-45 (Sept. 14, 1989)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (setting goal of reducing risk of benzene exposure to maximum exposed
individual for seventy years to one in one million, but allowing risk as high as one in ten thousand);
Natural Res. Def.Council v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("In the Benzene rulemaking,
EPA set forth its interpretation of 'ample margin of safety,' as that term was used in the 1970 version of
the Clean Air Act. It said that the 'ample margin' was met if as many people as possible faced excess
lifetime cancer risks no greater than one-in-one million, and that no person faced a risk greater than 100in-one million (one-in-ten thousand). 54 Fed.Reg. at 38,044-45. In other words, the Benzene standard
established a maximum excess risk of 100-in-one million, while adopting the one-in-one million
standard as an aspirationalgoal. This standard, incorporated into the amended version of the Clean Air
Act, undermines petitioners' assertion that EPA must reduce residual risks to one-in-one million for all
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C.

A Proposalfor a One in One Million Test for Standing

Courts should find standing to sue whenever an individual has a nontrivial statistical risk of injury, and should adopt a presumptive standard that a
regulatory action that increases a plaintiffs risk of serious injury or death by a
factor of one in one million is the necessary standing threshold for citizens to
sue. A one in one million risk of death or serious injury is the most plausible
quantitative threshold for standing because it is the most common risk
threshold used by agencies in determining when the government regulation is
necessary to protect the public health, although less stringent risk thresholds are
sometimes used to minimize the cost to industry. 4 68 It makes sense to match the
standing threshold with the regulatory threshold so that citizens can usually
challenge most regulations, unless Congress has strong reasons for limiting
judicial challenges for a specific type of regulation. As risk estimates are
469
inherently imprecise because of scientific uncertainties and data limitations,
courts should err on the side of allowing a claim if there is a plausible argument
that the risk is greater than one in one million, even if there are conflicting
estimates. The one in one million threshold would exclude cases involving the
smallest risks and avoid overloading the judicial system. Ideally, Congress
would adopt the one in one million excess risk of serious injury or death
sources that emit carcinogenic hazardous air pollutants.") (first emphasis added); Adler, supra note 458,
at 1151-52 (stating that Section 112 of the Clean Air Act "appears to contemplate that EPA will employ
its hybrid, pre-1990 test (no 'individual risk' above one in ten thousand; minimize the number of
individuals incurring a risk above one in one million, taking into consideration cost and feasibility) as
the substantive criterion here."), 1155 ("RCRA also empowers EPA to order remedial action at active
waste-disposal sites. The general agency practice, here, is apparently to perform a detailed study of
remedial options for particular sites producing more than a one in one million risk
to the highly exposed
individual, and then to consider cost and feasibility in choosing among these options but reject remedial
options resulting in more than a one in ten thousand risk (again to the highly exposed individual)."),
1157 ("EPA policy (more formalized than in the RCRA context) is to order clean-up at a CERCLA site
where the individual cancer risk consequent upon 'reasonable maximum exposure' exceeds one in ten
thousand; to refrain from clean-up where this risk is less than one in one million; and to exercise
discretion in the range between the two levels."); Mank, supra note 462, at 94-96 (explaining that
section 112 of the Clean Air Act uses one in one million risk standard as trigger for regulation, but
allows risks as high as one in ten thousand).
468. Wagner, supra note 465, at 835 n.229 ("The courts will need to define what constitutes an
'exposure' to a particular product. One approach would require plaintiffs to demonstrate sufficient
'exposure' contact (either in time or concentration) to pose a risk of latent harm of greater than I in
10,000 or I in I million."), 838 n.241 (suggesting that courts use one in ten thousand to one in one
million risk threshold in tort suits "for determining when a risk becomes significant.").
469. Judith Jones, Regulatory Designfor Scientific Uncertainty: Acknowledging the Diversity of
Approaches in Environmental Regulation and Public Administration, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 347,
349-52 (2007) (discussing scientific uncertainty and data limitations in area of environmental
regulation); Latin, supra note 447, at 91-92 (observing that scientific uncertainties and data limitations
often result in conflicting risk estimates); Wagner, supra note 465, at 777-80 (discussing inherent
limitations in determining cause-and-effect between chemical exposure and resulting latent harms
because of uncertainties in extrapolating animal data to human health and the fact that humans are
exposed to multiple chemicals so that it is often impossible to isolate the impact of a particular
chemical); Walker, supra note 461, at 204-11 (discussing five types of scientific uncertainty).
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standard as a standing threshold to guide courts in deciding what is a sufficient
injury for standing, except if Congress believes that a particular statute or
regulation deserves its own special standard. Alternatively, courts could adopt
the one in one million standard as a judge-made prudential limitation and then
invite Congress to adopt a lower or higher risk standard for particular
regulatory statutes or agencies. Thus, if the proposed one in one million
standard is not suitable for some issues, Congress could choose a different
standard for particular statutes or regulations.
A risk threshold is needed to exclude trivial suits and to reduce decision
costs for courts and agencies. Professor Adler has argued that de minimis
thresholds would not be justified in a world of unlimited resources and perfect
decision makers, 470 but he has acknowledged that such thresholds allow
agencies to "economize on decision costs" by excluding minimally risky or
improbable issues. 4 71 Professor Leiter observes that similar concerns about

economizing judicial decision costs may justify "allow[ing] judges to
economize on decision costs by conserving judicial resources for cases of
' 472
greater import in the relevant moral frame.
Courts may exclude suits where the alleged risks are relatively trivial. In
Korsinsky v. EPA, a federal district court dismissed a case for lack of standing
where the plaintiff alleged that his chronic sinus condition made him more
vulnerable to illness from environmental harms resulting from global climate
change. 473 The court concluded that the plaintiff's contention that climate
change could worsen his sinus condition were insufficient for Article III
standing because "[s]uch allegations fall more within the realm of the
hypothetical and conjectural than the actual or imminent and therefore are
insufficient for purposes of standing." 474 In a footnote, the district court
distinguished the facts in its case from those in Baur, in which the Second
Circuit had found standing because the plaintiff had alleged that he was at a
moderately elevated risk of contracting an incurable disease, vCJD.4 75 The
Korsinsky case appropriately applied a threshold to standing decisions by
distinguishing between relatively trivial harms and serious ones. If it had not

470. MATTHEW D. ADLER, WHY DE MINIMIS? 1, 19, 22 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Research Paper
No. 07-26, 2007), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=992878.
471. Id. at 24; accord Leiter, supra note 9, at 410 (discussing Adler's acknowledgement that de
minimis thresholds have practical justifications).
472. Leiter, supra note 9, at 410.
473. Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 1528, 2005 WL 1423345, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21778, at
*6-8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005), aff'd, 192 Fed. Appx. 71 (2d Cir. Aug. 10, 2006); Bradford C. Mank,
Civil Remedies, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 184-85 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007)
(discussing Korsinsky).
474. Korsinsky, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21778, at *8.
475. Id. at *8 n.5 ("Here, by contrast, plaintiff alleges nothing more than an increase in risk over a
long period of time of aggravating a chronic condition similar to allergies," distinguishing Baur v.
Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634-37 (2d Cir. 2003)); Mank, supra note 473, at 185 (discussing Korsinsky).
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found the allegations were insufficient for Article III standing, the court might
have alternatively dismissed the case for the prudential reason that the cost of
litigating a case involving such relatively trivial harms far outweighs any
possible benefits to the plaintiff.4 76 Professor Leiter observes, "A plaintiff who
faces a 1:1000 probability of getting sunburned may or may not have a
sufficient stake in the outcome of a lawsuit challenging the underlying agency
action, but a plaintiff who faces a much smaller probability of developing
melanoma surely does." 4 77 This Article's proposed approach would allow a
melanoma suit if the risk of developing the disease were at least one in one
million, but would reject suits involving trivial injuries such as getting
sunburned to limit judicial decision-making costs.
Some scholars may argue that a risk threshold for standing will exclude
valid claims. If a safety problem affected the entire U.S. population-around
300 million people 478-at least 300 people would have to be at risk of death or
serious harm for a plaintiff to sue pursuant to a one in one million standing risk
threshold.4 79 Certainly, a government action that kills 299 people is significant.
Because the proposed test applies not just to deaths, but to any serious
illness, it is less likely to preclude suits where there is genuine harm. In NRDC
II, the court found sufficient injury for standing because the risk of non-fatal
skin cancer was between one in 129,000 and one in 200,000, according to
expert evidence. 480 Because many chemicals can cause not only death, but also
non-fatal illnesses, even if a one in one million threshold excludes a suit based
on death, the court may still find standing if there is a one in one million
probability of some serious non-fatal heath consequences or other injuries.
Furthermore, as discussed below, Laidlaw's "reasonable concerns" test would
allow plaintiffs to sue in some circumstances where the risk is less than one in
one million if the plaintiffs recreational activities or aesthetic enjoyment is
diminished by a defendant's actions. 48 1 Laidlaw's liberal approach in cases

476. See Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 654-55 n.12 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J.,
concurring) (discussing the authority of federal courts to limit suits that are excessively burdensome if
political branches or suit by the United States could address issue); Mank, supra note 9, at 28, 44-45
(agreeing with Judge Gould that courts may invoke prudential standing barrier to that are excessively
burdensome).
477. Leiter, supranote 9, at 411.
478. As of June 21, 2009, the U.S. population was estimated to be over 306 million. U.S. Census
Bureau, U.S. POPClock Projection, http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited July
21, 2009).
479. See Craig, supra note 1,at 151-52, 220-21 (arguing that courts should adopt a precautionary,
preventative approach in granting standing where plaintiffs allege probabilistic risks); Leiter, supra note
9, at 409-10 (arguing that in ideal world standing thresholds would be unnecessary). See generally
Adler, supra note 395, at 1, 19, 22 (criticizing de minimis criteria as "difficult to justify ... as a matter
of non-ideal, not ideal, moral theory").
480. NRDCII, 464 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
481. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc, 528 U.S. 167, 181-83 (2000).
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involving recreational or aesthetic issues lessens any concerns that the
quantitative one in one million test will exclude too many valid cases.
A balance needs to be struck between allowing plaintiffs with non-trivial
injuries to sue and limiting the number of suits to a manageable number for
courts. If courts eliminated all standing barriers to suits against the government,
Public Citizen suggested that plaintiffs might file so many suits that they would
overwhelm both the judiciary and executive branch. 4 82 On the other hand,
plaintiffs with non-trivial injuries resulting from government action or inaction
should be able to sue the government. Courts need a standing threshold test to
distinguish between valid and trivial cases. As is discussed above, the one in
one million threshold is the one most widely used by agencies as a de minimis
threshold and there are no convincing grounds for using a different threshold
483
for courts, unless Congress provides more specific guidance in a statute.
Because agencies often possess considerable data about the risks of injury
posed by their regulatory decisions, courts can ask agencies to provide risk data
4 84
in many cases without imposing excessive burdens on the courts or agencies.
Sturkie and Logan argue that government agencies often avoid standing issues
and let industry intervenors challenge the standing of petitioners, unless the
court orders the government to address standing issues. 485 They argue that the
government's reluctance to engage in standing issues is unfortunate because in
both NRDC H and Public Citizen H the complicated standing issues in each
case were only clarified when the government provided crucial statistical
evidence during re-argument of the cases. 486 Sturkie and Logan contend: "In
sum, if agencies wish to conserve taxpayer resources and most effectively
defend their actions, they should consider submitting a declaration as soon as
increased-risk claims arise, not sit on the sidelines until the court is already
grappling with these issues." 4 87 If quantitative data does not exist, then courts
482. Public Citizen 1,489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
483. See generally Wagner, supra note 465, at 835 n.229, 838 n.241.
484. Cf Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10472 (observing that "agencies are often in the best
position to address-and quantify-the risks of injury presented under their chosen action and other
alternatives.").
485. As seen in NRDC Iand H .. , federal agencies (and their counsel, the U.S. Department
of Justice) typically let the industry intervenors slog out their standing dispute with the
petitioners. They often concede standing early in a case and/or do not weigh in unless
ordered to do so by the court.
Id.
486. But as NRDC H and Public Citizen I demonstrate, the agencies are often in the best
position to address-and quantify-the risks of injury presented under their chosen
action and other alternatives. 190 For example, it was only after EPA weighed in on the
risk calculations at the rehearing stage in NRDC H that the court revamped its
quantitative analysis and changed its holding. Similarly, in Public Citizen 11, the
NHTSA's declaration and risk assessment had the imprimatur of the agency's chief tire
safety expert, and thus were both valuable and highly influential.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
487. Id.
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may use a qualitative approach to determine when prudential considerations
might justify limiting standing and access to the judicial system.
D.

Applying the One in One Million Test

To explain how the proposed test would work, this Part will examine how
some of the cases discussed previously would be decided pursuant to the
proposed one in one million standard. The one in one million standard works
best where there is sufficient information to quantify the risk. If it is difficult to
quantify a risk, courts could continue to use a qualitative standard.
1.

NRDC I andII

NRDC I and NRDC II are the easiest cases in which to apply a quantitative
risk standard. In NRDC I, the court concluded that a one in 21 million risk of
developing skin cancer was insufficient injury for standing. 488 Although the
court did not explain what level of risk was sufficient for standing, it may have
implicitly used something approximating the one in one million standard to
determine which risks are sufficient for standing. When the court re-heard the
case, two different experts estimated the risk that NRDC members would
develop skin cancer from the impacts of the government's methyl bromide
exemptions on the stratospheric ozone to be between one in 129,000 and one in
200,000.489 NRDC II found that this risk was sufficient for standing because
two to four of NRDC's approximately half a million members would develop
skin cancer. 490 As Professor Elliott argues, the court may have implicitly
required that at least one member of NRDC is predicted to develop skin cancer
for the organization to have standing.4 9 1 The one in 129,000 and one in
200,000 risk standard used in NRDC II is consistent with this Article's one in
one million risk of serious injury standard.
As was discussed in Part V, this Article's proposed individual one in one
million risk standard for standing avoids the possible constitutional problems
raised by NRDC II's aggregation of the risk of all members of NRDC to
determine organizational standing. Professor Elliott is right that NRDC II
implies that large organizations with many members are more likely to be able
to demonstrate that at least one of their members will be injured in the future by
a probabilistic risk than small organizations. 492 This Article's proposal avoids
bias against small organizations by asking whether any individual in that

488. NRDC I, 440 F.3d 476, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2006), withdrawn, NRDC 11, 464 F.3d I (D.C. Cir.
2006); Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10292.
489. NRDC II, 464 F.3d at 7.
490. Id.
491. Elliott, supra note 17, at 504-05 & n.222.
492. See supra Part V.
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organization has at least a one in one million excess risk of death or serious
493
injury from a challenged government action.
2.

Laidlaw

Laidlaw is a much more difficult case in which to apply a quantitative risk
standard. Laidlaw's mercury discharges violated its permit because they
exceeded a stringent 1.3 parts per billion standard used by the EPA. 49 4 The
district court, however, specifically found that there was "'no demonstrated
proof of harm to the environment,"' or human health, based upon fish tissue
studies that measured the actual amounts of mercury in the North Tyger
River. 495 Although the Supreme Court did not quantify the risk, based on the
district court's interpretation of the evidence, it appears that the plaintiffs could
not have met a one in one million standard.
Nevertheless, the majority of the Laidlaw Court granted standing because
the plaintiffs altered or discontinued their recreational activities because of their
"reasonable concerns" about the harmfulness impacts of the defendant's
discharges into the River. 496 The Court did not require the plaintiffs to prove
that the environment had suffered an actual injury or was likely to suffer an
injury in the future, but instead focused on whether the plaintiffs had
reasonable grounds to change their recreational activities. 4 97 The Court stated
that, in environmental cases, "[t]he relevant showing for purposes of Article III
standing... is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff. '4 98 Yet
the Court did not require the plaintiffs to prove that they would suffer an injury
themselves, because their loss of recreational use of the river was a sufficient
499
concrete injury.
The Laidlaw decision appears to be at odds with this Article's one in one
million standard. Yet there is a possible way to reconcile risk standards with
Laidlaw. In dicta from Virginia SCC, the D.C. Circuit interpreted Laidlaw as
applying a more lenient standing test in environmental cases involving
recreational and aesthetic values than the Court does in non-recreational and

493. See supra Part V.
494. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc, 528 U.S. 167, 167-68, 176
(2000) ("Laidlaw consistently failed to meet the permit's stringent 1.3 ppb (parts per billion) daily
average limit on mercury discharges. The District Court later found that Laidlaw had violated the
mercury limits on 489 occasions between 1987 and 1995. 956 F. Supp. at 613-621 .").
495. Id.at 181 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), lnc, 956 F. Supp.
588, 602 (D.S.C. 1997)); accord id. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
496. Id.at 181 (majority opinion).
497. Id.at 181; Craig, supra note 1, at 181-84; Mank, supra note 32. But see Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at
199-201 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that plaintiffs should have prove that defendant's activities
actually harmed the environment).
498. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181; Craig, supra note 1,at 181.
499. Craig, supra note 1, at 184.
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non-aesthetic cases. 500 In non-recreational or non-aesthetic cases, a court may
still apply a one in one million standard as in NRDC II or a regulatory
challenge like Public Citizen II. The recreational activities exception to the one
in one million standard is appropriate because while recreational activities and
aesthetics constitute a valid, concrete injury, they cannot be fully measured
through quantitative methods. 50 1 The one in one million standard should be
used only where it is reasonable to measure risks, but not if a court is
addressing a fundamentally qualitative issue such as a person's recreational or
50 2
aesthetic enjoyment of nature.
3.

Baur

The Second Circuit in Baur rejected a quantitative approach to standing
and instead relied on the severity of vCJD as a deciding factor in granting
standing. 50 3 In his dissenting opinion in Baur, Judge Pooler argued that it was
inappropriate to grant standing to Baur because he was indistinguishable from
millions of other Americans who eat beef. 50 4 Judge Pooler complained:
"Allowing a lawsuit to go forward on the basis of such a remote harm would be
akin to saying that any citizen has standing to sue the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration because it currently does not do enough to prevent
meteorites from falling to Earth. ' 50 5 The majority responded by arguing that
Judge Pooler had failed to specify what statistical test should be used to decide
which cases meet standing criteria: "For example, it is unclear what statistical
showing the dissent would deem sufficient to establish standing in this case.
Would a 0.00011% chance of exposure to BSE contaminated beef be sufficient
to demonstrate sufficient injury, or would the risk of exposure be too minuscule
to merit standing?" 50 6 The Court answered this question by arguing that
statistical risk assessment should not decide Article III standing questions, but
instead should be used only by administrative agencies to decide substantive
issues: "In our view, the evaluation of the amount of tolerable risk is better
analyzed as an administrative decision governed by the relevant statutes rather
"
than a constitutional question govemed by Article I1I. '507

500. Va. State Corp. Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 468 F.3d 845, 848 (D.C. Cir.
2006); Sturkie & Logan, supra note 9, at 10463.
501. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-84; Craig, supra note 1, at 184.
502. The contrast between the Court's lenient approach to standing in Laidlaw, which is discussed
at supra Part II, and its restrictive approach in other cases, which are discussed at supra Parts I and III,
raises serious questions about its standing jurisprudence that I plan to address in a future article.
503. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 637-41 (2d Cir. 2003).
504. Id. at 646-48, 651-52 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
505. Id. at 651 n.3.
506. Id.
at 643 (majority opinion).
507. Id.
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The Baur decision did not present detailed statistical evidence, so it is
impossible to know for sure whether Baur was exposed to a one in one million
risk of death or serious disease. It is possible, however, to answer the majority's
hypothetical question of "would a 0.00011% chance of exposure to BSE
contaminated beef be sufficient to demonstrate sufficient injury, or would the
risk of exposure be too minuscule to merit standing?" 50 8 This percent chance
equals an approximately 1 in 9091 risk, which would be clearly sufficient for
standing pursuant to this Article's proposed test.
On the other hand, let us assume that only one or two people out of many
millions of Americans is likely to contract vCJD. Pursuant to the proposed one
in one million test, a court should deny standing. Was the Baur decision wrong
to grant standing or is the notion of a quantitative test fundamentally flawed?
In the first methyl bromide decision, the D.C. Circuit criticized Baur and
other cases that apparently allowed standing whenever there was any increased
risk of injury. 50 9 The D.C. Circuit stated:
NRDC contends, and several other courts of appeals have suggested, that
an increase in probability itself constitutes an "actual or imminent" injury..
. Put another way, the fact that governmental action or inaction increases
the likelihood of injury-regardless of the magnitude of the increaseconstitutes injury in the constitutional sense. Strictly speaking, this cannot
be correct. For example, if the original probability of harm is 1 in 100
billion per person per year, doubling the probability to 2 in 100 billion
would still leave an individual with a trivial chance of injury. The Baur
court acknowledged the "potential expansiveness of recognizing exposure
"Expansiveness" is an
to enhanced risk as injury-in-fact." ....
understatement.

5 10

The D.C. Circuit is correct that some risks are too trivial to justify standing.
The risk in Baur, however, was more than a trivial one in 100 billion risk.
Let us suppose it was a one in ten million risk. Some would certainly argue that
such a risk should be enough to justify standing. Yet there are limits to judicial
resources. Even if it might seem appropriate to grant standing in a case like
Baur, the one in one million standard may be necessary to exclude relatively
insignificant cases that would clog the courts. Any type of standing threshold is
likely to exclude merited cases, yet the absence of any threshold could result in
an excessively large work load for the federal courts.
There may be another way to present the evidence in Baur that might
justify standing. Suppose surveys demonstrated that fewer people ate meat
because of fear of contracting vCJD. As an example, in 2008, there were mass
protests in South Korea after the government proposed to allow the importation
of U.S. beef, which has been banned in that country since 2003 after the first
508.
509.
510.

Id.
at 643.
NRDC I,440 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006), withdrawn, NRDC II, 464 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2006).
NRDC 1, 440 F.3d at 484 (citations omitted); accord Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 9, at 10294.
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U.S. case of mad cow disease was discovered in Washington state. 5 11 In Japan,
beef consumption diminished because of fear of mad cow disease. 512 A person
who alleged that he stopped eating meat because of fear of contracting vCJD
arguably should have standing if a non-trivial number of persons also stopped
eating meat. This would be akin to the plaintiffs in Laidlaw not using the river
because of "reasonable concerns" about the pollution in the water. Perhaps
one's choice of what to eat is a non-quantitative issue based on more subjective
criteria like recreational or aesthetic activities. Courts should make exceptions
to the quantitative threshold if there are compelling qualitative reasons to hear a
case.
E.

Should the One in One Million StandardBe Used in All Cases?

In many cases, it may not be possible to calculate a risk, especially in
cases involving recreational or aesthetic activities. In those cases, courts should
use their best judgment in deciding whether the risk of injury meets the
"reasonable concerns" test in Laidlaw, discussed in Part II. The Supreme Court
in Laidlaw recognized standing where a plaintiff alleged that pollution
diminished their recreation activities or aesthetic enjoyment as long as the
plaintiff has "reasonable concerns." A concern about a one in one million risk
of serious illness is certainly reasonable, but even risks that cannot be
quantified may be reasonable grounds for standing based on the diminishment
of recreational or aesthetic interests. The Laidlaw Court acknowledged that it
was not clear whether the mercury pollution released by the defendant into the
river posed a serious health risk, but the Court took a precautionary approach
given the plaintiffs' reasonable fears about the impact of a toxic pollutant on
their recreational or aesthetic activities. 5 13 On the other hand, the district court
in Korsinsky appropriately concluded that a possible increased probability of
contracting relatively minor health problems from climate change was
insufficient for standing. 514 Courts will continue to make judgment calls in
deciding which cases are worthy of standing. The one in one million
presumption would be helpful in deciding some standing cases, but it will not
511. Kelly Olsen, Mad Cow Disease Fears Grip South Koreans, FOXNEwS.COM, May 29, 2008
(reporting protests of up to 10,000 person per day in Seoul, Korea against importation of United States
beef because of fears of mad cow disease), available at http://origin.foxnews.com/wires/
2008May29/0,4670,SKoreaMadCowMania,00.html.
512. James Brooke, In Japan, Beef Business Sinks in a Sea of Skepticism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/1 1/04/world/in-japan-beef-business-sinks-in-a-sea-ofskepticism.html. Similarly, in 2000, sales of beef in France plummeted because of fear of mad cow
disease. Chris Marsden, France gripped by fear of deathsfrom Mad Cow Disease, WORLD SOCIALIST
WEB SITE, Nov. 9, 2000, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/nov2000/fbse-nO9.shtml (last visited July
21, 2009).
513. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-83 (2000).
514. Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 1528, 2005 WL 1423345, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21778, at
*6-8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005), aff'd, 192 Fed. Appx. 71 (2d Cir. Aug. 10, 2006).
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resolve every case. Ideally, Congress could enact a statute or series of statutes
that determine under what circumstances the one in one million standard is
appropriate.
CONCLUSION

In light of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan, and the
Supreme Court's decisions in Akins and Laidlaw, federal courts should reject
Public Citizen's hostile approach to cases involving probabilistic injury.
Although Lujan's requirement of a concrete and imminent injury could be
5 15
interpreted to forbid any suit based on a probabilistic risk of future injury,
Justice Kennedy's crucial concurring opinion in Lujan emphasized that
Congress may define new types of injuries that were not traditionally
5 16
recognized at common law, presumably including probabilistic injuries.
Akins recognized that large numbers of plaintiffs may sue as long as each has a
concrete and particularized injury. 5 17 Additionally, Akins suggested that the
rule against suits involving generalized grievances is a largely prudential
barrier that Congress can waive in most circumstances. 5 18 A plaintiff with a
risk of being injured by a pollutant or defective consumer good has an injury at
least as concrete as the plaintiffs in Akins who sought information on political
contributions. 5 19 Further, the Laidlaw decision implicitly suggested that
probabilistic standing is valid when it allowed the plaintiffs in that case to sue
based on "reasonable concerns" about future injury." 520 The First, Second,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have allowed suits based on threatened harms in the
future, although they have differed to some extent on how significant the risk
must be to justify standing. 52 1 Further, the Mountain States, LEAN and NRDC
II decisions appropriately allowed standing for probabilistic injuries despite the
522
D.C. Circuit's overly stringent substantial probability test.
At least some suits alleging future risks from government action involve
procedural violations by the government. These suits are entitled to more
lenient standing criteria. Justice Scalia's Lujan opinion recognized that in

515. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Hsu, supra note 3, at 466-69.
516. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part); Leiter, supra note 9, at 400; Mank,
supra note 9, at 35.
517. See supra Parts IV and VI.C.
518. See Brown, supra note 80, at 689-94 (arguing Akins recognized that Congress has substantial
authority to define standing ights in a statute and thus is inconsistent with Lujan); Mank, supra note 32,
at 1714-15 (arguing that Akins treated the prohibition against generalized grievances as a largely
prudential barrier that Congress can waive, although the decision did not resolve all constitutional
questions about Congress's authority to define standing); Sunstein, supra note 324, at 636-37, 644-45,
671-75 (same); see supra Parts IV and VI.C.
519. Akins, 524 U.S. at 13-21.
520. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
521. See supra Parts II.B-E.
522. See supra Parts HI.A.2, 111.B and III.C.2.
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procedural rights cases courts must relax the imminence and redressability
requirements of standing. 523 Applying a relaxed standing approach in a
procedural rights case, Massachusetts recognized that incremental remedies are
sufficient for standing even if the remedy cannot solve the entire regulatory
issue. 524 As such, this approach supports suits by plaintiffs who seek redress
for procedural violations if the remedy can reduce the plaintiffs future risk of
injury.
Professor Elliott raises an interesting question in asking whether it was
appropriate for the NRDC II decision to give greater standing rights to larger
organizations. 52 5 Pursuant to the Hunt test, standing for large organizations is
appropriate as long as individual members do not have to participate in the
selection of the remedy. 526 Because
suits alleging
government
underenforcement of the law seek prospective relief rather than damages, 52 7 the
third prong of the Hunt test is no barrier to increased risk of harm cases.
The answer to Professor Elliott's concern that NRDC II gives greater
standing rights to large organizations is not to eliminate associational standing,
but to enhance individual standing. While public interest organizations have
many virtues, one should not have to join a large public interest organization to
sue the government. The one in one million risk of serious harm standing
threshold would allow individuals to sue without being members of large
public interest organizations. A one in one million risk of death or serious
injury is the most plausible quantitative threshold for standing because it is the
most common risk threshold used by agencies, although other thresholds are
sometimes used. 528 The one in one million standard is compatible with the one
in 129,000 or one in 200,000 risk in NRDC II. A one in one million standard
would also limit the number of probabilistic suits and thus avoid the concern in
the Public Citizen II decision that such suits would overtax limited judicial
529
resources.
A one in one million risk-based approach to standing would expand
standing rights for individuals or smaller organizations that cannot show that at
least one of their members will be harmed in the future. A one in one million
increased risk of a serious injury in the future is a sufficiently concrete risk to
justify standing because regulatory agencies have most often used this standard
as the threshold for regulation, as is discussed in Part VII. An individual whose
523. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
524. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523-25 (2007).
525. Elliott, supranote 17, at 504-06.
526. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); see supra Part VL.A.
527. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975); Roche, supra note 60, at 1499.
528. See Wagner, supra note 465, at 838 n.241 (observing that Congress and agencies most often
use one in one million risk standard, although they sometimes use one in ten thousand standard); see
supra Part VII.B.
529. See Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007), modified after rehearing,Public
Citizen I, 513 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam); supra notes 301, 487 and accompanying text.
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risk of serious injury is increased by at least one in one million ought to be able
to sue the government to challenge its underenforcement of the law.
This Article's proposed quantitative risk in some cases will expand the
standing rights of plaintiffs alleging that they are at an increased risk of nontrivial harm from the government's underenforcement of the law. The Baur
decision rejected a quantitative approach to standing because it feared that such
an approach would narrow standing rights.5 30 The Baur decision, however,
failed to recognize that a quantitative test in some circumstances can enable a
plaintiff to sue if she meets a threshold standard even if she or the association
to which she belongs cannot prove that at least one person will be seriously
injured by a government action. For example, if the plaintiffs in Public Citizen
had been able to show that the government's tire regulations placed them at an
elevated risk of injury of more than one in one million compared to alternative
regulations that they alleged were mandated, they should have been able to sue.
This Article's approach to standing recognizes that some risks are not
easily quantified, especially recreational and aesthetic values. Courts should
continue to recognize qualitative standing where quantification is difficult or
inappropriate. Following Laidlaw, courts would continue to allow suits if a
plaintiff can demonstrate that she has avoided or reduced recreational use of an
area because of "reasonable concerns" about pollution. 53 1 The proposed one in
one million standard would only decide cases where there are no reasonable
concerns about recreational and aesthetic issues.
A quantitative test can supplement today's mostly qualitative approach to
standing. Parts II and III demonstrate that courts apply the Court's standing test
in widely divergent ways. Where good statistical data is available, a
quantitative test would allow judges to be more consistent and fair to plaintiffs
and defendants.
SUMMERS ADDENDUM

Just prior to this Article's publication, the Supreme Court issued its five to
four decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, rejecting the dissent's

proposal for organizational standing based upon the statistical probability that
some of an organization's members would be harmed in the future by the
government's allegedly illegal actions. 532 Several environmental organizations
had filed suit to enjoin the U.S. Forest Service from applying its regulations to
exempt the Burnt Ridge Project in the Sequoia National Forest-a salvage sale
of timber on 238 acres of fire-damaged federal land-from the notice,

530. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 643 (2d Cir. 2003); Craig, supra note 1, at 200.
531. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
532. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151-53 (2009). Justice Scalia's majority
opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Alito. Id. at 1146.
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg. Id.
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comment, and appeal process that Congress requires the Forest Service to apply
to "more significant land management decisions." 533 The district court granted
a preliminary injunction against the Burnt Ridge salvage-timber sale and the
parties settled their dispute over that Project. 534 Despite the government's
argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing as soon as they settled the Burnt
Ridge Project dispute, the district court proceeded to decide the merits of the
plaintiffs' challenges by invalidating five of the Forest Service's regulations
and entered a nationwide injunction against their application.5 35 The Ninth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs' challenges to regulations not at issue in the
Burnt Ridge Project were not ripe for adjudication, but affirmed the district
court's conclusion that two regulations applicable to the Burnt Ridge Project
were contrary to law, and upheld the nationwide injunction against their
53 6
application.
In Summers, Justice Scalia's majority opinion concluded that the plaintiffs
no longer satisfied the injury prong of the standing test once they settled the
Burnt Ridge Project dispute. 537 The plaintiffs had initially satisfied the injury
requirement by submitting an affidavit alleging that organization member Ara
Marderosian had repeatedly visited the Burnt Ridge site, that he had imminent
plans to visit the site again, and that the government's actions would harm his
aesthetic interest in viewing the flora and fauna at the site. 538 The settlement,
however, had remedied Marderosian's injury and no other affidavit submitted
by the plaintiffs alleged that the Forest Service's application of the challenged
regulations was causing a particular organization member an imminent injury at
539
a specific site.
In its Summers decision, the Supreme Court for the first time specifically
addressed the question of probabilistic standing based on potential future
injuries to an organization's members. The Sierra Club asserted in its pleadings
that it has more than 700,000 members nationwide, including thousands of
members in California who use and enjoy the Sequoia National Forest.
Therefore, the Sierra Club argued that it was probable that the Forest Service's
application of its challenged regulations would harm at least one of its
members. 540 Justice Scalia's majority opinion rejected the plaintiffs'

533. Id. at 1147; see Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 102381, Tit. III, § 322, 106 Stat. 1419, note following 16 U.S.C. § 1612. (requiring the Forest Service to
establish a notice, comment, and appeal process for "proposed actions of the Forest Service concerning
projects and activities implementing land and resource management plans developed under the Forest
and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974").
534. Summers, 129 S.Ct. at 1148.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. ld.at 1149-50.
538. Id.at 1149.
539. Id.at 1149-51.
540. Id.at 1151.
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probabilistic standing argument because "[t]his novel approach to the law of
organizational standing would make a mockery of our prior cases, which have
required plaintiff-organizations to make specific allegations establishing that at
least one identified member had suffered or would suffer harm." 54 1 He
maintained that a court cannot rely on an organization's general assertions
about its members' activities and that the Court's precedent required an
organizational member to file an individual affidavit confirming that he or she
uses the affected site and that his or her recreational interests will harmed by
the government's alleged failure to comply with legal requirements.5 42 Justice
Scalia argued, "While it is certainly possible-perhaps even likely-that one
543
individual will meet all of these criteria, that speculation does not suffice."
The majority rejected all affidavits introduced by the plaintiffs after the district
court entered its judgment and after they had filed a notice of appeal because
the majority concluded that such late supplementation of the record was
inappropriate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure despite the dissenting
opinion's contrary view. 54 4 Because it concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
establish standing, the Court did not address the Forest Service's contention
that the case was not ripe for review or whether a nationwide injunction would
545
have been appropriate if the plaintiffs had prevailed.
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion argued that the plaintiffs had standing
because their members were likely to be affected by the government's allegedly
illegal salvage timber sales in the future. 546 He acknowledged that the Court
had used the term "imminent" in its standing decisions, but he argued that the
majority had inappropriately used the term to bar standing in contrast to
previous decisions that had used that term to reject standing only where the
alleged harm was merely "hypothetical," "conjectural," "or otherwise
speculative." 54 7 Justice Breyer argued that the majority's use of the "imminent"
test was inappropriate where a plaintiff has "already been subject to the injury
it wishes to challenge," as it had in the case at issue, and that prior decisions in
cases involving prior harm had asked "whether there is a realistic likelihood
548
that the challenged future conduct will, in fact, recur and harm the plaintiff.
In Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court stated that the plaintiff, who had been
subject to an unlawful police chokehold in the past, "would have had standing
had he shown 'a realistic threat' that reoccurrence of the challenged activity

541,
542,
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.

Id.
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.
Id. at
Id at
Id.at

1151-52.
1152.
1153.
1154-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1155.
1155-56 (emphasis in original).
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would cause him harm 'in the reasonably near future."' 54 9 Even though the
plaintiffs could not predict which tracts of fire-damage land the Forest Service
would sell as salvage without following the disputed procedural rules, Justice
Breyer concluded that there was a "realistic threat" that some member of the
plaintiff organizations would be harmed by a sale by the Forest Service, and,
550
therefore, that the plaintiffs ought to have standing.
Summers might appear to close the door to statistical standing, but there
are valid reasons to believe that probabilistic standing may continue to be an
issue in the future. First, Justice Breyer observed that if Congress had expressly
enacted a statute allowing standing for parties injured by salvage sales in the
past if they are likely to use salvage parcels in the future, provided that they
have objected to such sales in the past and would do so in the future, "[t]he
majority cannot, and does not, claim that such a statute would be
unconstitutional. ' 551 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy quoted his
concurring opinion in Lujan that "[t]his case would present different
considerations if Congress had sought to provide redress for a concrete injury
'giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy where none existed before."' 5 52 There is
a reasonable chance that Justice Breyer is correct and that the Court would find
standing if the statute at issue specifically approved probabilistic standing for
plaintiffs like those in Summers. It is possible that organizations such as Earth
Island Institute or the Sierra Club will lobby Congress to amend statutes to give
them standing in similar cases in the future.
Second, in light of the five to four split in Summers, if one of the Justices
in the majority were replaced by a new Justice who agrees with Justice
Breyer's approach of a "realistic threat" of injury, then the Court might
overturn Summers and allow probabilistic standing. Without overly simplifying
the complex relationship between politics and judicial decision making, it is
worth observing that all members of the Summers majority were appointed by
Republican presidents. As a senator, President Obama voted against the
confirmation of both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, both members of
the Summers majority. 553 His appointments as President are likely to represent

549. Id. at 1156 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.7, 108 (1983)) (emphasis added
by Justice Breyer).
550. Id. at 1156-58.
551. Id.at1155.
552. Id. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
572, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
553. C-Span.org, Final Senate Vote: Confirmation John Roberts (September 29, 2005),
http://www.c-span.org/congress/roberts_senate.asp (last visited July 21, 2009) (Senator Obama voted
against confirmation of Chief Justice Roberts); United States Senate, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th
Congress
2nd
Session
(January
31,
2006),
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll call lists/roll call votecfm.cfm?congress=109&session=2&vote=00002 (last visited July 21,
2009) (Senator Obama voted against confirmation of Justice Alito).
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a different judicial philosophy. Third, it may be possible to distinguish
Summers in some cases involving probabilistic standing; the author will address
that possibility in a future article.
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